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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from the Utah Court of Appeals' affirmation of the Third 
District Court's grant of judgment to Plaintiff Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. 
("Fairbourn") against Defendant American Housing Partners, Inc. ("American") in 
the principal amount of $153,000.00 plus attorneys' fees and costs in the amount 
of $45,001.00. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 78-
2a-4, Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. The Court of Appeals erred in a case of first impression in adopting the 
purported "majority rule," that the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable 
at closing" in a broker's listing agreement does not make closing of the underlying 
real estate transaction a condition precedent to a broker's receipt of commission 
where a majority of jurisdictions have expressly rejected such argument. A question 
of "contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence [is a] matter of 
law" and the appellate court accords "the trial court's interpretation no presumption 
of correctness." Lee v. Barnes. 1999 UT Ct. App. 126, fl 7, 977 P.2d 550 (citations 
omitted). 
II. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the phrase "all 
commissions shall be due and payable at closing" in a broker's listing agreement 
is unambiguous where there is a reasonable interpretation that such phrase means 
that payment of the broker's commission is conditioned upon closing of the 
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underlying real estate transaction. The trial court's interpretation of common law 
is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 
777, 778-79 (Utah 1992). 
III. The trial court erred in finding that the phrase "evidence of financial capability 
to close" contained in the Purchase Agreement between Rochelle and American 
was ambiguous. A trial court's determination that a writing is ambiguous is a 
conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. West Valley City v. Majestic 
Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah 1991: Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P. 2d 1234, 
1251 (Utah 1998). 
IV. If the Purchase Agreement is ambiguous, the trial court erred in implying that 
there was a meeting of the minds between American and Rochelle. A trial court's 
determination of whether an enforceable contract exists is a finding of fact that will 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 266-67 
(Utah 1987). 
V. The trial court erred in its admission of parol evidence that contradicted the 
plain language of the Purchase Agreement rather than clarified the Purchase 
Agreement. The trial court's admission of parol evidence is a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness. Glauser Storage. LLC, v. Smedley. 2001 Utah Ct. 
App. 141, If 14, 27 P.3d 565 (citations omitted). 
VI. The trial court erred in holding the alleged ambiguity of the Purchase 
Agreement against American. The trial court's interpretation of common law is a 
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conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777, 
778-79 (Utah 1992). 
VII. If the Purchase Agreement is ambiguous, the trial court erred in construing 
the extrinsic evidence of the intent of American and Rochelle. The trial court's 
construction of an ambiguous contract based on extrinsic evidence is a question of 
fact that is reviewed under clearly- erroneous standard. West Valley City v. Majestic 
InvestmtntCa, 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Craig Food Industries. 
Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P. 2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
VIII. The trial court erred in failing to apply Utah law, as set forth in Sproul v. 
Parks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 436 (Utah 1949), to the Purchase Agreement 
regarding who is a ready, willing, and able buyer. A question of "contract 
interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence [is a] matter of law" and the 
appellate court accords "the trial court's interpretation no presumption of 
correctness." Lee v. Barnes. 1999 UT Ct. App. 126, fl 7, 977 P.2d 550 (citations 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules which pertain to 
this appeal are fully set forth in the addenda hereto where not fully set forth in the 
body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 28, 2000, Fairbourn filed a Complaint against American and 
Armando J. Alvarez alleging breach of a Listing Agreement against both American 
and Mr. Alvarez and breach of broker standards (including treble damages) and 
tortious interference with economic relations against Mr. Alvarez. On April 5,2000, 
American and Mr. Alvarez filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was 
denied by the trial court on June 14,2000. On August 6 and 7,2001, the trial court 
held a bench trial. On August 29, 2001, the trial court heard oral argument on 
pre-trial and post-trial briefs. On October 29, 2001, the trial court entered a 
Memorandum Decision which incorporated the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court granted 
Fairbourn's claim for commission against American but denied its claims against 
Mr. Alvarez. On November 9,2001, Fairbourn filed a Motion to Modify Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law seeking to increase the principal amount awarded 
Fairbourn. On November 28, 2001, the trial court entered a Judgment which was 
amended and restated in a subsequent Judgment entered by the trial court on 
December 28,2001. On January 11,2002, American filed a Notice of Appeal. On 
April 3, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment in favor of 
Fairbourn, but on a theory not addressed at trial. On May 2, 2003, American 
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari which was granted on July 
10,2003. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In early 1999, Armando Alvarez ("Mr. Alvarez") approached James Fairbourn 
("Mr. Fairbourn") of Plaintiff Fairbourn Commercial Inc. ("Fairbourn"), a real estate 
brokerage, for assistance in selling a parcel of real property located in West Jordan, 
Utah (the "Property"). (R. 231; T. 53-54.) Mr. Alvarez was acting as a 
representative of Defendant American Housing Partners, Inc. ("American"). (R. 
231 ;T. 9.) 
American was wholly owned by Mr. Alvarez's brother, Sergio Alvarez. (R. 
231; T. 9.) American had entered into an agreement to buy the Property from its 
owners, the Coons. (R. 231; T. 39-41.) At the time that Alvarez began his 
conversations with Mr. Fairbourn, American had encountered considerable 
obstacles in gaining the approvals from the City of West Jordan necessary to 
develop the Property. (R. 231-2; T. 48-54.) These problems placed American's 
purchase agreement with the Coons in peril. (R. 232; T. 82-87.) 
During the first seven months of 1999, American pressed ahead on three 
fronts: the effort to gain municipal approval of its development plan; the effort to 
preserve the purchase agreement with the Coons; and the effort to find a buyer for 
the Property who would pay the Coons' selling price, put some money in American's 
pocket, and free American from its entanglements with West Jordan officials. (R. 
232; T. 38-87.) Mr. Fairbourn and Fairbourn were enlisted to aid American in the 
third undertaking. (R. 232-33.) Mr. Fairbourn proposed that American seek a buyer 
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for the Property marketed as "paper lots" - lots which had received plat approval 
but which had not been improved. (R. 232; T. 53-54,171-72, 306-07.) 
The pressure on American to act mounted in late July 1999 when the Coons 
notified American that they were "ending and terminating any and ail agreements" 
relating to the Property because American had failed to close. (R. 232; T. 82-83.) 
In late August 1999, the Coons agreed to reinstate their contract of sale with 
American through December 1, 1999. (R. 232; T. 85.) As American worked to 
salvage the deal with the Coons it scored a success with West Jordan when it 
persuaded the City to approve the necessary zoning for the Property if American 
would acquire an adjacent parcel of property owned by an opponent of American's 
proposed development. (R. 232; T. 247.) 
In this uncertain setting, Fairbourn moved ahead with the performance of its 
task. (R. 232.) Through a contact with real estate agent Marshall Larson ("Mr. 
Larson"), who later became employed by Fairbourn, Fairbourn learned of a 
potential buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. ("Rochelle").1 (R. 232-3; T. 309-10.) 
Rochelle was an affiliate of Liberty Homes, a residential home builder in the Salt 
Lake City area. (R. 233; T. 219, 310.) 
1Fairbourn therefore representep! both the seller, American, and the buyer, 
Rochelle in this matter under a "dual agency" listing arrangement. Mr. Alvarez 
was not representing American as a real estate agent in this transaction, 
contrary to the statement of facts of this matter by the Court of Appeals. 
Fairbourn at ^ 6 (Addenda "A", "B" and "C" attached hereto). (R. 234-35; T. 315.) 
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In early August 1999, Rochelle made a preliminary proposal to buy the 
Property. (R. 233; R. 411, Ex. No. 1; T. 55-56.) Rochelle's proposal, presented in 
the form of "an official notice of intent" letter, led to a meeting among 
representatives of American, Rochelle, and Fairbourn. (R. 233; T. 57-60.) 
Numerous elements of possible transactions were discussed at the meeting, 
including a remark by Mr. Alvarez that any deal must include a provision concerning 
the buyer's ability to perform. (R. 233; T. 59-60, 311-12.) Mr. Fairbourn, who 
attended the meeting, was aware of the exigent circumstances in which American 
found itself and recognized that American had a legitimate interest in securing a 
buyer who could be counted on to perform. (R. 233; T. 312.) 
On August 13,1999, Rochelle made an offer to buy the Property. (R. 233; 
R. 410, Ex. No. 2; T. 62.) The offer was presented through a preprinted Real Estate 
Purchase Contract and a handwritten addendum. (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 1.) It 
was accompanied by a Single Party Listing and Sale Agreement (the "Listing 
Agreement") which obligated American to pay Fairbourn a $1,500.00 per lot 
commission if Rochelle bought the Property for $2,277,000.00 cash. (R. 233; R. 
410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "D" attached hereto.) The Listing Agreement indicates 
that the Property contained "approx (sic) 99 undeveloped lots." (R. 233; R. 410, 
Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "D" attached hereto.) 
The Listing Agreement also states that Fairbourn is to procure an offer from 
Rochelle "at the price and upon the terms set forth herein" and "upon any other 
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terms or conditions acceptable to" American. (R. 410; R. 410, Ex. No. 3.; 
Addendum "D" attached hereto.) The Listing Agreement further states that "all 
commissions shall be due and payable at closing." (R. 410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum 
"D" attached hereto, emphasis added.) 
American rejected Rochelle's offer because it was inconsistent with what was 
discussed at the prior meeting. (R. 233; T. 62, 312.) Rochelle presented a second 
offer several days later which was met with a counteroffer. (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 
5; T. 63-64; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) American's counteroffer was 
presented in typewritten form and incorporated the terms of Rochelle's second offer 
while adding several new provisions. (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" 
attached hereto.) Among the new provisions was a term titled "Financial 
Capability." (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) This 
term stated: 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement 
by both parties, buyer shall supply to seller with evidence 
of financial capability to close on the Property within the 
time frame reference above. In the event Buyer is unable 
to provide said evidence, Seller shall at its sole option 
cancel this Agreement and neither party shall have any 
further obligation to the other. 
(R. 234; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) (Hereinafter this 
paragraph shall be referred to as "Paragraph 3.") 
Mr. Alvarez inserted Paragraph 3 into the counteroffer because under the 
terms of the proposed sale Rochelle's duty to perform was not contingent on its 
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acquisition of financing pursuant to paragraph two of the Purchase Contract; 
therefore he wanted evidence of Rochelle's ability to perform. (R. 234; R. 410, Ex. 
No. 5; T. 225-27; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) While the printed contract 
provision regarding financing, when elected, excuses the buyer's duty to perform 
if he is unable to obtain financing under the specified terms, the buyer is required 
pursuant to paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract to make timely application for 
financing. (R. 234; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) If financing 
is unavailable on the terms agreed to in the Purchase Contract, a buyer may 
nevertheless insist that the seller perform by "providing Seller with absolute 
assurance" that the proceeds required to close the sale are available. (R. 234; R. 
410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) Mr. Alvarez believed that the 
Paragraph 3 inserted into the counteroffer would serve as an equivalent substitute 
for these "buyer's undertakings" which did not apply to Rochelle because it did not 
elect to make its purchase contingent on financing. (R. 234; R. 225-27.) 
The parties met on August 30,1999, the day the counteroffer was accepted. 
(R. 234; T. 88-90.) At the meeting they reviewed the terms of the sale and made 
several changes to the counteroffer by interlineation. (R. 234; T. 90.) Before they 
entered into the sales contract for the purchase of the Property for a purchase price 
of $2,272,000, Paragraph 3 was discussed at the meeting. (R. 234; R. 410, Ex. No. 
5; T. 89, 318-19; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) American expected Rochelle to 
provide within fourteen days evidence of cash on hand, an existing line of credit 
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available to fund the purchase, a loan commitment, or similar proof of Rochelle's 
ability to fund the purchase. (T. 77, 100-02, 224-25.) Mr. Larson, a real estate 
agent then employed by Fairbourn, who represented Rochelle under the terms of 
a dual agency agreement, believed that Mr. Alvarez intended to require a letter from 
Rochelle's bank in the form of an unofficial loan commitment. (R. 234-5; T. 400, 
418.) 
On or about September 10,1999, Rochelle provided American with a letter 
from First Security Bank ("First Security") which stated that First Security "would not 
expect having difficulty making acquisition and development loans in the future" 
regarding Rochelle but noting that "[a]n acquisition and development loan would be 
subject to committee approval." (R. 235; R. 410, Ex. No. 7; Addendum "E" attached 
hereto.) Prior to receipt of this letter American did not know that Rochelle intended 
to fund the purchase price from a future loan, although Mr. Larson representing 
Rochelle did as an employee of Fairbourn. (T. 195.) 
American rejected the First Security letter as insufficient evidence of financial 
capability to close, because the funding was conditioned upon approval of a loan 
from First Security. (R. 235; T. 168-70.) Mr. Alvarez had previous experience with 
First Security declining to make a loan after obtaining assurances of financing 
without having first received a commitment. (T. 169-70.) As a result of further 
communication between American and Fairbourn, Mr. Larson then asked First 
Security to issue a binding loan commitment for the benefit of Rochelle. (T. 248, 
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252-55.) Rochelle then provided American a second letter, dated September 17, 
1999, from First Security which made reference to existing lines of credit (none of 
which were available for acquisition and development of lots) and stated that an "A 
& D loan is considered on it's [sic] own merits" and that a loan "would be contingent 
upon the acquisition and development loan receiving committee approval." (R. 410, 
Ex. No. 11; T. 239; Addendum "F" attached hereto.) Again the letter did not specify 
that Rochelle could obtain a loan, that it could do so on its own account or that it 
could do it within the prescribed time frame. (R. 410, Ex. No. 11; T. 239; Addendum 
"F" attached hereto.) 
On September 21,1999, finding the second First Security letter unacceptable 
as evidence of financial capability to close due to the contingency of committee 
approval, American canceled the Purchase Agreement with Rochelle in writing. (R. 
236; R. 410, Ex. No. 12.) Rochelle then reclaimed its earnest money deposit. (T. 
283.) 
Cy Simon ("Mr. Simon"), an employee of First Security, testified that loans to 
Liberty and various Rochelle entities were all guaranteed by each other and its 
principals because the bank was insecure about relying only upon one entity. (T. 
232-34.) In the process of preparing the First Security letters and even though he 
never spoke with Mr. Alvarez, Mr. Simon was asked to provide an absolute loan 
commitment but he stated that he could not provide a binding commitment for the 
bank. (T. 248.) Providing a loan to Rochelle would be contingent upon factors such 
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as the economy, credit worthiness, interest rates, and the supply and demand for 
lots. (R. 236; T. 236-38.) Lines of credit mentioned in the September 17, 1999 
First Security letter were not available to Rochelle or for acquisition of the Property. 
(T. 249.) 
When advised of the termination, Mr. Fairbourn apologized to Alvarez and 
made no objection about the loss of the sale or a commission. (T. 186-87,194.) 
Mr. Fairbourn acknowledged in his deposition, which was read into the record at 
trial, that "we never did establish if Rochelle could perform or not." (T. 373-74.) Mr. 
Larsen testified that he was embarrassed because his buyer could not perform. (T. 
455-56.) Alvarez testified that he did not terminate the Purchase Agreement 
because of any ill will to Mr. Larson or Mr. Fairbourn. (T. 196.) Mr. Fairbourn 
concluded at his deposition, which was read into the record at trial, that American 
had not acted in bad faith in terminating the Purchase Agreement. (T. 361-62.) 
American eventually sold the Property to Leon Peterson. (T. 127.) American 
did not commence negotiation with Mr. Peterson until after termination of the 
Purchase Agreement with Rochelle and it was not an incentive for American to 
terminate the Purchase Agreement as ruled by the trial court on the facts presented 
at trial. (R. 493-94.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the 
purported "majority rule," that the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable 
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at closing" in the Listing Agreement does not make the closing of the underlying 
real estate transaction a condition precedent to broker's receipt of commission, 
because a majority of jurisdictions considering the issue have expressly rejected 
such argument. Alternatively, the Listing Agreement is ambiguous with regard to 
payment of commissions and such ambiguity should be held against Fairbourn as 
the drafter of the Listing Agreement. 
The trial court erred in finding that the language of Paragraph 3 of the 
Purchase Agreement between Rochelle and American, that required Rochelle to 
produce evidence within fourteen days of the execution of the Purchase Agreement 
of its financial capability to close the purchase, was ambiguous. The language 
regarding the financial capability of Rochelle as contained in Paragraph 3 of the 
Purchase Agreement has a plain and usual meaning and has been defined in case 
law in this jurisdiction as well as others. Pursuant to its plain meaning and 
applicable case law, Rochelle was not a "capable" and/or "able" buyer. Fairbourn 
does not claim an alternative definition of Paragraph 3 but the trial court 
nevertheless rewrote such paragraph. 
If Paragraph 3 does not have a plain meaning, Rochelle and American had 
vastly differing views of what was required to establish financial capability and 
consequently Rochelle and American did not have a meeting of the minds 
regarding an essential and material element of the Purchase Agreement. If 
Paragraph 3 is ambiguous, the trial court erred in its admission of parol evidence 
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that contradicted Paragraph 3 rather than clarified it. If the language of Paragraph 
3 is ambiguous, the trial court erred in holding such ambiguity against American as 
the drafter of the same. If Paragraph 3 is ambiguous regarding the "evidence of 
financial capability to close," the trial court erred in construing the parol evidence 
regarding the intent of American and Rochelle when entering into the Purchase 
Agreement. 
The trial court erred in determining that American failed to communicate to 
Rochelle its expectations of the evidence of Rochelle's financial capability that it 
would find satisfactory. It also erred in failing to impute the knowledge of Rochelle's 
agent, Mr. Larson, to Rochelle regarding what evidence of Rochelle's financial 
ability to close Rochelle needed to provide American to satisfy Paragraph 3. 
The trial court erred in failing to find that Fairbourn had met its contractual 
duties under the Listing Agreement to provide American an "able" buyer pursuant 
to Utah law as set forth in Sproul v. Parks. 116 Utah 368, 210 P. 2d 436 Utah 
(1949). 
ARGUMENT 
I. IN A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED 
IN ADOPTING THE PURPORTED "MAJORITY RULE," THAT THE PHRASE 
"ALL COMMISSIONS SHALL BE DUE AND PAYABLE AT CLOSING" IN THE 
LISTING AGREEMENT DOES NOT MAKE THE CLOSING OF THE 
UNDERLYING REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO 
BROKER'S RECEIPT OF COMMISSION, BECAUSE A MAJORITY OF 
JURISDICTIONS HAVE REJECTED SUCH ARGUMENT. 
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In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the 
purported "majority rule," that the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable 
at closing" in the Listing Agreement does not make the closing of the underlying 
real estate transaction a condition precedent to broker's receipt of commission, 
because a majority of jurisdictions considering the issue have expressly rejected 
such argument. This issue found to be controlling by the Court of Appeals was not 
argued before the trial court, nor was it briefed by the parties to the Court of 
Appeals. The ruling by the Court of Appeals does violence to the plain language 
of the Listing Agreement and actually adopts a minority position on this issue rather 
than the majority view as stated by the Court of Appeals. The actual majority of 
courts interpreting similar language have held that such language makes payment 
of the commission to the broker conditioned upon the closing of the underlying real 
estate transaction. 
In adopting the purported "majority rule", the Court of Appeals cited three 
cases to support its determination that such an interpretation is a majority view 
regarding this issue. Fairbourn Commercial. Inc. v. American Housing Partners. 
Inc.. 2003 Utah Ct. App. 98, 68 P.3d 1038 at fl 21, FN 3 (Addendum "A" attached 
hereto). The Court of Appeals also cited two cases to set forth the purported 
"minority rule." JdL Of the three cases cited by the Court of Appeals supporting its 
decision, one has been subsequently overturned, one is an unpublished opinion 
which should not be cited or used pursuant to Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of 
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Judicial Administration and furthermore does stand for the proposition for which it 
is cited by the Court of Appeals, and the third does not stand for the proposition for 
which it is cited by the Court of Appeals ruling but rather holds that similar contract 
language is ambiguous with such ambiguity to be held against the drafter of the 
same. The two cases cited by the Court of Appeals for the purported "minority 
position" do stand for the proposition that similar language is unambiguous and 
conditions payment of commission upon the closing of the underlying real estate 
transaction. American believes that this interpretation is in reality the majority view 
of courts considering this issue. 
Following is a detailed discussion and a presentation of the cases cited by 
the Court of Appeals and a comparison of law demonstrating that the actual 
majority position interpreting such phrase requires a closing before the broker's 
commission is earned. 
A. Current Mew Jersey Law Holds That All Broker Listing 
Agreements Contain an Implied Condition That a Commission is 
Due Only if The Underlying Real Estate Transaction is 
Consummated. 
Current New Jersey law holds that all broker listing agreements contain the 
implied condition that a commission is due only if the underlying real estate 
transaction is consummated. Ellsworth Dobbs. Inc. v. Johnson. 50 N.J. 528, 236 
A.2d843(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1967). 
The Court of Appeals cited the 1937 New Jersey case Samuel R. Laden. Inc. 
v. Lidgerwood Estates. Inc.. 15 N.J. Misc. 498,192 A. 425,428 (Essex County Ct. 
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1937) to support its ruling adopting the purported "majority rule" that the phrase "all 
commission shall be due and payable at closing" does not condition payment of 
broker's commission upon the completion of the underlying real estate transaction. 
However, Laden is not current law in the state of New Jersey, but was in fact 
overturned by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1967 by Dobbs. Dobbs. supra. 
In Dobbs. the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from the traditional rule 
that a broker is not an insurer of the underlying real estate transaction and held that 
if the underlying real estate transaction is not consummated, the broker has no right 
to commission from the seller. Dobbs at 855. Dobbs stands for the proposition that 
all broker listing agreements contain an implicit condition that the underlying real 
estate transaction be consummated before the broker earns his or her commission. 
IdL 
As discussed in Section I.F below, the Dobbs decision has proven to be a 
landmark decision establishing the minority position that commission under a 
broker contract is not earned absent a closing. See e.g.. Mulliken, When Does the 
Seller Owe The Broker A Commission? A Discussion of the Law and What it 
Teaches About Listing Agreements. 132 Mil. L. Rev. 265 (1991) (Addendum "G" 
attached hereto); and Note, Arguing for the Minority Rule: An Efficient Approach to 
Real Estate Brokerage Contracts. 82 B.U. L. Rev. 195 (2002) (Addendum "H" 
attached hereto). The Court of Appeals' reliance on New Jersey law is misplaced 
in that New Jersey law currently holds that all listing agreements implicitly condition 
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payment of the broker's commission upon consummation of the underlying real 
estate transaction. Dobbs. supra. 
B. The Utah Court of Appeals Violated Rule 4-508 of The Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration in Relying Upon an Unpublished 
Opinion of a Connecticut Trial Court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals violated Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration in relying upon the unpublished opinion of the Waterbury Superior 
Court of Connecticut, Finno Dev.. Inc. v. Smedes Realty. No. CV010163687S, 2001 
Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 995 (April 11, 2001). Fairbourn at U 21, F.N. 3. 
Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration states: 
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential 
value and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except 
for purposes of applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res 
judicata, or collateral estoppel. . . For the purposes of this rule, any 
memorandum decision, per curiam opinion, or other disposition of the 
court designated "not for official publication" shall be regarded as an 
unpublished opinion. 
The Finno opinion has been designated by the Waterbury Superior Court as 
an unpublished opinion, stating "this decision is unreported and may be subject to 
further appellate review." Finno at * 1 . The Court of Appeals' reliance upon Finno 
is therefore in violation of Rule 4-508 and the Finno opinion should have no or little 
weight in resolving the current dispute. 
C. The Utah Court of Appeals Erred in Its Interpretation of The Finno 
Opinion. 
Even if Finno were not an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals erred 
in its statement that it stands for the proposition that the phrase "due and payable 
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at closing" is unambiguous and does not condition payment of commission upon 
closing of the underlying real estate transaction. The court in Finno held that the 
term "'listing agent shall be paid a 5% real estate commission by the seller directly 
within 72 hours from the date of closing' . . . simply establishes the time for the 
commission to be paid, i.e., within 72 hours of the closing." I d at *3-*4. The court 
went on to hold that even if the disputed terms "were equally susceptible of two 
different meanings, that favoring the party who did not draw up the contract will be 
applied." ]dL at *5 (citations omitted). 
In the dispute at hand, Fairbourn drafted the Listing Agreement and therefore 
any ambiguity of the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable at closing" 
should be held against it pursuant to Finno as argued below in Section II. 
Furthermore, the Listing Agreement states that "all commissions shall be due and 
payable at closing." Fairbourn at % 21, F.N. 3 (emphasis added) (Addendum "A" 
attached hereto). The use of the word "due" in the Listing Agreement further 
clarifies that the commission to be paid Fairbourn would not be owing until closing 
occurred. Such language was not contained in the listing agreement identified in 
the Finno opinion. Finno at *3. 
D. The Utah Court of Appeals Erred in Its Interpretation of Nebraska 
Law. 
The Nebraska case law cited by the Utah Court of Appeals does not stand 
for the proposition for which it was cited by the Utah Court of Appeals. Fairbourn 
atf l 21 F.N. 3 (Addendum "A" attached hereto). The Utah Court of Appeals cited 
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Don J. McMurray Co. v. Wiesman. 199 Neb. 494, 260 N.W.2d 196 (1977) to 
support its adoption of the purported "majority rule" that the phrase "all commissions 
shall be due and payable at closing" does not indicate that closing is a condition 
precedentto a broker's receipt of commission. Fairboumat^21 F.N. 3 (Addendum 
"A" attached hereto). However, McMurray does not support such conclusion, but 
rather stands for the proposition that similar phrasing is ambiguous and should be 
construed against the drafter of such language, as argued below in Section II. Id. 
at 201-02. 
The language contained in the broker agreement in McMurray is quite 
different than the language of the Listing Agreement. McMurray involved a loan 
transaction with relatively complex language regarding the payment of a brokerage 
commission, as follows: 
14. A 2% Good Faith Fee in the amount of $18,000.00 payable to Don 
J. McMurray Co. is enclosed with the application. If a commitment is 
issued based substantially in accordance with the terms and 
conditions outlined in this application, this check would be cashed by 
the Don J. McMurray Co. and you would be given full credit for this 
amount at the time of final loan closing as the 2% fee which is our 
charge for the handling of the loan. If a commitment is not issued 
based substantially in accordance with the above terms and 
conditions, then this check would be returned to you and there would 
be no fee due or payable to Don J. McMurray Co. However, if a 
commitment is issued on terms and conditions different than set forth 
in this application, but still acceptable by you, then a fee in the amount 
of 2% of the loan amount would be due and payable to the Don J. 
McMurray Co. on the same basis as outlined above. 
Id. at 198-99. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that such language was 
ambiguous as to whether payment of commission was conditioned upon closing of 
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the loan. ja\ at 201. The Nebraska Supreme Court proceeded to rule that the trial 
court had properly received extrinsic evidence regarding the interpretation of such 
clause and noted that the "language of an ambiguous contract prepared by one 
party is generally to be given such consideration as the other party would be fairly 
justified in giving it." |cL at 202 (citations omitted). 
A correct application of the legal reasoning stated in McMurray would hold 
that the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable at closing" is ambiguous 
and should be held against the drafter, Fairbourn, as argued below in Section II. 
The Court of Appeals has erred in citing McMurray for the proposition that the 
phrase "due and payable at closing", is unambiguous and does not condition 
payment of the broker's commission upon closing of the underlying real estate 
transaction. Fairbourn at ^ 21 F.N. 3 (Addendum "A" attached hereto). 
E. A Majority of Courts Holding Similar Language to be 
Nonambiguous, Have Held it to Mean That Payment of Broker's 
Commissions is Contingent Upon Closing of The Underlying Real 
Estate Transaction. 
A majority of courts holding that language similar to that contained in the 
Listing Agreement to be unambiguous, have held that such language conditions 
payment of the broker's commission upon closing of the underlying real estate 
transaction. 
The two cases cited by the Court of Appeals for the purported "minority 
position" do stand for the proposition cited by the Court of Appeals. (As argued 
herein, American believes that this interpretation is in reality the majority view of 
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courts considering this issue.) In Arvida. the broker agreement stated that "a 
commission is payable at the closing of the real estate transaction." Arvida Realty 
Sales. Inc. v. William R. Tinnerman & Co.. 536 So.2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1988). The Fourth District Court of Appeals in Florida held that such "language 
is clear and unambiguous, and as a matter of law, means no closing, no 
commission." idL. (citations omitted). The Fairbourn Listing Agreement states that 
"all commissions shall be due and payable at closing." Fairbourn at ^ 21, F.N. 3 
(emphasis added) (Addendum "A" attached hereto). The use of the word "due" in 
the Listing Agreement further clarifies that the commission to be paid Fairbourn 
would not be owing until closing occurred. Such language was not contained in the 
listing agreement referred to in the Arvida opinion. I d 
In Doss, the broker's agreement stated that the commission "is payable to 
[broker] only upon a sale/closing." Doss v. Moses & Sloan P'ship. C.A. No. L-88-
212,1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 845, at * 5 (March 17,1989). The Sixth Appellate Court 
of Appeals of Ohio held that such language conditions the broker's right to payment 
upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction. Id* at *5.2 
The majority of courts interpreting phrases similar to "all commissions are 
due and payable at closing" to be unambiguous, hold that the broker's commission 
2The language contained in the broker agreement in Doss appears to be 
more consistent with the Court of Appeals' reasoning that in order for such 
language to create a condition, it must contain words "such as: only, unless, 
until, or i f rather than the language contained in the Listing Agreement before 
the Court. Fairbourn. supra at fl 22. 
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is conditioned upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction. Berman v. 
Hall. 275 Md. 434, 340 A.2d 251, 252-53 (Md. 1975) (listing agreement stating that 
commission was "to be due and payable upon the settlement" denotes something 
more than a postponement of time for payment, and means that the commission 
is not due until settlement and not payable until then); Hodges v. Lewis. 112 
Cal.App.2d 526, 527-29, 246 P.2d 676 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (a listing 
agreement stating that a commission would be paid "upon final consummation of 
said sale" means that no commission shall be considered as earned until the 
happening of the specified event); Aimes v. Wesnofske. 255 N.Y. 156, 174 N.E. 
436, 436 and 438 (1931) (a listing agreement that indicates one-half of the 
commission is "to be paid on the closing of title" means that if closing does not 
occur there is no duty of the seller to pay broker the half commission); Silhouette 
Realty. Inc. v. Welson. 265 N.Y.S.2d 193, 24 A.D.2d 212, 213-14 (1965) (an oral 
listing agreement where the broker testified that commission was to be paid "'at the 
closing' or 'on the closing' or 'when they closed'" means payment of commission 
was conditioned upon the actual closing); Hamerick v. Cooper River Lumber Co.. 
223 S.C. 119, 74 S.E.2d 575, 576 and 578 (1953) (a purchase agreement that 
states the seller will pay the broker a commission "on date of settlement" means 
that the commission is contingent upon closing of the underlying transaction which 
is the meaning such contract language would have conveyed to the ordinary 
businessman and no good reason appears why it should not be given such 
E \Laurte\Amerhous\FairAppeal\SCBrief wpd Page -23-
construction); Home Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc, of Palm Beach v. Illustrated 
Properties Realty. 465 So.2d 1244, 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (broker 
agreement stating that commission is "due and payable upon closing" is clear and 
unambiguous and as a matter of law means that no commission is owed unless the 
underlying real estate transaction closes); Clark v. Provident Trust Co. of 
Philadelphia. 329 Pa. 421,198 A. 36, 37-39 (1938) (where a broker sent a letter to 
seller stating that commission "is to be considered as earned and payable only 
when settlement is finally completed," such language means that payment of 
commission is conditioned upon the occurrence of closing); and Nicoud v. Boley. 
211 Wis. 431, 248 N.W. 452, 453-54 (Wis. 1933) (a brokerage agreement that 
states the commission is "to be paid on the day the conveyances are executed" 
means that payment of the commission is dependent upon the execution of the 
conveyances). 
In 1968, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals stated as follows regarding the 
state of the law in the U.S. regarding this issue: 
It has been held that the employment in such contracts of words such 
as 'when', 'after', or 'as soon as' or 'when the sale is completed' or 
'upon delivery of the deed and payment of the consideration' or 'at the 
date of passing title' or 'upon consummation of deal', or such similar 
language clearly indicates a promise is not to be performed except 
upon fulfillment of the condition. Probably one of the leading cases 
directly supporting the interpretation of the contract here involved is 
Aimes v. Wesnofske. 255 N.Y. 156, 174 N.E. 436 (1931), which was 
concerned with the promise by the sellers of land under a written 
contract to pay a broker a certain sum of money 'on the closing of title.' 
The court, after a complete examination of the authorities throughout 
the nation, held that such a promise was not merely one to pay on the 
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date fixed by the contract for the closing of title, but one to pay such a 
commission only if the closing of title should occur. 
O'boyle v. Dubose-Killeen Properties. Inc.. 430 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1968) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (a sale agreement that stated "upon 
closing of title" seller would pay broker commission conditioned payment of 
commission upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction). 
More recently in 1983, the Third District Court of Appeals of Florida held 
regarding the state of the law on this issue that: 
Although there are some cases to the contrary,... the great weight of 
authority holds that contractual provisions for payment of a brokerage 
commission at the time of sale, closing, or settlement render such 
occurrence a condition precedent to the obligation of payment. 
Harding Realty. Inc. v. Turn berry Towers Corp.. 436 So.2d 983, 984 (Fl. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983) (emphasis added) (a broker agreement that states the broker is entitled 
to commission "at time of closing" means that the broker was employed to effect a 
sale rather than to simply obtain a ready, willing and able buyer). 
In fact, after extensive research of this issue, counsel for Fairbourn has been 
unable to find any currently valid case law supporting the position of the Court of 
Appeals ruling in this matter. There appears to be no. support for continuation of 
even a "minority rule." 
As indicated by the above-referenced case law, the actual majority position 
regarding the interpretation of language similar to "all commissions shall be due 
and payable at closing" is that closing is a condition precedent to payment of the 
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broker's commission. The Court of Appeals' decision is not supported by the cases 
cited in its opinion and should be overturned by this Court adopting the actual 
majority position on this issue. 
F. This Court Should Adopt The New Jersey Rule That All Listing 
Agreements Contain The Implied Condition That a Commission 
is Due Only if The Underlying Real Estate Transaction is 
Consummated. 
Though not required to overturn the Court of Appeals' decision in this matter, 
American urges this Court to reverse its holding in Bushnell and adopt the New 
Jersey Rule that all listing agreements contain the implied condition that a 
commission is due only if the underlying real estate transaction is consummated. 
Numerous jurisdictions have found persuasive the public policies behind the 
New Jersey Rule and have either adopted the New Jersey Rule as set forth in 
Dobbs or expressly approved it, including Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and 
Vermont. Drake v. Hc^gy, 713 P.2d 1203 (Alaska 1986); Potter v. Ridge Realty 
Corp.. 28 Conn. Supp. 304, 259 A.2d 758 (1969); Rodgers v. Hendrix. 92 Idaho 
141, 438 P.2d 653 (1968); Mullenger v. Clause. 178 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1970); 
Winkelman v. Allen. 214 Kan. 22, 519 P.2d 1377 (1974); Tristam's Landing. Inc. v. 
Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 327 N.E.2d 727 (1975); Ehley v. Cady. 687 P.2d 687, 212 
Mont. 82 (Mont. 1984); Cornett v. Nathan. 196 Neb. 277, 242 N.W.2d 855 (1976); 
Ferrara v. Firsching. 533 P.2d 1351, 91 Nev. 254 (Nev. 1975); Goetz v. Anderson. 
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274 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1978); Sesterv. Commonwealth. Inc.. 256 Or. 11,470 P.2d 
142 (1970); Staab v. Messier. 128 Vt. 2380, 264 A.2d 790 (1970). 
In addition, this rule has long been the law of the state of Maryland. Keener 
v. Harrod. 2 Md. 63, 56 Am. Dec. 706 (1852). Colorado has codified the New 
Jersey Rule as follows: 
No real estate agent or broker is entitled to a commission for finding 
a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to complete the purchase 
by the owner until the same is consummated or is defeated by the 
refusal or the neglect of the owner to consummate the same as agreed 
upon. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. §12-61-201 (1973). 
Though still a minority rule, the New Jersey Rule as set forth in Dobbs has 
been largely praised by commentators for public policy reasons as it is consistent 
with the common expectation of sellers that a commission is paid to brokers from 
proceeds of the sale of the real property. See e.g.. Mulliken, When Does the Seller 
Owe The Broker A Commission? A Discussion of the Law and What it Teaches 
About Listing Agreements. 132 Mil. L. Rev. 265 (1991) (Addendum "G" attached 
hereto); and Note, Arguing for the Minority Rule: An Efficient Approach to Real 
Estate Brokerage Contracts. 82 B.U. L. Rev. 195 (2002) (Addendum "H" attached 
hereto). 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly rejected the New Jersey Rule as set 
forth in Dobbs. holding that in Utah there is not an implied condition in all broker 
contracts that the underlying real estate transaction must close in order for a broker 
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to be entitled to a commission. Bushnell Real Estate. Inc. v. Nielson. 672 P.2d 746, 
751 (Utah 1983). 
The public policies and facts of this case demonstrate why this Court should 
reverse its holding in Bushnell and hold that all broker listing agreements contain 
the implied condition that a commission is due only if the underlying real estate 
transaction is consummated. Public policy considerations support adoption of the 
New Jersey Rule because a typical businessman, or homeowner selling his home, 
would expect the phrase "all commissions are due and payable at closing" to mean 
that if the closing did not occur, no commission would be paid the broker. As 
neither party in this matter raised this issue at the trial court level nor briefed this 
issue to the Court of Appeals on appeal, both the parties, their counsel, and the trial 
court judge interpreted the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable at 
closing" as meaning Fairbourn's commission was contingent upon closing of the 
underlying real estate transaction. The disputed issues heard at trial and briefed 
on appeal to the Court of Appeals were all based on this interpretation of the phrase 
and American's alleged wrongful termination of the Purchase Agreement. 
As demonstrated by the actions of the parties in this matter, it is the 
commonly held perception that if there is no closing of a real estate transaction, 
there are no funds due a real estate broker. Adopting the New Jersey Rule would 
conform Utah law with the common perception of parties buying and selling 
property in the state of Utah and would eliminate claims for real estate commissions 
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by any unscrupulous real estate agent who is aware of the current common 
misperception of Utah law interpreting listing agreements and providing a buyer he 
knows will not be able to perform. The New Jersey Rule "produces a result that is 
more consistent with the realities of a real estate transaction and the expectations 
of property owners in those transactions." Arguing for the Minority Rule at 221 
(Addendum "H" attached hereto). Utah law as it currently stands places the burden 
of risk of a real estate transaction failing on the property owner rather than the real 
estate agent who is more familiar with the risk and therefore better prepared to 
minimize such risk. ig\ at 207-08 (citations omitted). 
The New Jersey Rule provides an incentive to real estate brokers to stay 
involved with the real estate transaction until they actually close rather than moving 
on to the next transaction immediately after the buyer and seller of real property 
have reached an agreement. Ja\ at 221. Current Utah law places the duty of 
investigating the financial capability of the buyer on the property owner rather than 
the broker. ig\ at 208 (citations omitted). As a real estate professional, a broker is 
better suited to bear this burden than most sellers of real estate. ]cL (citations 
omitted). 
As sellers of real property contemplate that a broker's commission will be 
paid from proceeds of the sale, current Utah law forces real property owners to pay 
for brokers' fees on failed transactions, though such funds are not readily available 
to the seller due to the failure of the transaction. Furthermore, the additional burden 
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placed on real estate brokers under the New Jersey Rule to see the transaction 
through to completion would render the commissions earned by a real estate agent 
more commensurate with the services actually being provided by the real estate 
agent. Ig\ at 224 (citations omitted). 
This Court should adopt the New Jersey Rule, overturning its rejection of the 
same in Bushnell. which would render the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the 
phrase "all commissions are due and payable at closing" moot. Such a ruling would 
require the courts of the State of Utah to interpret listing agreements consistent with 
what the public and typical businessman would expect in entering into such 
contracts. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE LISTING AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS AND 
SUCH AMBIGUITY SHOULD BE HELD AGAINST THE DRAFTER OF THE 
LISTING AGREEMENT, FAIRBOURN. 
Alternatively, the Listing Agreement is ambiguous with regard to payment of 
commissions and such ambiguity should be held against the drafter of the Listing 
Agreement, Fairbourn. 
Several courts have held that language similar to the phrase "all commissions 
are due and payable at closing" as contained in the Listing Agreement is 
ambiguous and should be held against the drafter of the agreement. Fineberg 
Bros. Agency. Inc. v. Berted Realty Co.. Inc.. 124 A.D.2d 549 507 N.Y.S.2d 694 
(1986) (where the letter of broker to seller stated that broker's commission was "due 
and payable in full upon closing," the ambiguity in such disputed language must be 
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resolved against the broker who prepared it); and McMurray. supra at 502 (the 
language of an ambiguous contract prepared by one party is generally to be given 
such consideration as the other party would be fairly justified in giving it). 
Potentially the phrase in questions may be interpreted to mean either that (1) 
payment of a commission is conditioned upon closing or (2) it merely indicates date 
of payment, not that commission is conditioned upon closing. "A contract is 
considered ambiguous if the words used to express the meaning and intention of 
the parties are insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach 
two or more plausible meanings." C.J. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923, 928 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). "[T]he general rule of contract 
interpretation [is] that ambiguous language is to be construed against the drafter." 
Jones. Waldo. Holbrook & and McDunnough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 
(Utah 1996). 
In the case at hand, Fairbourn drafted the Listing Agreement and therefore 
any ambiguity contained in the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable 
at closing" should be held against Fairbourn. J& The ambiguous statement should 
therefore be held to mean that payment of commissions to Fairbourn is conditioned 
upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction. Because no closing occurred 
in this matter (as American was entitled to terminate the Purchase Agreement), 
Fairbourn is not entitled to commission based on the terms of the Listing 
Agreement. The Court of Appeals' decision should therefore be overturned. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM 
"EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL CAPABILITY TO CLOSE" CONTAINED IN 
THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT. 
The Court of Appeals did not address any of the issues raised by Fairbourn 
on appeal of the trial court's ruling, stating "[i]t is unnecessary for us to consider 
each of these arguments, however, because there are proper grounds to affirm." 
Fairbourn at fl 14. The remaining arguments of this brief are therefore related to 
the rulings of the trial court in this matter. 
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the language of the Purchase 
Agreement between Rochelle and American that required Rochelle to produce 
evidence within fourteen days of the execution of the Purchase Agreement of its 
financial capability to close the purchase. The trial court ruled that such language 
was ambiguous, admitted parol evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties, held 
the ambiguity against American as the drafter of the same, and further held that 
American failed to clarify the ambiguity when Rochelle requested clarification. (R. 
231-40; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Finding That The Phrase "Evidence of 
Financial Capability to Close" is Ambiguous. 
i. Legal Standard. 
The trial court erred in finding that the phrase "evidence of financial capability 
to close" contained in the Purchase Agreement between Rochelle and American 
was ambiguous. A trial court's determination that a writing is ambiguous is a 
conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. West Valley City v. Majestic 
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Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah 1991); Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P. 2d 1234, 
1251 (Utah 1998). 
"The primary rule in interpreting a contract is to determine what the parties 
intended by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, 
giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears 
v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982). "A contract is considered 
ambiguous if the words used to express the meaning and intention of the parties 
are insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach two or more 
plausible meanings." C. J. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (citations omitted). "[A] contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous just 
because one party gives that provision a different meaning than another party does 
[, t]o demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be 
tenable." R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068,1074 
(Utah 1997) (citations omitted). "Where a contract is plain and unambiguous, it 
does not become ambiguous by reason of the fact that in its operation it will work 
hardship upon one of the parties thereto and a corresponding advantage to the 
other." 17A Am. Jur. 2D Contracts § 338. 
If the language of a contract "is clear and is not susceptible of more than one 
interpretation, the ordinary plain meaning of the words must be used." Bryant v. 
Desert News Publishing Co.. 120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951). "The 
contract must be looked at realistically in the light of the circumstances under which 
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it was entered into, and if the intent of the parties can be ascertained with 
reasonable certainty it must be given effect." Maw v. Noble. 10 Utah 2d 440,443, 
354 P.2d 121, 123 (1960). In Maw the Utah Supreme Court held that though the 
contract in question was silent on an issue, the parties were subject to the effects 
of the language of the contract "which would reasonably and naturally follow." i d 
at 123. Parol "evidence cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the plain 
language of the contract." Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair. 565 P.2d 776, 778 
(Utah 1977). In Commercial, the Utah Supreme Court overturned a district court's 
construction of contract language where it required "the substitution of the word 'or' 
for the word 'and.'" ig\ In so ruling, the Court stated "[a]ll words used by the parties 
must, if possible, be given their usual and ordinary meaning and effect." Ig\ 
ii. The Purchase Agreement Language is Not Ambiguous. 
Paragraph 3 of the Counter-Offer to the Purchase Agreement, that was 
incorporated into the final Purchase Agreement, states as follows: 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both 
parties, [Rochelle] shall supply [American] with evidence of financial 
capability to close on the Property within the time frame referenced 
above [14 days from final plat plan approval by the City of West 
Jordan]. In the event [Rochelle] is unable to provide said evidence, 
[American] shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and neither 
party shall have any further obligation to the other. 
(R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) (Hereinafter this paragraph 
shall be referred to as "Paragraph 3.") 
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There are therefore three (3) elements required by the plain language of 
Paragraph 3: (1) within fourteen days of execution of the Agreement; (2) Rochelle 
is required to supply American; (3) with evidence of its financial capability to close 
on the Property, by paying $2,277,000 within fourteen days of final plat plan 
approval. The primary financial obligation imposed upon Rochelle to close on the 
property is the payment of $2,277,000. (R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached 
hereto.) There is no ambiguity in this requirement. The plain and ordinary meaning 
of the words used in Paragraph 3 require Rochelle to produce evidence within 
fourteen (14) days of execution, that Rochelle was capable of paying the purchase 
price of $2,277,000. The terms "capable" and/or "able" are not subject to ambiguity 
as argued in the following Subsection IIIAiii. Rochelle needed to provide evidence 
within fourteen days of execution of the Purchase Agreement that it had the ability 
to pay this amount. 
Hi. Rochelle Was Not a "Capable" And/or "Able" Buyer. 
The language regarding the financial capability of Rochelle as contained in 
Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement has been defined in case law in this 
jurisdiction as well as others. Pursuant to applicable case law, Rochelle was not 
a "capable" and/or "able" buyer. 
The terms "capable" and "able" are synonyms and may be used 
interchangeably. Black's Law Dictionary defines "capable" as "[sjusceptible; 
qualified; fitting; possessing legal power or capacity. Able, fit or adapted for." 
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Black's Law Dictionary 107 (Abridged Fifth Ed. 1983). Black's defines "able" 
through the definition of ability as "[cjapacity to perform an action or service; exu to 
support spouse and family. Financial ability is usually construed as referring to 
pecuniary ability." i d at 2. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Tenth Edition 
1998) defines "capability" as the quality or state of being "capable" which is in turn 
defined as "having legal right to own, enjoy, or perform." 
In the matter of Winkelman v. Allen. 519 P.2d 1377 (Kan. 1974), the Kansas 
Supreme Court overturned a jury verdict in favor of a broker seeking recovery of 
commission for producing a "ready, willing and able buyer" because the proposed 
purchaser's financial ability to perform did not meet the definition of an "able" buyer. 
After a review of the law in numerous jurisdictions, the Kansas Supreme Court 
concluded that the degree of proof required to show financial capability of an "able" 
buyer is a showing that "the purchaser is able to command the necessary funds to 
close the deal on the date agreed upon." ] d at 1384 (citations omitted). In noting 
that the term "command" is important, the court stated the "cases uniformly hold 
that the purchaser cannot show ability by depending upon third persons in no way 
bound to furnish funds." icL at 1385 (citations omitted). Citing the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota in Shell Oil Co. v. Kapler/235 Minn. 292, 50 N.W.2d 707 (1951), the 
court quoted with approval the following as an excellent discussion of a buyer's 
financial ability in connection with a real estate transaction: 
Generally speaking, a purchaser is financially ready and able to buy: 
(1) If he has the needed cash in hand, or (2) if he is personally 
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possessed of assets—which in part may consist of the property to be 
purchased—and a credit rating which enable him with reasonable 
certainty to command the requisite funds at the required time, or (3) if 
he has definitely arranged to raise the necessary money-or as much 
thereof as he is unable to supply personally-by obtaining a binding 
commitment for a loan to him for that purpose by a financially able third 
party, irrespective of whether such loan be secured in part by the 
property to be purchased.... [I]t is clear—in the light of the purpose 
of the rule—that where the purchaser relies primarily, not upon his own 
personal assets, but upon the process of a contemplated loan or loans 
to be made to him by a third party, he is financially able to buy only if 
he has a definite and binding commitment from such third party loaner. 
Even though the third party is financially able, his promise is of no 
avail unless made for an adequate consideration. 
id. at 1385 (quoting Shell Oil at 712-130) (emphasis added); See also Potter v. 
Ridge Realty Corporation. 28 Conn. Super. 304, 259 A.2d 758 (1969). 
The Utah Supreme Court has in spirit adopted this same rationale in Sproul 
v. Parks. 116 Utah 368,210 P.2d 436 (Utah 1949). In Sproul. a real estate broker 
asserted a claim for a commission against the owners of real property under the 
terms of a listing agreement. The listing agreement provided for the payment of a 
commission to the broker if he was to find a buyer who is ready, able, and willing 
to buy. I d at 437. The Utah Supreme Court concluded from the buyer's testimony 
that the buyer intended to obtain funds for the purchase of the property out of the 
proceeds of the sale of his own property, i d at 438. The Court stated: 
Even if defendants had been presented with a written acceptance of 
their counter-offer within the listing period, which never occurred, they 
would be entitled to assume that the purchaser then was financially 
able to perform, not that he might become able sometime in the future. 
The provisions in the broker's listing contract obligates the owner to 
pay a commission if a sale is procured or a purchaser is procured who 
is ready, able and willing to perform. That does not mean a purchaser 
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who will not be ready for some time nor one who must sell his home 
first. 
i d (emphasis added) (citing Cottingham v. Smith. 28 Cal.App.2d 345, 82 P.2d 479 
and Willis v. Page. 19 Cal.App.2d 508, 65 P.2d 944 (1937)). 
In the case at hand, the evidence is undisputed that Rochelle did not present 
American with documentation of its assets or existing credit lines but rather 
intended to obtain a loan secured by the Property from which it would satisfy the 
balance of the purchase price at the closing of the purchase. (R. 234; Addendum 
"B" attached hereto at page 4.) As evidenced by the two letters prepared by First 
Security, Rochelle could not demonstrate within the initial 14 days of the Purchase 
Agreement a current ability to close the purchase but was dependent upon a non-
binding expression of willingness from First Security that sometime in the future, it 
might make a loan to Rochelle to purchase the Property, dependent upon 
numerous factors. (R. 410, Ex. Nos. 7 and 11; Addenda "E" and "F" attached 
hereto.) 
Just as there was no binding commitment for a loan from First Security, there 
was no evidence of a binding commitment from the other Rochelle and Liberty 
entities to guaranty a loan to Rochelle (a condition to First Security's loan), nor 
other evidence that Rochelle was financially "able" to purchase the Property, such 
as cash on hand or the availability of a letter of credit. Consequently Rochelle did 
not demonstrate that it had a current ability to purchase; at best Rochelle 
demonstrated a future contingent ability to purchase the Property. 
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Even Mr. Larsen agreed that his obligation was to provide an "able" buyer, 
one who has the substance or the "resource to close the deal." (T.445-46.) That 
substance or resource to close was not present within fourteen (14) days of the 
contract and because of the undisputed peril American found itself in nearly losing 
the purchase from Coons, American did not bargain to wait months for a closing to 
determine its presence. 
The trial court's construction of the word "capable" requires that the disputed 
language be interpreted to mean it is a "probable" or "likely" event and rewrites the 
contract rather than interprets the contract by its plain meaning. Rochelle was not 
a "capable" and/or "able" buyer, American terminated the Purchase Agreement in 
good faith, and Fairbourn is therefor not entitled to commissions. 
iv. Fairbourn Does Not Claim an Alternative Definition of Paragraph 
3 But The Court Nevertheless Rewrote it. 
Fairbourn did not argue an alternative definition of Paragraph 3 before the 
trial court, but asserted that the term "evidence of financial capability to close" was 
ambiguous because the Purchase Agreement did not further "define that term or 
the scope thereof." (R. at 125.) Fairbourn further argued that in any event, the two 
letters provided by First Security were sufficient to meet the requirement of the 
ambiguous language and that American's termination of the Purchase Agreement 
for Rochelle's failure to provide the same was in bad faith. (R. at 125-28,173-75.) 
By contending that the two First Security letters meet the necessary proof of 
financial capability, Fairbourn necessarily argues that the "likelihood of future loan 
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approval" is sufficient evidence of present (14 day) capability. Thus Paragraph 3 
is rewritten by both Fairbourn and the trial court to read as follows: 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both 
parties, [Rochelle] shall supply [American] with evidence of [a 
likelihood of obtaining future loan proceeds sufficient] financial 
capability to close on the Property within the time frame referenced 
above [14 days from final plat plan approval by the City of West 
Jordan]. 
Read in this manner, proof of present capability and proof of a likelihood of 
obtaining a future loan have significantly different and conflicting meanings. The 
likelihood of closing a loan in the future, conditioned upon the satisfaction of the 
Bank's conditions, is not the same as proof, within 14 days, of the capability to pay 
$2,277,000 at closing. By inclusion of the terms "likelihood" or similar terms such 
as "probable" or "more likely than not" the Court rewrote Paragraph 3 and nullified 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the parties' agreement. 
Such an argument is the same as made in Commercial where the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that parol evidence cannot "vary or contradict" the plain 
language of the contract. Commercial at 778. The effects of Paragraph 3 that 
"reasonably and naturally follow" do not support modifying the language with the 
term "likelihood" or similar phrases. Maw at 123. 
Admittedly Paragraph 3 imposed a heavy burden upon Rochelle to prove its 
ability to close, one that Rochelle could not meet. Such a burden on Rochelle, 
regardless of its weight, does not render Paragraph 3 ambiguous. 
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B. If Paragraph 3 is Ambiguous, The Trial Court Erred in Construing 
The Ambiguity. 
i. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Hold That There Was no 
Meeting of The Minds Between American And Rochelle 
Regarding The Purchase Agreement. 
Though briefed by American, the trial court did not expressly rule in its 
Memorandum Decision whether or not there was a meeting of the minds between 
American and Rochelle when they entered into the Purchase Agreement. (R. 225-
26; R. 231-41.) If Paragraph 3 is indeed ambiguous, there is evidence that 
Rochelle and American had vastly differing views of what was required to establish 
financial capability and consequently Rochelle and American did not have a 
meeting of the minds regarding an essential and material element of the Purchase 
Agreement. Therefore, if there is no enforceable contract, Fairbourn has no claim 
to commissions under the Listing Agreement. 
A trial court's determination of whether an enforceable contract exists is a 
finding of fact that will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Davies v. Olson. 
746 P.2d 264, 266-67 ( Utah 1987). In overturning such a ruling by a trial court this 
Court must find that the evidence is insufficient "viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's construction." West Valley Citv at 1313. In order 
to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of the evidence, 
the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings." 
Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993). In marshaling the 
evidence, the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
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order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial." Moon v. Moon. 973 
P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). After constructing this array of competent 
evidence, the challenging party "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence . . . 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City at 1315. 
If after parties enter into a contract, "circumstances disclosed a latent 
ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word by which one of the parties meant 
one thing and the other a different thing, the difference going to the essence of the 
supposed contract, the result is that there is no contract." 17A Am. Jur. 2D 
Contracts § 31. In Davies. after detailed review of contract negotiation, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has previously upheld a finding there was no meeting of minds 
regarding the contract price "[gjiven the disparity in the testimony regarding the 
contract price." Davies at 267. "[A]n honest difference of understanding as to what 
the contract was is fatal to reformation, for in such case there is no meeting of the 
minds of the parties and no pre-existing agreement to which the written instrument 
can be conformed." Ingram v. Forrer. 563 P.2d 181,182 (Utah, 1977). 
In marshaling the evidence, there were six witnesses who testified in this 
matter. Mr. Alvarez testified on behalf of American, Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson 
testified on behalf of Fairbourn, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner testified on behalf of 
Rochelle, and Mr. Simon testified on behalf of First Security. (Mr. Alvarez T. 8-229; 
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Mr. Fairboum T. 303-390; Mr. Larson T. 390-468; Mr. Clark T. 259-285; Mr. 
Gardner T. 286-302; Mr. Simon T. 229-258.) 
Because the court did not state its decision on this issue, it is presumed that 
only the witnesses testifying on behalf of American and Rochelle would proffer 
relevant evidence regarding meeting of the minds regarding Paragraph 3 of the 
Purchase Agreement. Mr. Clark testified that Mr. Alvarez did request proof of ability 
to perform in their initial meeting, but did not request or expect a binding loan 
commitment or letter of credit, and that Rochelle wouldn't have been able to have 
cash available within two weeks. (T. 262-64, 274.) Mr. Clark also testified that Mr. 
Alvarez asked for "just a letter from a lender that states that more than likely you will 
be credit worthy and that sort of thing." (T. 270.) He also indicated that during the 
meeting, he told Mr. Alvarez that Rochelle was "not going to be able to get anything 
approaching a loan approval because we won't be able to get appraisal on the 
property and that sort of thing, and the sort of things that the lender is going to 
need." (T. 270.) 
Mr. Gardner testified that his understanding of Paragraph 3 was that Rochelle 
would provide a letter from its bank discussing the banking relationship, what 
banking lines Rochelle had, and how much business Rochelle had done with the 
bank. (T. 289-90.) Mr. Gardner further testified that he believed the initial letter 
provided by First Security satisfied the requirements of Paragraph 3. (T. 293.) 
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In contrast, Mr. Alvarez testified that he expected that Rochelle would provide 
cash, a line of credit, a letter of credit or its equivalent to satisfy Paragraph 3. (T. 
77,167-68.) Mr. Alvarez based this belief on Rochelle's purchase of the Property 
not being contingent upon financing and his urgent need to verify Rochelle's current 
ability to close. (T. 225-27.) 
As noted above, American and Rochelle had extremely different 
understandings of what Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement required. The trial 
court found credible Mr. Clark's testimony regarding Rochelle's inability to provide 
cash, a loan commitment or a letter of credit with fourteen days of execution of the 
Purchase Agreement, as he cites the same in his Memorandum Decision as a 
basis or his ruling.3 (R. 235; Addendum "B" attached hereto at page 5.) The trial 
court however disregarded the testimony of Mr. Alvarez where he indicated he had 
a vastly different understanding of the requirements of the Listing Agreement. 
The fatal flaw in the trial court's finding is that although Rochelle was unable 
to provide evidence of its financial capability in the form of proof of available cash, 
a loan commitment or letter of credit within fourteen days of the execution of the 
Purchase Agreement, a different party with the financial capability sought by Mr. 
Alvarez could have provided American evidence of the same within fourteen days.4 
3
 It is this finding of the Court that confirms that American was justified in 
terminating the Agreement. Rochelle could not provide the evidence required by 
Paragraph 3. 
4Mr. Clark's testimony is consistent with the fact that Rochelle couldn't 
produce the evidence required by Paragraph 3 within 14 days. 
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For example, if Rochelle had cash available in an account, it could have produced 
evidence of those funds within fourteen days. If RocheHe had an existing line of 
credit it could use to purchase the Property, it could have produced evidence of 
such line of credit within fourteen days. If Rochelle had other assets available or 
if its bank could issue a letter of credit, it could have produced evidence of the same 
easily with fourteen days. It is precisely this type of evidence of current financial 
ability to close that American expected to receive within fourteen days of execution 
of the Purchase Agreement. (T. 77,100,102,105,167-68, 225-27.) 
The trial court failed to rule whether there was a meeting of minds, though the 
issue was briefed by American. (R. 225-226; R. 231-41.) Because of the 
materiality of Paragraph 3, and the completely different understandings of the same 
of American and Rochelle, there was no meeting of the minds between American 
and Rochelle regarding an essential and material element of the Purchase 
Agreement, and therefore no enforceable contract. 
ii. The Trial Court Erred in Its Admission of Parol Evidence That 
Contradicted The Plain Language of Paragraph 3 of The 
Purchase Agreement. 
If Paragraph 3 is ambiguous, the trial court erred in its admission of parol 
evidence that contradicted Paragraph 3 rather than clarified it. The trial court's 
admission of parol evidence is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
Glauser Storage. LLC , v. Smedley. 2001 Utah Ct. App. 141, fl 14, 27 P.3d 565 
(citations omitted). 
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If an integrated contract is found to be ambiguous, parol evidence may be 
admissible "only in the very limited situations where it is needed to clarify—not 
contradict—any ambiguous terms in the agreement." Jd at U 21 n. 2. (emphasis in 
original) (citing Hall v. Process Instruments & Control. Inc.. 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 
(Utah 1995). "Parol evidence not inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show 
what the entire contract really was, by supplementing, as distinguished from 
contradicting, the writing." Webb v. R.O.A. Gen.. Inc.. 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (emphasis in original) (quoting Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co.. 
669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983)). Though parol evidence may be admitted to 
show the intent of the parties if contract language is vague or uncertain, "such 
evidence cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the plain language of the 
contract" and all words used in a contract must "be given their usual and ordinary 
meaning and effect." Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair. 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 
1977) (citations omitted). 
As noted above in Section III.A, the plain language of Paragraph 3 of the 
Purchase Agreement contains three elements: (1) within fourteen days of execution 
of the Agreement; (2) Rochelle is required to supply American; (3) with evidence of 
its financial capability to close on the Property within fourteen days of final plat plan 
approval. (R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) Rochelle therefore 
had fourteen days to provide American evidence of its financial capability. The trial 
court received into evidence, and based its ruling in part, on testimony that Rochelle 
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could not produce evidence of its ability to pay $2,277,000 in the form of "available 
cash, a loan commitment, or letter of credit because none of this evidence could 
have been obtained from a bank within the 14 days allotted for its production." (R. 
235; Addendum "A" attached hereto at page 5.) David Clark, owner of Rochelle 
and a licensed realtor, stated that cash, letter of credit, or firm commitment within 
fourteen days of execution "wouldn't be possible[, i]t just isn't the way it works out 
there, to be able to get that type of thing within two weeks." (T. 260, 263-64.) 
Claiming ambiguity when Rochelle admittedly could not provide the required 
proof, the trial court then received evidence in the form of testimony from David 
Clark, Mr. Fairboum, Mr. Larsen, and Mr. Gardner and the letters of First Security, 
that future contingent loans, a mere probability, was sufficient to establish 
Rochelle's current financial capability. Such testimony contradicts the plain 
language of Paragraph 3. (R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) The 
plain meaning of such language is that Rochelle was to have proof, within 14 days, 
of money readily available to actually close the sale. All of the parol evidence 
allowed by the trial court would render Paragraph 3 meaningless and force 
American to wait until closing before it would know if Rochelle could perform. 
American clearly bargained to receive within fourteen days' evidence that Rochelle 
could perform and the trial court's consideration of parol evidence and its 
subsequent ruling nullifies this provision. 
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Though the trial court was correct in finding testimony credible that a binding 
loan commitment could not be obtained within fourteen days, it's finding that a party 
cannot obtain proof that it has available cash, a line of credit, a letter of credit, 
sufficient assets to secure a loan, or other evidence within fourteen days is incorrect 
on its face and contradicts reason, logic and the plain language of Paragraph 3. (R. 
235; Exhibit "B" attached hereto at page 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) 
If Rochelle had cash available in an account at its bank, it could have 
produced evidence of those available funds. If Rochelle had an existing line of 
credit it could use to purchase the Property, it could have produced evidence of 
such line of credit within fourteen days. If Rochelle had other assets available or 
if its bank could issue a letter of credit, it could have produced evidence of the 
same, easily within fourteen days. It is precisely this type of evidence of current 
financial ability to close that American expected to receive within fourteen days of 
execution of the Purchase Agreement. (T. 77, 100, 102, 105, 167-68, 225-27.) 
Proof of anything less than readily available funds, is not evidence of the capability 
to close and is therefore inconsistent with the usual and ordinary meaning of the 
words contained in Paragraph 3. (R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached 
hereto.) 
iii. The Trial Court Erred in Holding Any Ambiguity in Paragraph 3 
Against American. 
If the language of Paragraph 3 is indeed ambiguous, the trial court erred in 
holding such ambiguity against American as the drafter of the same. The trial 
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court's interpretation of common law is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 P. 2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992). The trial court 
cited Jones Waldo Holbrook and McDunnough v. Dawson. 923 P. 2d 1366,1372 
(Utah 1996) and Simonsen v. Travis. 728 P. 2d 999, 1002 (Utah 1986) for the 
proposition that an ambiguous contract is held against the drafter of the document, 
stating that Paragraph 3 was ambiguous and that American failed to clarify its 
meaning when asked by Rochelle. (R. 237-38; Addendum "B" attached hereto at 
pages 7-8.) 
Both Jones Waldo and Simonsen are easily distinguished from this matter 
because they dealt with fact situations involving parties with unequal bargaining 
power and the party with greater power being the sole drafter of the ambiguous 
agreement. In the case at hand, both parties had equal bargaining power and both 
participated in the drafting of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 231-35; Addendum "B" 
attached hereto at pages 1-5.) In Jones Waldo, the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
a written attorney fee agreement was subsequently modified by an oral agreement 
between the parties. Jones Waldo at 1372-73. In construing the oral agreement 
against the attorney, the Court of Appeals stated that it "is the general rule that in 
construing a contract between attorney and client, doubts are resolved against the 
attorney and the construction adopted which is favorable to the client" and that 
"because of the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship, compensation 
agreements made during the existence of that relationship are closely scrutinized 
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and construed most strongly against the attorney." JdL at 1372 (citations omitted). 
In Simonsen. the Utah Supreme Court held that a release drafted solely by an 
insurer contained ambiguous language regarding release of both medical and 
property damage claims when the insured had previously refused to sign a release 
unless it was limited to only her property damage claims. Simonsen at 1002. In so 
ruling, the Court stated that a general release "must at a minimum be 
unambiguous, explicit, and unequivocal." ]dL (citations omitted). 
In the case at hand, the Purchase Agreement was heavily negotiated by both 
Rochelle and American with both parties drafting language contained in the final 
version of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 233-34; Exhibit "B" attached hereto at 
pages 3-4.) This case is similar to the facts of Nunn v. Chemical Waste 
Management. Inc.. 856 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) where the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that any ambiguity in a business acquisition agreement would not be 
held against the drafter because the "rule that contracts are to be construed against 
the draftsperson is simply inapplicable in this case in which the parties brought 
equal bargaining power to the negotiation table." Nunn at 1469. Both Rochelle and 
American were real property developers and well-versed in contract negotiation and 
drafting. (R. 231-35; Exhibit "B" attached hereto at pages 1-5.) Four different 
versions were circulated between the parties before being executed by both 
Rochelle and American. (R. 233-34; Exhibit "B" attached hereto at pages 3-4.) 
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This Court should construe the language of Paragraph 3 in light of the 
circumstances in which it was entered into without strictly construe the language 
of Paragraph 3 against American because both parties participated in the drafting 
of the Purchase Agreement and had equal bargaining position. 
iv. The Trial Court Erred in Construing The Extrinsic Evidence of 
The Intent of American And Rochelle. 
If Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement is ambiguous regarding the 
"evidence of financial capability to close," the trial court erred in construing the parol 
evidence regarding the intent of American and Rochelle when entering into the 
Purchase Agreement. The trial court's construction of an ambiguous contract 
based on extrinsic evidence is a question of fact that is reviewed under clearly-
erroneous standard. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 
1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Craig Food Industries. Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P. 2d 279, 
283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In overturning such a ruling by a trial court this Court 
must find that the evidence is insufficient "viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's construction." West Valley City at 1313. As noted in 
Section III. B. i above, the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings." Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 
1993). 
In this matter, the trial court heard testimony from six witnesses. Mr. Alvarez 
testified on behalf of American, Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson testified on behalf of 
Fairbourn, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner testified on behalf of Rochelle, and Mr. Simon 
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testified on behalf of First Security. (Mr. Alvarez T. 8-229; Mr. Fairbourn T. 303-
390; Mr. Larson T. 390-468; Mr. Clark T. 259-285; Mr. Gardner T. 286-302; Mr. 
Simon T. 229-258.) 
Both Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson had a financial interest in the outcome of 
this action as agents of Fairbourn. (T. 306-09; 436-37.) Fairbourn represented 
both Rochelle and American as set forth in the dual Listing Agreement. (T. 315; R. 
410, Ex. No. 3; Addendum "D" attached hereto.) 
Testimony regarding the intent of the parties regarding Rochelle's evidence 
of financial capability to close varied broadly during the course of the bench trial. 
The testimonies of Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner were all 
fairly consistent, with the testimony of Mr. Alvarez sharply contradictory. Mr. 
Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Gardner testified that Mr. Alvarez had 
requested proof of Rochelle's ability to-perform during their meetings. (T. 312-19; 
T. 404-18; T. 262-63; T. 289-92.) However, Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, 
and Mr. Gardner testified that Mr. Alvarez made no requests for cash, a binding 
loan commitment, or a letter of credit during their meetings. (T. 318-19; T. 404; T. 
263; T. 289-90.) Mr. Clark testified that it would have been impossible to have 
produced anything too strong financially within two weeks of signing the Purchase 
Agreement. (T. 264.) Mr. Clark testified that Mr. Alvarez indicated during the 
August 1999 meeting that all he needed was a letter from a lender that stated it was 
more likely than not that Rochelle would receive a loan. (T. 268-69.) Mr. Fairbourn, 
E \Laurie\Amerhous\FairAppeal\SCBnef wpd Page -52-
Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Gardner thought that the first letter provided by First 
Security was more than sufficient to meet the evidence of proof of financial 
capability to close as required by the Development Agreement. (T. 320; T. 420; T. 
273; T. 293.) Mr. Fairbourn's testimony at trial was contradicted by his earlier 
deposition testimony, which was read into the record, that he believed that "we 
never did establish if Rochelle could perform or not." (T. 373-74.) Mr. Fairboum 
further testified that American did not have an obligation to negotiate after the 
fourteen day period had expired. (T. 375.) Mr. Gardner did not include language 
regarding proof of Rochelle's financial ability to close in the first draft of the contract 
proposed to American because he did not think it was a key point of the deal. (T. 
292.) Mr. Larson testified that it was clear during the discussions in the August 
1999 meeting that Rochelle would be borrowing money to fund the purchase. (T. 
402-03.) 
All of the witnesses involved with the negotiations of the Purchase Agreement 
agreed that American was in a precarious situation regarding the Property subject 
to the Purchase Agreement and wished to be able to close quickly with a 
dependable buyer. (T. 53-75; T. 306-10; T. 400-01; T. 261-63; T. 289.) The trial 
court's memorandum decision accurately characterizes this evidence: 
American had entered into an agreement to buy the West 
Jordan property from its owners, the Coons. At the time that Mr. 
Alvarez began his conversations with Mr. Fairbourn, American had 
encountered considerable obstacles in gaining the approvals from the 
city of West Jordan necessary to develop the property. These 
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problems placed American's purchase agreement with the Coons in 
peril. 
During the first seven months of 1999, American pressed ahead 
on three fronts: the effort to gain municipal approval of its development 
plan; the effort to preserve the purchase agreement with the Coons; 
and the effort to find a buyer for the property who would pay the 
Coons' selling price, put some money in American's pocket, and free 
American from its entanglements with West Jordan officials. Mr. 
Fairbourn and his company were enlisted to aid American in the third 
undertaking. He proposed that American seek a buyer for the property 
marketed as "paper lots" - lots which had received plat approval but 
which had not been improved. 
The pressure on American to act mounted in late July 1999 
when the Coons notified American that it was "ending and terminating 
any and all agreements" relating to the property because American 
had failed to close. In late August 1999, the Coons agreed to reinstate 
its contract of sale with American through December 1, 1999. As 
American worked to salvage the deal with the Coons it scored a 
success with West Jordan when it persuaded the city to approve the 
necessary zoning for the property if American would acquire an 
adjacent parcel of property owned by an opponent of American's 
proposed development. 
In this uncertain setting, Fairbourn moved ahead with the 
performance of its task. Through a contact with real estate agent 
Marshall Larson, later to become employed by Fairbourn, Fairbourn 
learned of a potential buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. Rochelle was 
an affiliate of Liberty Homes, a major residential home builder in the 
Salt Lake City area. 
In early August 1999, Rochelle made a preliminary proposal to 
buy the property. Rochelle's proposal, presented in the form of "an 
official notice of intent" letter, led to a meeting among representatives 
of American, Rochelle, and Fairbourn. Numerous elements of 
possible transactions were discussed at the meeting, including a 
remark by Mr. Alvarez that any deal must include a provision 
concerning the buyer's ability to perform. Mr. Fairbourn, who attended 
the meeting, was aware of the exigent circumstances in which 
American found itself and recognized that American had a legitimate 
interest in securing a buyer who could be counted on to perform. 
(R. 231-33; Addendum "A" attached hereto at pages 1-3.) 
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The trial court then compared the language requiring Rochelle to provide 
evidence of financial capability to close with the language contained in paragraph 
7.2 of the purchase agreement regarding a financing contingency which is form 
language in the standard Utah real estate purchase contract. (R. 234) Section 7.2 
was inapplicable regarding the Purchase Agreement between American and 
Rochelle because Rochelle's purchase was not contingent upon Rochelle obtaining 
financing. (T. 406.) However, the standard language of 7.2 states that even if a 
buyer is unable to obtain financing, the buyer may nevertheless insist that the seller 
perform by "providing the seller with absolute assurance that the proceeds required 
to close the sale are available." (R. 234; T. 406; R. 410 at Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" 
attached hereto.) In addition, the Purchase Agreement has a total purchase price 
of $2,277,000, closing was to occur within fourteen days after American received 
plat plan approval from the city of West Jordan, and the purchase price was due in 
cash at closing. (R. 410 at Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) 
The trial court then disregarded both the exigent circumstances and the 
testimony of Mr. Alvarez regarding what Rochelle was to provide under Paragraph 
3. It then construed Paragraph 3 and the Purchase Agreement in accordance with 
the arguments of Fairbourn. (R. 236; Addendum "B" attached hereto at page 6.) 
The trial court's construction is clearly erroneous in that it determined that the 
language regarding Rochelle's production of evidence of financial capability to close 
was somehow inferior to the "absolute assurance" language found in paragraph 7.2 
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of the Purchase Agreement. Such language, along with the purchase price and 
closing requirements contained in the Purchase Agreement, demonstrate that 
Rochelle was to provide evidence of its closing ability within two weeks of the 
execution of the Purchase Agreement. Despite uncontroverted testimony from the 
negotiators of the Purchase Agreement that American needed to close quickly and 
with a financially strong buyer, and uncontroverted testimony that Rochelle's 
purchase of the Property was not contingent on financing, the court erred in holding 
that the intent of the parties was to not require Rochelle to provide absolute 
assurance to American that it had that ability to close. 
The language and context in which the Purchase Contract was negotiated 
are much more credible evidence than the evidence of witnesses who have a 
financial stake in the outcome of this matter (Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson) or 
witnesses that lost out on a potentially profitable transaction (Mr. Clark and Mr. 
Gardner). The construction of the Purchase Agreement by the trial court is 
therefore clearly erroneous regarding Rochelle's duty to provide evidence of 
financial capability to close and should therefore be overturned. 
a. The Trial Court Erred in Holding That American Failed to 
Communicate, or Subsequently Clarify. What it Would 
Consider Proof of Rochelle's Financial Ability to Close. 
The trial court erred in determining that American failed to communicate to 
Rochelle its expectations of the evidence of Rochelle's financial capability that it 
would find satisfactory. (R. 237.) The trial court further erred in determining that 
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American failed to provide Rochelle any meaningful clarification of its interpretation 
of what would be sufficient evidence for the benefit of Rochelle. (R. 237.) 
If the terms of the purchase agreement are ambiguous regarding the 
"evidence of financial capability to close" the trial court erred in construing the parol 
evidence regarding the intent of American and Rochelle when entering into the 
Purchase Agreement. The trial court's construction of an ambiguous contract is a 
question of fact that is reviewed under clearly erroneous standard. Craig Food 
Industries. Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P. 2d 279,283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In overturning 
such a ruling by a trial court this Court must find that the evidence is insufficient 
"viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's construction." 
West Valley City at 1313. As noted in Section III. B. i above, the challenging party 
"must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings." Robb v. Anderton. 863 
P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993). 
Though Mr. Simon produced the two letters from First Security which were 
to be the evidence of Rochelle's financial ability to close, both Mr. Alvarez and Mr. 
Simon testified that they did not communicate directly with each other regarding the 
evidence of financial ability that American would find sufficient. (T. 145-46; T. 168-
69; T. 200; T. 237-38) Therefore, any communications from American to First 
Security regarding what American would find as sufficient evidence of financial 
capability to close would have been communicated from American through either/or 
Fairbourn and Rochelle to Mr. Simon at First Security. 
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Consistent with the trial court's ruling, Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark 
and Mr. Gardner all testified that though Armando requested proof of Rochelle's 
financial ability to perform, he did not mention cash, a binding loan commitment, or 
a letter of credit before the initial letter. (T. 318-19; T. 404; T. 263; T. 289-90.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner all 
consistently testified that even after American had rejected the initial letter from First 
Security that American never clarified that it sought evidence of cash, a letter of 
credit or a firm loan commitment from First Security would be sufficient. (T. 274; T. 
282-83; T. 321; T. 356; T. 386-87; T. 420-24; T. 439; T. 447; T. 451-52; T. 459-64.) 
Furthermore, all four initially thought that both letters from First Security were more 
than sufficient to meet the purchase agreement's requirement that Rochelle provide 
American evidence of its financial ability to close. (T. 53-75; T. 306-10; T. 400-01; 
T. 261-63; T. 289.) 
Mr. Alvarez's testimony completely contradicted the testimony of Mr. 
Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Gardner. Mr. Alvarez testified that he 
specifically requested that Rochelle provide cash, a line of credit, a letter of credit. 
(T. 59-60; T. 503-06; T. 529-30.) Mr. Alvarez testified that after the initial letter from 
First Security Bank, he clarified to Mr.Tairbourn that he required evidence in the 
form of cash, or an existing line of credit. (T. 174; T. 224-25; T. 503-06.) The trial 
court disregarded this testimony, holding that American "declined to provide any 
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meaningful clarification of [its] interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle." (R. 237; 
Addendum "B" attached hereto at page 7.) 
The fatal flaw in the court's reasoning is that it did not acknowledge Mr. 
Simon's testimony. Mr. Simon at First Security was the only truly "independent" 
witness in this matter regarding what was communicated to him regarding 
American's requirements for evidence of Rochelle's financial ability. Mr. Simon 
testified with respect to the first letter requested from First Security Bank, that he 
could not provide Rochelle with an unconditional commitment letter and was unsure 
whether one was requested or not. (T. 246-47.) When the initial letter was rejected 
by American, Mr. Simon testified that someone acting on Rochelle's behalf 
requested an absolute loan commitment which he was not able to provide. (T. 248, 
252.) Furthermore, Mr. Simon's consistent pretrial deposition testimony was read 
into the record where he stated that his understanding was that American was 
wanting an absolute commitment from First Security "again" after rejecting the first 
letter. (T. 253-54.) 
In summary, Mr. Alvarez requested that Rochelle provide evidence of cash, 
a line of credit, or a loan commitment. (T. 274; T. 282-83; T. 321; T. 356; T. 386-
87; T. 420-24; T. 439; T. 447; T. 451-52; T. 459-64.) Though the testimonies of Mr. 
Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner were that Mr. Alvarez had 
requested no such evidence, Mr. Simon at First Security had the same 
understanding as Mr. Alvarez: that American required an absolute commitment 
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regarding Rochelle's financial ability to close the purchase. (T 246-48, 252.) 
Though Mr. Alvarez only spoke with Mr. Fairbourn regarding clarification of 
Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement after the first letter from First Security, that 
same request somehow reached the ears of Mr. Simon at First Security who was 
unable to provide such evidence of Rochelle's financial capability. The trial court's 
conclusion that American had failed to communicate what it required from Rochelle 
is clearly erroneous in light of the independent testimony of Mr. Simon, that he had 
a clear understanding of what American was requesting, he was just unable to 
provide it. 
b. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Impute Rochelle's 
Agent's Understanding of The Financial Capability Clause 
to Rochelle. 
The trial court erred in failing to impute the knowledge of Rochelle's agent, 
Mr. Larson, to Rochelle regarding what evidence of Rochelle's financial ability to 
close Rochelle needed to provide American to satisfy Paragraph 3. Imputation of 
an agent's knowledge to a principal is a conclusion of law by the trial court that is 
reviewed for correctness. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 
1311,1313 (Utah 1991); Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P. 2d 1234,1251 (Utah 1998). 
Under Utah law, personal knowledge of an agent is imputed to the principal 
"concerning a matter as to which . . . it is his duty to give the principal information." 
Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 157 (Utah 1991). "An agent's 
knowledge of matters within the scope of his or her authority is imputed to his or her 
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principal, for it is presumed that such knowledge will be disclosed to the principal." 
Maoris v. Sculptured Software. Inc.. 2001 UT 43, ^  21, 24 P.3d 984 (citing FAM Fin. 
Corp. v. Hansen Dairy. Inc.. 617 P.2d 327, 329-30 (Utah 1980). 
In the matter at hand, Marshall Larson acted as Rochelle's real estate agent 
regarding the purchase of the Property and was associated with Fairbourn during 
the events relevant hereto. (T. 390-92.) At trial, Mr. Larson testified that after 
American rejected the initial First Security letter, his understanding was that Mr. 
Alvarez of American was "saying that he needs some kind of credit lines or 
something stronger: and that American requested evidence that's "got to have 
something about lines of credit." (T. 420-21.) When Mr. Larson met with Mr. Simon 
of First Security to obtain stronger evidence, he testified that he had indicated that 
such evidence "has got to have something credit or something mores substantial" 
and that Mr. Simon indicated he couldn't "make any guarantees." (T. 423-24.) Mr. 
Larson further testified that he jokingly requested Mr. Simon "to give me a 
guarantee and have it notarized that you will give me the money." (T. 450.) 
As Rochelle's agent, such knowledge and understanding is imputed to 
Rochelle.5 The trial court's conclusion that American "declined to provide any 
meaningful clarification of his interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle" is not 
consistent with the testimony of Rochelle's agent regarding the same. (R. 237; 
5As a dual agent, all knowledge of Mr. Fairbourn about American's needs 
should also be imputed to Rochelle. 
E \Laurie\Ameft»ous\FairAppeal\SCBnef wpd Page-61-
Addendum "A" attached hereto at page 7.) Imputation of such knowledge to 
Rochelle mandates reversal of the trial court's ruling in favor of Fairbourn. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FAIRBOURN HAD 
PRODUCED AN "ABLE" BUYER. 
The trial court erred in failing to find that Fairbourn had met its contractual 
duties under the Listing Agreement to provide American an "able" buyer, a condition 
precedent to earning commission, pursuant to Utah law as set forth in Sproul v. 
Parks. 116 Utah 368, 210 P. 2d 436 Utah (1949). (See Larson testimony at page 
445-46 where he agrees that he must provide a willing and able buyer.) Though 
this issue was raised and briefed before the trial court, the trial court did not mention 
it its Memorandum Decision. (R. 219-21; R. 231-40.) A question of "contract 
interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence [is a] matter of law" and the 
appellate court accords "the trial court's interpretation no presumption of 
correctness." Lee v. Barnes. 1999 UT Ct. App. 126, fl 7, 977 P.2d 550 (citations 
omitted). 
The Listing Agreement between Fairbourn and American states that 
Fairbourn is to procure an offer from Rochelle "at the price and upon the terms set 
forth herein" and "upon any other terms or conditions acceptable to" American. (R. 
410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) Those terms include the financial 
capability of Rochelle as contained in Paragraph 3 which is therefore a condition 
precedent to Fairbourn earning commissions and has been defined in case law in 
this jurisdiction as well as others as argued above in Section III. A. iii. As the Utah 
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Supreme Court stated in Sproul. an able buyer "does not mean a purchaser who 
will not be ready for some time." Sproul. at 438. 
The Court of Appeals mistakenly characterized American's arguments on this 
issue that the phrase a "ready, willing, and able buyer" would need to be 
incorporated into the Listing Agreement, which the Court indicated would be an 
inappropriate rewriting of the Listing Agreement. Fairbourn at fl 14 F.N. 1. As set 
forth in the preceding paragraph, the Listing Agreement incorporates the terms and 
conditions of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 410, Ex. No. 3; Addendum "D" attached 
hereto.) Fairbourn therefore had the duty to procure a buyer, Rochelle, who could 
"[wjithin Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties . . . supply 
[American] with evidence of financial capability to close on the Property." (R. 410, 
Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) The express language of the Listing 
Agreement incorporates the financial capability condition of the Purchase 
Agreement located in Paragraph 3 and is therefore a condition precedent to 
Fairbourn earning commission. 
In the case at hand, the evidence is undisputed that Rochelle intended to 
obtain a loan from which it would satisfy the balance of the purchase price at the 
closing of the purchase. (R. 234; Addendum "B" attached hereto at page 4.) As 
evidenced by the two letters prepared by First Security, Rochelle could not 
demonstrate within the 14 day period a current ability to close the purchase but was 
dependent upon a non-binding expression of willingness from First Security that 
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sometime in the future it might make a loan to Rochelle to purchase the Property, 
dependent upon numerous factors. (R. 410, Ex. Nos. 7 and 11; Addenda "E" and 
"F" attached hereto.) Rochelle did not demonstrate within 14 days that it had a 
current ability to purchase; at best Rochelle demonstrated a future contingent ability 
to purchase the Property. Because Rochelle was not able to satisfy the condition 
precedent set forth in Paragraph 3 evidencing that it was an "able" buyer, American 
was entitled to terminate the Purchase Agreement. Because this condition 
precedent was not satisfied, Fairbourn failed to procure a buyer on terms 
acceptable to American and is therefore not entitled to commissions. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court (i) 
overturn the Court of Appeals, (ii) hold that Appellees' commission was conditioned 
upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction, (iii) reverse the judgment of 
the trial court, and (iv) remand this matter to the trial court for calculation and award 
of Appellant's attorneys' fees and costs due under the Listing Agreement both at 
trial and on appeal. 
DATED this 7^ day of August, 2003. 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
JOHN L. ADAMS 
POOLE & ADAMS, L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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t> 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL, INC, a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
AMERICAN HOUSING PARTNERS, INC, a 
Delaware corporation, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20020060-CA. 
April 3, 2003. 
Real estate broker brought action against real estate 
developer to recover sales commission from the sale 
of real property pursuant to listing agreement signed 
by the parties. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, Ronald E. Nehring, entered judgment in 
favor of broker in the amount of $153,000 plus 
attorney fees and costs. Developer appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, P.J, held that closing was 
not condition precedent to payment of commission. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Contracts <©=> 176(1) 
95kl76(l) 
[1] Contracts <®=> 176(3) 
95kl76(3) 
A contract's interpretation may be either a question of 
law, determined by the words of the agreement, or a -
question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of 
intent. 
[2] Appeal and Error <©=> 842(8) 
30k842(8) 
[2] Appeal and Error <@^ 1008.1(10) 
30kl008.1(10) 
If a contract is not integrated or is ambiguous and the 
trial court finds facts regarding the parties' intent 
based on extrinsic evidence, the Court of Appeals will 
not disturb the findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous; however, questions of contract 
interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic 
evidence are matters of law, and on such questions 
the Court of Appeals accords the trial court's 
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interpretation no presumption of correctness. 
[3] Brokers <@^>63(2) 
65k63(2) 
Real estate broker, by procuring and presenting to 
real estate developer an offer to buy developer's real 
property, performed its contractual duties under terms 
of listing agreement, and was thus deserving of 
commission "in cash at closing," even though closing 
ultimately did not occur; absent words widely 
recognized as conditional, listing agreement phrase, 
"due and payable at closing," did not create condition 
precedent to broker's commission, but rather merely 
established time for commission to be paid. 
[4] Brokers <®^40 
65k40 
A "listing agreement" is a contract between a real 
estate broker and a seller. 
[5] Contracts <@^ 147(2) 
95kl47(2) 
When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the 
contract's four corners to determine the parties' 
intentions, which are controlling. 
[6] Contracts <®=* 147(2) 
95kl47(2) 
[6] Evidence <®^ =>448 
157k448 
If the language within the four corners of the contract 
is unambiguous, then a court does not resort to 
extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, and a 
court determines the parties' intentions from the plain 
meaning of the contractual language as a matter of 
law. 
[7] Brokers <®=*63(1) 
65k63(l) 
[7] Brokers <§=> 64(1) 
65k64(l) 
Absent a contractual provision which conditions the 
right to a commission on the performance or part 
performance of the buyer, the broker is not an insurer 
of the subsequent performance of the contract and is 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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(Cite as: 68 P.3d 1038) 
Page 2 
not deprived of his right to a commission by the 
failure or refusal of one party to perform. 
[8] Brokers <®^>63(2) 
65k63(2) 
[8] Brokers <©^>64(2) 
65k64(2) 
If a broker's listing agreement imposes unconditional 
liability for broker's fees or is silent on the matter, a 
court will not imply a condition making such fees 
contingent on either the buyer's or seller's 
performance of the purchase contract. 
[9] Brokers <®=*64(1) 
65k64(l) 
Absent a contractual provision to the contrary, a real 
estate broker, whose commission is due at closing, is 
entitled to full commission at closing regardless of the 
buyer's subsequent performance. 
[10] Brokers <§==>63(2) 
65k63(2) 
[10] Brokers <®^>64(2) 
65k64(2) 
The phrase in a broker's listing agreement, "at 
closing," by itself, is not a condition precedent to a 
broker's receipt of commission. 
*1039 Dennis K. Poole and John L. Adams, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Neil R. Sabin, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before JACKSON, P.J., and GREENWOOD, and 
ORME. JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
K 1 American Housing Partners, Inc. (American) 
appeals from a judgment awarding Fairbourn 
Commercial, Inc. (Fairbourn) a real estate 
commission of $153,000 plus attorney fees and costs 
in the amount of $45,001. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1) 2 In September 1998, American, an experienced 
real estate developer, entered into a contract to 
purchase real property in West Jordan, Utah (the 
property) from a group of sellers (the Coon Group). 
Armando Alvarez (Alvarez), a licensed real estate 
broker, handled all the transactions for American, 
which is owned by Alvarez's brother. 
t 3 In early 1999, Alvarez approached Jim Fairbourn 
(Jim) of Fairbourn, a real estate brokerage, seeking 
assistance in selling the property. At the time Alvarez 
began his conversations with Jim, American had been 
unable to gain the approvals from the City of West 
Jordan necessary to develop the property. Because of 
the delay in city approval, the Coon Group and 
American signed an Addendum to the sales contract 
extending the closing date until April 5, 1999. In 
April 1999, the city denied the zoning application. 
K 4 In June or July 1999, Alvarez solicited Jim to 
help him find a buyer for the entire property due to 
his frustrations with the city. In late July 1999, the 
Coon Group threatened to terminate its agreement to 
sell the property because American had failed to 
close. In late August 1999, the Coon Group agreed to 
reinstate their contract of sale with American through 
December 1, 1999. In the meantime, the city 
approved the necessary zoning for the property 
contingent on American acquiring an adjacent parcel 
of property owned by an opponent of American's 
proposed development. 
U 5 In August 1999, Marshall Larson (Larson), an 
agent for Fairbourn, obtained an interested buyer for 
the property. The buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. 
(Rochelle), was an affiliate under common control 
with Liberty Homes, Inc., a large Utah homebuilder. 
On August 6, 1999, David C. Clark (Clark), *1040 
manager of Rochelle, signed a letter of intent to 
purchase the property for $23,000 per lot. 
K 6 Fairbourn represented American in the 
transaction and Larson represented Rochelle under a 
"dual agency" agreement. After receipt of the letter 
of intent, a meeting occurred in American's office. 
Those present were Alvarez, Jim, Larson, Clark, and 
Irv Gardner (Gardner) of Rochelle. The meeting 
included a discussion of American's expectations 
regarding Rochelle's ability to perform. 
% 7 On August 13, 1999, Rochelle made an offer to 
buy the property. The offer was presented to 
American on a preprinted Real Estate Purchase 
Contract with a handwritten addendum. The offer 
was accompanied by a Single Party Listing and Sale 
Agreement (Listing Agreement), identifying Rochelle 
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as the prospective buyer The Listing Agreement 
provided for payment to Fairbourn of a $1,500 per lot 
commission based on the sale of the 99 lots at a price 
of $2,277,000 Alvarez signed the Listing Agreement 
but rejected the offer 
U 8 Rochelle presented a second offer several days 
later American submitted a written counteroffer (the 
Purchase Contract) that incorporated the terms of the 
second offer and added several new provisions 
Among the new provisions was a term entitled 
"Fmancial Capability," which provided 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this 
Agreement by both parties, Buyer shall supply 
Seller with evidence of financial capability to 
close on the Property within the time frame 
referenced above In the event Buyer is unable to 
provide said evidence, Seller shall at its sole 
option cancel this Agreement and neither party 
shall have any further obligation to the other 
f 9 On August 30, 1999, Alvarez, Jim, Larson, and 
Clark met and reviewed the Purchase Contract, 
including the "Financial Capability" clause, which 
required evidence withm fourteen days of signing 
After initialing a change regarding the closing of the 
Purchase Contract, the seller and buyer signed 
K 10 Pursuant to the Fmancial Capability clause, 
Rochelle arranged for a letter from Cy Simon 
(Simon), a construction loan officer of First Security 
Bank, to be delivered to American Alvarez rejected 
the letter as satisfying the requirement of "evidence of 
financial capability " Rochelle then arranged for a 
second letter, dated September 17, 2000, to be sent 
from the Bank providing more detail as to the 
availability of credit lines and amounts of current 
loans m place 
% 11 Alvarez also rejected the second letter, and on 
September 21, 1999, he telephoned Fairbourn to 
inform it that he was rejectmg the letters and 
terminating the Purchase Contract The sole reason 
Alvarez gave for rejectmg the letters was that they did 
not comply with the Fmancial Capability provision of 
the Purchase Contract Rochelle then recovered its 
earnest money deposit, and Alvarez sold the property 
to another purchaser 
T| 12 Fairbourn filed suit m the Third District Court 
agamst American to recover its sales commission 
pursuant to the Listmg Agreement On December 18, 
2001, the trial court entered judgment agamst 
American for the sum of $153,000 plus attorney fees 
and costs American now appeals 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] U 13 American challenges the trial court's 
determination that Fairbourn was entitled to a 
commission under the terms of the Listmg 
Agreement Specifically, American challenges the 
trial court's interpretation of the Listmg Agreement's 
language that Fairbourris commission was due at the 
closmg of the Rochelle sale 
A contract's interpretation may be either a 
question of law, determined by the words of the 
agreement, or a question of fact, determined by 
extrinsic evidence of mtent If a contract is not 
mtegrated or is ambiguous and the trial court 
finds facts regardmg the parties' mtent based on 
extrinsic evidence, we will not disturb the 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous 
However, [qjuestions of contract interpretation 
not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are 
matters of law, and on such questions *1041 we 
accord the trial court's interpretation no 
presumption of correctness 
Schmidt v Downs, 775 P 2d 427, 430 (Utah 
Ct App 1989) (alteration m original) (quotations and 
citations omitted) 
f 14 American also challenges the trial court's initial 
determination that the terms of the Purchase Contract 
are ambiguous, the court's taking of extrinsic 
evidence, and its factual findings based on the 
evidence admitted [FN1] Fairbourn defends each 
link m the trial court's approach It is unnecessary for 
us to consider each of these arguments, however, 
because there are proper grounds to affirm See 
Buehner Block Co v UWC Assocs, 752 P 2d 892, 
895 (Utah 1988) ("[W]e may affirm trial court 
decisions on any proper ground(s), despite the trial 
court's havmg assigned another reason for its 
ruling ") Specifically, the meaning of the Purchase 
Contract is not the dispositive issue m this appeal 
Rather, the dispositive issue is whether Fairbourn is 
entitled to a commission under the terms of the 
Listmg Agreement Thus, American's arguments 
based on the Purchase Contract fail to distinguish its 
separate contractual obligations to Fairbourn under 
the Listmg Agreement See Robert Langston, Ltd v 
McQuame, 741 P 2d 554, 558 (Utah CtApp 1987) 
(reversmg trial court's denial of commission to real 
estate broker where trial court confused seller's 
obligation to buyer with its separate obligation to 
broker) Because the terms of the Listmg Agreement 
are dispositive of American's obligations to pay 
Copr © West 2003 No Claim to Orig U.S. Govt Works 
68 P.3d 1038 
(Cite as: 68 P.3d 1038, *1041) 
Page 4 
Fairbourn a commission, we need not analyze the 
ambiguities of American's Purchase Contract with 
Rochelle. [FN2] 
FN1. American also argues the trial court 
improperly applied Utah law regarding who 
is a "ready, willing, and able buyer," 
phraseology often employed in listing 
agreements. The Listing Agreement in this 
case, however, does not contain this 
language. Thus, we cannot read it into the 
agreement. See Bakowski v. Mountain 
States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62,K 19, 52 PJd 
1179 ("We will not make a better contract 
for the parties than they have made for 
themselves. Nor will we avoid the 
contract's plain language to achieve an 
'equitable' result."); Utah Farm Bur. Ins. 
Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47,K 6, 980 P.2d 685 
(stating courts "may not rewrite [a] contract 
... if the language is clear") (internal 
quotations and citations omitted) (omission 
in original). 
FN2. American also contends the trial court 
erred in not holding Fairbourn to the 
standard of a fiduciary with relation to 
American. American asserts it raised this 
issue in closing arguments, which were not 
recorded. However, the trial court did not 
mention the argument in its memorandum 
decision. We cannot rely on American's 
assertion that is unsupported by the record 
on appeal, and therefore, we cannot 
consider this issue on appeal. See State v. 
Marquez, 2002 UT App 127,1 ?> 54 P.3d 
637 (refusing to address an argument not 
preserved in the trial court). 
ANALYSIS 
[3][4][5][6] % 15 A listing agreement is a contract 
between a real estate broker and a seller. See 
generally Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Manias, 699 
P.2d 730 (Utah 1985). 
When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to 
the contract's four corners to determine the 
parties' intentions, which are controlling. If the 
language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, then a court does not resort to 
extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, and 
a court determines the parties' intentions from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language as a 
matter of law. 
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 
62,1116, 52 P.3d 1179. 
% 16 In this case, the Listing Agreement's language 
regarding Fairbourn's commission is clear and 
unambiguous. It provides: 
IF, AT ANY TIME, WITHIN SAID PERIOD, 
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. procures, 
or presents an offer to purchase said property 
from [Rochelle], at the price and upon the terms 
and conditions set forth herein, or at any other 
price or upon any other terms or conditions 
acceptable to me, I agree to pay a commission 
equal to $1,500.00 per lot. 
According to this plain language, American agreed 
to pay Fairbourn a commission if it procured or 
presented an offer from Rochelle to purchase under 
the price, terms, and conditions in the Listing 
Agreement. The price stipulated in the Listing 
Agreement was $2,277,000 and the terms were "Cash 
at Closing." 
*1042 K 17 On August 30, 1999, American and 
Rochelle entered into a Purchase Contract. Under the 
terms of the Purchase Contract, Rochelle agreed to 
pay American $2,277,000 cash at closing for the 
property. Thus, Fairbourn procured or presented an 
offer from Rochelle that satisfied the requirements of 
the Listing Agreement and was accepted by 
American. Accordingly, Fairbourn performed its 
contractual duties under the Listing Agreement and is 
entitled to its commission from American. 
[7] H 18 American contends Fairbourn is not entitled 
to a commission because the Listing Agreement 
conditioned the receipt of commission on completion 
of the sale of the property to Rochelle. The general 
rule in Utah is that "[a]bsent a contractual provision 
which conditions the right to a commission on the 
performance or part performance of the buyer, the 
broker is not an insurer of the subsequent 
performance of the contract and is not deprived of his 
right to a commission by the failure or refusal" of one 
party to perform. Robert Langston, Ltd. v. 
McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). The Listing Agreement provides: 
ALL COMMISSIONS shall be due and payable 
at closing.... 
[8] 1| 19 If a broker's listing agreement imposes 
unconditional liability for broker's fees or is silent on 
the matter, a court will not imply a condition making 
such fees contingent on either the buyer's or seller's 
performance of the purchase contract. See Bushnell 
Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah 
1983) (refusing to adopt minority rule, which 
conditions broker's commission on buyer's 
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performance if contract does not expressly condition 
liability for commission); Robert Langston Ltd., 741 
P.2d at 558 n. 7 (refusing to condition broker's 
commission on parties' performance where contract 
did not contain conditional language). 
[9] \ 20 Thus, we must determine whether the phrase 
"due and payable at closing" creates a condition 
precedent to Fairbourn's entitlement to commission or 
whether it merely establishes the time for the 
commission to be paid. In Utah, absent a contractual 
provision to the contrary, a real estate broker, whose 
commission is due at closing, is entitled to full 
commission at closing regardless of the buyer's 
subsequent performance. See Bushnell Real Estate, 
Inc., 672 P.2d at 748-51 (affirming trial court's award 
of commission to broker because listing agreement, 
which provided commission was due at closing, did 
not condition broker's receipt of commission on 
buyer's performance). 
[10] \ 21 However, Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. and 
Robert Langston Ltd. do not address the precise 
question of whether a real estate broker, whose 
commission is due and payable at closing, is entitled 
to commission when a closing does not occur. This is 
a matter of first impression in Utah. The majority 
rule, [FN3] which we now adopt, is that the phrase "at 
closing," by itself, is not a condition precedent to a 
broker's receipt of commission. 
FN3. See, e.g., Finno Dev., Inc. v. Smedes 
Realty, No. CV010163687S, 2001 WL 
420584, at *1, 2001 Conn.Super. LEXIS 
995, at *3 (April 11, 2001) (holding that 
contract providing commission was to be 
paid within 72 hours of closing did not 
condition the payment of commission on the 
closing); Don J. McMurray Co. v. 
Wiesman, 199 Neb. 494, 260 N.W.2d 196, 
200-01 (1977) (contract providing 
commission was "due and payable ... at the 
time of loan closing," did not condition the 
broker's commission on the actual loan 
closing); Samuel R. Laden, Inc. v. 
Lidgerwood Estates, Inc., 15 N.J. Misc. 
498, 192 A. 425, 428 (1937) ("In order to 
absolve a party from the payment of 
commissions, it must clearly appear by the 
contract with his broker that the payment of 
commissions was made contingent upon the 
actual transfer of title.") (Internal 
quotations and citation omitted.). But see 
Arvida Realty Sales, Inc. v. William R. 
Tinnerman & Co., 536 So.2d 1041, 1042 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988) (holding brokers 
were not entitled to commission where 
agreement provided commission was 
payable at closing of real estate transaction 
because brokers did not produce clients that 
closed); Doss v. Moses & Sloan P'ship, 
C.A. No. L- 88-212, 1989 WL 25537, at *2, 
1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 845, at *5 (March 
17, 1989) (determining broker's right to 
payment was subject to an express condition 
where owner promised to pay commission 
on closing of the deal). 
f 22 The majority rule accords with the presumption 
in Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. that a broker is entitled 
to commission and is not an insurer of the buyer's 
performance. *1043 See Bushnell Real Estate, Inc., 
672 P.2d at 748-51. Moreover, American and 
Fairbourn could have included in the Listing 
Agreement words widely recognized as conditional, 
such as: only, unless, until, or if. [FN4] The fact that 
they chose not to include such conditional language 
indicates they did not intend Fairbourn's commission 
to be conditioned on the closing of the deal. 
Accordingly, we hold Fairbourn is entitled to a 
commission. 
FN4. These words have been recognized by 
other jurisdictions as making a broker's 
commission conditional. See Harbour Inn, 
Inc. v. Kagan, 343 So.2d 1353, 1355 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977) (denying brokerage 
fees where commission was to "only be paid 
upon ... the actual consummation of the 
loan"); Kay v. Sperling, 83 So.2d 881, 882 
(Fla.1955) (denying brokerage fees where 
commission was not to be paid " 'unless and 
until a deal [was] consummated'") (citation 
omitted); William A. White & Sons v. La 
Touraine-Bickford's Foods, Inc., 50 A.D.2d 
547, 375 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 
(N.Y.App.Div.1975) (denying brokerage 
fees where agreement provided " 'if a sale is 
consummated by yourself a commission ... 
will be paid'") (citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
% 23 Fairbourn is entitled to a commission because it 
procured an offer from Rochelle to purchase the 
property according to the terms and conditions of the 
Listing Agreement. The phrase "at closing" did not 
condition Fairbourn's receipt of a commission on the 
actual closing, it merely indicated when the 
commission was due. Affirmed. 
K 24 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Judge, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC., a Utah 
corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN HOUSING PARTNERS INC., 
a Delaware corporation, and ARMANDO J. 
ALVAREZ, an individual 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 000902534 
JUDGE RONALD E. NEHRING 
On August 6th, 7th, and 29th' 20011 presided over a bench trial in this matter. Following the 
conclusion of the trial, I took the case under advisement. Now, having fully considered the 
arguments of counsel, submissions of the parties and the applicable legal authority I render the 
following Memorandum Decision which incorporates my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
In early 1999, defendant Armando Alvarez approached James Fairbourn of plaintiff 
Fairbourn Commercial Inc., a real estate brokerage, for assistance in selling a parcel of real property 
located in West Jordan, Utah. Mr. Alvarez was acting on behalf of defendant American Housing 
Partners, Inc. He was also a licensed real estate broker. 
American was wholly owned by Armando Alvarez's brother, Sergio. American had entered 
into an agreement to buy the West Jordan property from its owners, the Coon's. At the time that 
ftftfi^l 
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Alvarez began his conversations with Mr. Fairbourn, American had encountered considerable 
obstacles in gaining the approvals from the city of West Jordan necessary to develop the property. 
These problems placed American's purchase agreement with the Coons in peril. 
During the first seven months of 1999, American pressed ahead on three fronts: the effort to 
gain municipal approval of its development plan; the effort to preserve the purchase agreement with 
the Coons; and the effort to find a buyer for the property who would pay the Coon's selling price, 
put some money in American's pocket, and free American from its entanglements with West Jordan 
officials. Mr. Fairbourn and his company were enlisted to aid American in the third undertaking. 
He proposed that American seek a buyer for the property marketed as "paper lots" - lots which had 
received plat approval but which had not been improved. 
The pressure on American to act mounted in late July 1999 when the Coons notified 
American that it was "ending and terminating any and all agreements" relating to the property 
because American had failed to close. In late August 1999, the Coons agreed to reinstate its contract 
of sale with American through December 1,1999. As American worked to salvage the deal with the 
Coons it scored a success with West Jordan when it persuaded the city to approve the necessary 
zoning for the property if American would acquire an adjacent parcel of property owned by an 
opponent of American's proposed development. 
In this uncertain setting, Fairbourn moved ahead with the performance of its task. Through 
a contact with real estate agent Marshall Larson, later to become employed by Fairbourn, Fairbourn 
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learned of a potential buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. Rochelle was an affiliate of Liberty Homes, 
a major residential home builder in the Salt Lake City area. 
In early August 1999, Rochelle made a preliminary proposal to buy the property. Rochelle's 
proposal, presented in the form of "an official notice of intent" letter, led to a meeting among 
representatives of American, Rochelle, and Fairbourn. Numerous elements of possible transactions 
were discussed at the meeting, including a remark by Mr. Alavarez that any deal must include a 
provision concerning the buyer's ability to perform. Mr. Fairbourn, who attended the meeting, was 
aware of the exigent circumstances in which American found itself and recognized that American 
had a legitimate interest in securing a buyer who could be counted on to perform. 
On August 13,1999, Rochelle made an offer to buy the property. The offer was presented 
through a pre-printed Real Estate Purchase Contract and handwritten addendum. It was 
accompanied by a Single Party Listing and Sale Agreement which obligated American to pay 
Fairbourn a $1,500.00 per lot commission if Rochelle bought the property for $2,277,000.00 cash. 
The Listing Agreement indicated that the property contained "approx (sic) 99 undeveloped lots." 
American rejected Rochelle's offer. Rochelle presented a second offer several days later 
which was met with a counter offer. American's counter offer was presented in typewritten form 
and incorporated the terms of Rochelle's second offer while adding several new provisions. Among 
the new provisions was term titled "Financial Capability." This term stated: 
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Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both 
parties, buyer shall supply to seller with evidence of financial 
capability to close on the Property within the time frame reference 
above. In the event Buyer is unable to provide said evidence, Seller 
shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and neither party shall 
have any further obligation to the other. 
Mr. Alvarez inserted the Financial Capability term into the counter offer because under the 
terms of the proposed sale Rochelle's duty to perform was not contingent on its acquisition of 
financing pursuant to paragraph two of the Purchase Contract. While this contract provision, when 
elected, excuses the buyer's duty to perform if he is unable to obtain financing under the specified 
terms, the buyer is required pursuant to paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract to make timely 
application for financing. If financing is unavailable on the terms agreed to in the Purchase Contract, 
a buyer may nevertheless insist that the seller perform by "providing Seller with absolute assurance" 
that the proceeds required to close the sale are available. Mr. Alvarez believed that the Financial 
Capability term would serve as a substitute for these "buyer's undertakings" which did not apply to 
Rochelle because it did not elect to make its purchase contingent on financing. 
The parties met on the day the counter offer was accepted. At the meeting they reviewed the 
terms of the sale and made several changes to the counter offer by interlineation. The Financial 
Capability clause was discussed at the meeting. Marshall Larson, a real estate agent employed by 
Fairbourn but who represented Rochelle under the terms of a dual agency agreement, believed that 
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Mr, Alvarez intended to require a letter from Rochelle's bank in the form of an unofficial loan 
commitment. 
Acting on this interpretation, Mr. Larson contacted Cy Simon, a construction loan officer at 
First Security Bank and sought a letter to provide evidence of financial capability. Mr. Simon and 
First Security had a banking relationship with Liberty and Rochelle. Although Mr. Larson asked Mr. 
Simon to provide a loan commitment, I do not find that Mr. Alvarez expressed to anyone at anytime 
his intention that only a binding loan commitment or letter of credit would satisfy his definition of 
adequate financial capability. The participants in this transaction shared considerable experience and 
sophistication in real estate development and financing. I credit the observation made by David 
Clark, the owner of Liberty Homes who negotiated on behalf of Rochelle, that he would have taken 
note of a demand that the evidence be in the form of proof of available cash, a loan commitment, or 
letter or credit because none of this evidence could have been obtained from a bank within the 14 
days allotted for its production. The letter, which Mr. Simon prepared for American on behalf of 
Rochelle, stated, "I would not expect having difficulty making acquisition and development loans 
[to Rochelle] in the future, barring something unforeseen in the economy." 
Mr. Alvarez rejected Mr. Simon's letter. Mr. Alvarez told Mr. Fairbourn, who was acting 
as American's agent under the dual agency agreement, that the evidence from First Security must 
reference a line of credit and that the contents of Mr. Simon's letter was "not what we had 
discussed." Mr. Fairbourn met with Mr. Larson and Mr. Simon for the purpose of discussing the 
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contents of a second "evidence" letter. Mr. Simon prepared a letter dated September 17,1999 which 
referenced credit lines held by Liberty and Rochelle and, while making allowance for predictable 
guarded banker rhetoric, painted a positive picture of Rochelle's financial strength. 
On September 21,1999, Mr. Alvarez told Mr. Fairbourn that he had rej ected the second letter 
and that American was terminating the purchase contract because Rochelle had failed to provide the 
necessary evidence of financial capability. 
The merits of Fairbourn's claim that American's termination of the purchase contract was 
wrongful turns on the outcome of an analysis of the Financial Capability clause. I find that the 
provision is ambiguous. The language of the clause gives no guidance to either the quantity or 
quality of evidence which Rochelle must produce to demonstrate financial capability. Despite Mr. 
Alvarez's contention that the provision was drafted as a substitute for paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase 
Contract, it has none of the precision of, for example, the "absolute assurance" language found in 
that paragraph. 
The extrinsic evidence relating to the Financial Capability clause yields the conclusion that 
Rochelle reasonably interpreted the clause in a manner consistent with paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase 
Contract to the extent that it required evidence that First Security Bank make a commitment to loan 
Rochelle money "subject only to changes of conditions in the Buyer's credit worthiness and to 
normal loan closing procedures." 
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Although Mr. Fairbourn, who represented American throughout the aborted transaction, was 
aware of the circumstances which made a strong buyer important to American, he could not have 
been expected to draw from this knowledge the details of the financial capability evidence that Mr. 
Alvarez presumably knew but did not communicate either to Mr. Fairbourn or Rochelle. By 
contrast, Mr. Alvarez had ample reason to know what Rochelle's interpretation of the Financial 
Capability clause was. The pre-printed Purchase Contract gives legal expression to the respective 
interests of buyers and sellers in the face of the practical business reality that most real estate 
transactions involve financing, provided either by the seller or by a third party. In this transaction 
between experienced developers, it could not have come as a surprise to Mr. Alvarez to receive the 
first letter from Mr. Simon. Even if Mr. Alvarez had been surprised by the contents of the letter, he 
was in an advantaged position to remedy what he then knew to be Rochelle's misapprehension of 
his expectations for evidence of financial capability. He nevertheless declined to provide any 
meaningful clarification of his interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle. 
Mr. Alvarez drafted the Financial Capability clause on behalf of American. American was, 
therefore, wholly responsible for its ambiguity. The existence of the ambiguity should have become 
apparent to Mr. Alvarez upon receiving Mr. Simon's letter, and his knowledge of the ambiguity 
coupled with his responsibility for it created an obligation for Mr. Alvarez to clarify the ambiguity. 
He failed, however, to do this and it is therefore appropriate in this setting to invoke the principle 
that words used in an agreement are construed against the drafter. Jones, Waldo. Holbrook & 
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McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996). The propriety of turning to this rule 
of contract interpretation is buttressed in this case by equitable considerations. In Simonson v. 
Travis, 728 P.2d 999 (Utah, 1986), our Supreme Court construed the language of a release against 
the defendant's insurer after the plaintiff sought clarification of an ambiguity in the release and the 
adjuster's explanation was inadequate. The Court found that it would be inequitable to enforce the 
release against the plaintiff when the "defendant was wholly responsible for the ambiguity and the 
subsequent ambiguous explanation." Id. at 1002. 
Accordingly, I find that American breached the terms of its listing agreement with Fairbourn. 
Fairbourn is entitled to the benefit of its bargain, or $1,500.00 for 99 lots resulting in a total damage 
award against American of $148,500.00 together with an award of reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs.. 
I reject Fairbourn's claim for relief against Mr. Alvarez based on alleged violations of Utah 
law governing the regulation of those engaged in the real estate business, Utah Code Ann. §§61-2-1-
24 (2000). Fairbourn insists that it has a private right of action against Mr. Alvarez pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §61-2-17 (4) which states, 
If any person receives any money or its equivalent, as commission, 
compensation, or profit by or in consequence of a violation of this 
chapter, that person is liable for an additional penalty of not less than 
the amount of the money received and not more than three times 
the amount of money received, as may be determined by the court. 
This penalty may be sued for in any court of competent jurisdiction, 
and recovered by any person aggrieved for his own use and benefit. 
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The misconduct which gives rise to a cause of action under this section is limited to acts 
performed by persons regulated under Chapter 2 of Title 61 in the course of their business as a real 
estate agent or broker. I decline Fairbourn's invitation to broadly interpret this provision to reach 
all business activities of a licensed agent or broker. Such a reading of §61-2-17 would lead to the 
clearly irrational result of exposing everyone holding a real estate license for treble damages for 
their acts of dishonestly, or lapses in integrity irrespective of whether the conduct occurred in 
connection with their activities as an agent or broker. 
Mr. Alvarez was not acting as a real estate agent in this transaction and his conduct is not 
subject to the imposition of the penalty provision of §61-2-17. 
Finally, Fairbourn argues that Alvarez improperly interfered with its economic relations by 
breaching the Purchase Contract with Rochelle in order to enter into a more lucrative contract with 
another party. In order to recover damages under the tort of interference with prospective economic 
relations a plaintiff must prove "(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs 
existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) 
causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh Furniture v T. Richard Isom 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). 
Plaintiff fails to prove that Alvarez intentionally interfered with Fairbourn's economic 
relations with American for an improper purpose or by improper means. While I have concluded 
that the terms of the Purchase Agreement should be construed against defendant, I am unwilling to 
ascribe an outright "intentional" or "improper" label to Alvarez's conduct. A deliberate breach of 
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contract in and of itself does not constitute an improper means. Id. at 309. A tort action only exists 
if the interference with business relations is not an incidental consequence of the breach— but an 
actual motive therefor. Id. at 310. In this case I am unable to make that conclusion and 
consequently plaintiffs cause of action against Alvarez for tortious interference with economic 
relations is denied. 
Dated this ^ ? day of October, 2001. 
l^^^J^fj, 
RONALD E. NEHRING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, 
to the following, this^)day of October, 2001: 
Neil R. Sabin 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dennis K. Poole 
John L. Adams 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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INVESTMENT-rNDUS TRIAL-COMMERCIAL 
This is a legally binding Contract The Bu>er and Seller may legally agree in writing to alter 
or delete provisions of this form If you desire legal or tax advice consult your attorne) or tax law)er 
_ _ - EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
e Buyer F^utHfrtLCL I/^JM&Q f /'£-S" L^d- offers to purchase the Propert) described below and deliver as Earnest 
»ney Deposit $ Sp£>V* 7 in the form of tfj ^ C^ to 
the Brokerage to be deposited within three business days after Acceptance by all parties of this Offer to Purchase 
the Title/Escrow Company identified below 
okerage or Title/Escrow Company £&jj£Z&«3frt/~^^ SZXuJfc^, Ctf 
ceiyed by on this date Phone Number 
fitje^Escrow Company for deposit no later than J^r_ (date) 
Other fiWMU^OjlU^ fa, - 3 tVt?5 4t*££g_ ntL(7*t&ft lte£^T3tiLCC0 
0 F F E R T O PURCHASE 
PROPERTY AftWK y//HL£e SH&htt//</d\) . Aftfedtr *_ f k,dTS 
dress / W C ^ T ~?%M ?Q. £ D &D iJC^T ^ City loe^T C&ptbtoJ County S C^ State Uf7f/f-
r legal description of Property see Q attached Addendum # Q preliminary title report when available as provided below 
I 1 INCLUDED I f_MS Unless excluded herein this sale shall include all fixtures presently attached to Property The following personal property 
ill also be included in this sale and conveyed under a separate Bill of Sale with Warranties as to title 4/^^h 
1 2 EXCLUDED ITEMS These items are excluded from this sale / ( / / ^ 
PURCHASI^PRICE AND FINANCING Buyer agrees to pay for Property as follows 
£_ /7lXO» " Earnest Money Deposit 
Loan Proceeds 
• Representing the liability to be assumed b> Buyer under an existing assumable loan • with Q without Seller being released of 
liability in tins approximate amount with Q Bu>er Q Seller agreeing to pay any loan transfer and assumption fees Any net differences 
between the approximate balance of the loan shown abo\e and the actual balance at Closing shall be then adjusted in • cash Q other 
• From new institutional financing on terms no less favorable to Buyer than the following Interest rate for first period prior to 
adjustment if any %, Amortization period , Term Other than these, the loan terms shall be the best 
obtainable under the loan for which Bu>er app'ies below 
Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum) 
Other 
1fQT?dit #Vb, Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Closing -
\017tmp. Total Purchase Price(Se£ /H^^i/Au/*^ 
CLOSING This transaction shall be closed on or before S.C€. / H A ^ O o s u % shall occur when (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each 
er (or to the Title/Escrow Company) all documents required by this Contract by Lender by written escrow instructions signed by Buyer and Seller, and by 
jhcable law, (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the Escrow/Title Company in the form of collected or cleared 
ids and (c) the deed which Seller has agreed to deliver under Section 6 has been recorded Buyer and Seller shall each pay one half of the escrow Closing 
, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as 
forth in this Section All deposits on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of Q date of 
>sing Q date of possession other 
POSSESSION Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer w ithin T~"/_^Q hours after Closing 
CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE At the signing of this Contract the Listing Agent J)m f*ie&&n£-4j represents __T Seller 
Buyer, and the Selling Agent /??/tf>S>jfrtti Z+pSihf repraents Q Seller .feCBuyer Buver and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Contract 
tten disclosure of agency relationship was provided to her/him ^ X ^ B u y e r s initials ( ) Sellers initials 
TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE (a) SeTIeTnas, or shall have at Closing, free title to Property and agrees to convey such title to 
yer by JST^general Q special warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as warranted under Section 10 6 (b) Seller agrees to pay for, and furnish Buyer 
"losing with a current standard from Owners policy of title insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price, (c) the title pohc) shall conform with 
ler's obligations under subsections (a) and (b) above Unless otherwise agreed under Section 8 4 die commitment shall conform with the title insurance 
rimitment provided under Section 7 1 
Q Buyer elects to obtain a full coverage extended ALTA policy of title insurance under section 6(b) The cost of tins coverage, above that of a standard 
Tier's policy shall be paid for by Q Buyer £) Seller Also the cost of a full-coverage ALTA survey shall be paid for by %( Buyer • Seller 
SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS OF SELLER AND BUYER 
7 1 SELLER DISCLOSURES Seller will deliver to Buyer the following Seller Disclosures no later than the number of calendar days indicated below 
ch shall be after Acceptance 
O (a) a Seller Property Disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller 
"p> (b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance required under Section 6, to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller 
including copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment __________-$ 
<£ (c) a copy of all loan documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber Property after Closing ________X> 
£1 (d) a copy of all leases and rental agreements now in effect with regard to Property together with a current rent roll 
£> (e) operating statements of Property for its last full fiscal years of operation plus the current fiscal year through 
, certified by Seller or by an independent auditor 
O (f) tenant Estoppel agreements 
er agrees to pay any charge for cancellation to the title commitment provided under subsection (b) 
If Seller does not provide any of the Seller Disclosures within the time periods agreed above, Buyer may either waive the particular Seller Disclosure 
Jirement by taking no timely action or Buyer may notify Seller in writing within /O calendar days after the expiration of the particular disclosure lime 
od the Seller is in Default under this Contract and that the remedies under Section J 6 are at Buyer's disposal The holder of the Eainest Money Deposit 
II, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of further written authorization 
n Seller 
7 2 BUYER UNDERTAKINGS. Buyer agrees to 
O (a) Apply for approval of the assumption or funding of the loan proceeds described in Section 2 by completing, signing, and 
delivering to the Lender the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender and by paying all fees as required by the 
lender, appraisal fee included, no later than calendar days after Acceptance, and 
0 (b) No later than calendar days after Acceptance obtain from the Lender to whom application is made under subsection 
(a) a written commitment to approve the assumption of the existing loan or to fund the new loan subject only to changes of conditions in 
Buyers credit worthiness and to normal loan closing procedures, or, if Buyer elects, providing Seller with absolute assurance, within 
the same time frame, that the proceeds required for funding the Total Purchase Price are available 
se Buyer Undertakings are at the sole expense ol Buyer and are material elements of this Contract for the benefit of both Buyer and Seller 
If Buyer does not initiate any Buyer Undertakings and provide Seller with written confirmation in the time agreed above, Seller may either waive the 
ticular Buyer Undertaking requirement by taking no time!) action or Seller may notify Buyer in writing within calendar days of the expiration of 
particular undertaking time period that Buyer is in Default under this Contract and that the remedies under Section 16 are at Sellers disposal The holder of 
Earnest Money Deposit shall upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice deliver to Seller the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of 
her written authorization from Buyer — 
73 ADDITIONAL DUE DILIGENCE Buyer shall undertake the following Addition Due Diligence elements at its own expense and for its own 
efit^ for the purpose of complying with the Contingencies under Section 8 
(a) Ordering and obtaining an appraisal of the Property if one is not otherwise required under Section 7 2, 
^(b) Ordering and obtaining a survey of the Property if one is not otherwise required under Section 6, 
(c) Ordering and obtaining a physical inspection report regarding, and completing a personal inspection of the Property, 
£f (d) Ordering and obtaining any environmentally related study of the Propert), _. _ i~ A AfiftWi M **~/ - 0\,c /„/j_v __ p/J<L<£~ 
fif (e) Requesting and obtaining verification that the Property complies with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, ordinances, and requlations with 
m-A i - — _ m n anA . _ . - , - „ U ! _ * _ ~ f . U „ D ~ ~ - _ - + 
iigence matters in Section 7. Buyer's discretion, however, for approving the terms of the loan under subsection 7.2 (b) is subject Buyer's covenant with 
,ard to minimally acceptable financing terms under Section 2. 
8.1. Buyer shall have calendar days after the times specified in Section 7.1 and 7.2 for receipt of Seller Disclosures and for completion of Bu>cr 
dertakings to review the content of the disclosures and the outcome of the undertakings. The latest applicable date under Section 7.1 and 7.2 applies for 
npleting a review of Additional Due Diligence matters under Section 7.3. 
8.2 If Buyer objects, Buyer and Seller shall have calendar days after receipt of the objections to resoKe Buyer's objections. Seller may. but shall 
be required to, resolve Buyer's objections. Likewise. Buyer is under no obligation to accept any resolution proposed b\ Seller. If Buyer's objections are not 
olved within the stated time, Buyer may void this Contract b> providing Seller written notice within the same stated lime The holder of the Earnest Money 
posh shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return Buyer's Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written 
horization from Seller. If this Contract is not voided by Buyer, Buyer's objection is deemed to have been waived. This waiver, however, does not affect 
rranties under Section 10. 
8.3 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure, Buyer Undertaking, or Due Diligence matter within the time 
ivided in Section 8.1 that item will be deemed approved by Buyer. 
8.4 Resolution of Buyer's objections under Section 8.2 shall be in writing and shall become part of this Contract. 
SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to: ££& Ah>b£&/teUa<P\ 
i terms of attached Addendum # / are incorporated into this Contract by this reference. 
SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the Property are limited to the following: 
10.1 When Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings: 
10.2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixtures, cooling, heating, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler. 
Ih indoor and outdoor), systems, appliances, and fireplaces in working order; 
10.3 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller; 
10.4 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Proper!) in working order aiid in compliance 
h governmental regulations; 
10.5 Seller will be responsible for repairing any of Seller's moving-related damage to the Property; 
10.6 At Closing, Seller will bring all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer current and all such 
igations which Buyer has not so assumed will be discharged; 
10.7 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of a building, environmental, or zoning code violation regarding the Property which 
; not been resolved. 
VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. After all contingencies have been removed and before Closing. Buyer may conduct a 
alk-through" inspection of the Property to determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1, 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4 are in the wan anted 
idilion and to verify that items included in Section I.I are presently on the Property. If any item is not in the warranted condition. Seller will correct, repair, 
replace it as necessary or, with the consent of Buyer and if required by Lender, escrow an amount at Closing to provide for such repair or replacement, 
yer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" inspection or to claim during the "walk-through" inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced 
Section 1.1 or is not in the condition warranted in Section 10, shall constitute a waiver of Buyer's rights under Section 1.1 and of the warranties contained in 
:tion 10. 
. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, no new leases entered into, and no substantial 
srations or improvements to the Property shall be undertaken without the prior written consent of Buyer. 
, AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person signing this Contract on its behalf 
nrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller and the heirs or successors in interest to Buyer or Seller. If Seller is not the vested Owner of 
Property but has control over the vested Owner's disposition of the Property, Seller agrees to exercise this control and deliver title under this Contract as if it 
\ been signed by the vested Owner. 
COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument together with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitutes the entire Contract 
ween the parties and supersedes all prior dealings between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by the written agreement of the parties. 
, DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the Earnest 
Dney Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to mediation in accordance with Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller 
jdiation Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. Any Agreement signed by the parties pursuant 
the mediation shall be binding. Jf mediation fails, the procedures applicable and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 
ill prohibit Buyer seeking specific performance by Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on Seller by means of summons or as otherwise 
"milted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard to the action provided that Buyer permits Seller to refrain from answering the complaint pending 
diation. Further, the parties may agree in writing to waive mediation. 
. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money 
posit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from 
Her as liquidated damages a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit or sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages. If Buyer elects to accept the 
uidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the 
rties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common law. 
. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out of this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it is authorized by: (a) Section 7.1, 7.2 and 8.2; (b) 
>arate written agreement of the parties, including an agreement under Section 15 if (a) does not apply; or (c) court order. 
. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing. 
. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction. Extension must be agreed to in writing by all 
rties. Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5:00 P.M. Mountain Time on the stated date. 
. COUNTERPARTS AND FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS. This Contract may be signed in counterparts, and each counterpart bearing an original 
mature shall be considered one document with all others bearing original signature. Also, facsimile transmission of any signed original document and re-
jnsmission of any signed facsimile transmission shall be the same as delivery of an original. 
. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Buyer or Seller, responding to an offer or counter offer of the other: (a) signs the offer or counter offer where 
ted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the other party's agent that the offer or counter offer has been signed as required. 
. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to ourchase the Property on the above terms and conditions If Seller does not accept this 
fer by ^
 f'tTO U A.M. <G£p.M. Mountain Time / p l < £ / / *>T~ / / £ Wff'. this offer shall lapse and the holder of the Earnest Money 
sposit shall return it to Buyer. ' 
ryer's Name (please print) / Offer Reference Date " Phone Number 
ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER \ ' ' v ' 
] Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
>ller's Name (please print) Dale Time Phone Number 
eller's Signature Notice Address 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHACE CONTRACT. 
THIS IS AN ADDENDUM to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Offer Reference Date of 8/12/99 , including all prior addenda and counter offers, between Rochelle 
Properties, L. C, as Buyer, and American Housing - Utah, as 
Seller, regarding the Property know as West Jordan Meadows Subdivision located at approximately 7800 
South and 5200 West, West Jordan City, Utah. See Exhibit A to be attached. The following terms are 
hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflict with any 
provisions of the REPC, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain 
the same: 
Earnest Money. The Earnest Money, in the amount of $5,000.00 shall be deposited with Merrill Title 
Company within four (4) business days of acceptance of this offer and addendum and held in an interest 
bearing account for the benefit of the buyer. 
Purchase Price. The total purchase price shall be $23,000.00 per lot, -"paper" lot stage, final platted, city 
council approved and recordable, - multiplied by approximately 99 lots, for a total purchase price of 
approximately $2,277,000.00. The final total purchase price may be adjusted according to the final 
number of lots approved by West Jordan City and shall be calculated by multiplying the final number of 
lots by $23,000.00 per lot. The total size of each lot shall not be less than 12,000 sq. feet 
Purchase Price Inclusions. The Seller shall provide to Buyer the following items and complete the 
following conditions as part of the purchase price. 1) The final city council approved plat as described 
above, which shall include three separate phases with approximately the same number of lots per phase. 2) 
All engineering and construction plans and drawings, including, but not limited to, street, sewer and water 
plans and profiles, grading and drainage plans, 3) All water rights that may be required by the City of West 
Jordan. 4) All major infrastructure constructed to the perimeter of subject property, including, but not 
limited to streets, sewer and water and utilities so as to allow buyer to connect to and extend such facilities 
to service the lots included in this agreement. 5) Approval from the city of West Jordan to obtain early 
building permits for the construction of no more than two model homes to be constructed concurrent with 
the installation of subdivision improvements. 
Due Diligence. Buyer shall have a 30 day feasibility period in which to investigate and analyze all 
information relative to the subject site and project, which shall include, but is not limited to the following 
items, 1) A commitment of title insurance per paragraph 7.1 of the attached REPC agreement. 2) A 
Geotechnical Study of subject property to be paid by seller. 3) A Phase I Environmental Investigation to be 
paid by seller. 4) Applicable street and utility plans and profiles, 5) grading and drainage plans, 6) All 
agreements, requirements, stipulations and conditions required by the city of West Jordan in connection 
with the plat approval, including zoning requirements. 7) A list of all applicable impact, design, 
reimbursement, inspection and permit fees. 8) Seller and or engineers' estimates of improvements costs, 
and required city bond amounts, 9) City development agreement and CC& R's if applicable. 
The due diligence period shall begin upon delivery by Seller to Buyer of all the above cited plans, 
documents and information. 
During the feasibility period, if buyer determines, at its sole discretion, that any unacceptable condition 
exists relative to the above described plans and information, then buyer shall notify seller in writing and in 
the event seller is unable or unwilling to resolve said unacceptable condition, then this contract shall be null 
and void and all earnest money and interest shall be released to buyer. 
Closing The closing shall take place within sixty days of the final plat approval by the city of West Jordan, 
which shall be no earlier than October 15,1999. Within fifteen days of final plat approval buyer shall pay 
over to seller an additional $25,000.00 earnest money which shall be non-refiindable, but applicable to the 
purchase price at closing In the event the final plat is not approved and ready for recording by December 
jit Z-^-7f 
31, 1999, then buyer shall have the right to either cancel this contract, in which case the earnest money and 
interest shall be returned to buyer, or extend this contract up to an additional 360 days. 
Commissions. Buyer and Seller acknowledge that their principals and associates are real estate brokers 
licensed to do business in the State of Utah. Buyer shall not be responsible to pay any real estate 
commission in regard to this transaction. Buyer understands and agrees that Seller shall pay a $500.00 per 
lot commission to its designated Broker/agent. 
jX] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until fT.' Da f ] AM \ft PM Mountain Time g*—/&-9? 
to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. 
Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
lx;]Buyer [ ] Seller Signaatre Date "Time // [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature Date Time 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this 
ADDENDUM. 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of 
attached ADDENDUM NO. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
[ [ REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, EFFECTIVE JUNE 12,1999. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY 
APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
Counter Offer to Real Estate Purchase contract dated August 16, 1999 including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, between Rochelle Properties LC as Buyer and American Housing Partners Inc 
as Seller regarding the property located at approximately 7800 So 5300 West, West Jordan, Utah. 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of this Agreement. 
1. EARNEST MONEY 
Buyer shall deposit the sum of $50,000 as Earnest Money Deposit. Said deposit shall 
become non-refundable to Buyer after the lapse of the Due Diligence Period as outlined 
below except for default by seller.. 
2. CLOSING 
The Closing shall occur within Fourteen (14) days after Seller receives final site plan / 
approvals from the City of West Jordan Planning CommiooioR. &/T~y CotLtJCl L, / 
3. FINANCIAL CAPABILITY 
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties, Buyer shall 
supply to Seller with evidence of financial capability to close on the Property within the 
time frame referenced above. In the event Buyer is unable to provide said evidence, Seller 
shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and neither party shall have any further 
obligation to the other. 
DUE DILIGENCE 
Buyer shall complete its investigation ("Due Diligence") within a Twenty One (21) day 
period following execution of this Agreement. Buyer shall remove all contingencies at 
the completion of the Due Diligence Period. Removal of contingencies shall be in writing 
and delivered to Seller on or before the end of the Due Diligence Period. 
PARTIES TO AGREEMENT 
Seller, American Housing Partners, Inc. a Delaware Corporation, and ("Owners"), are 
parties to an Agreement of Purchase and Sale Agreement dated September 9, 1998, as 
amended (the '"Purchase Agreement"), pursuant to which Seller has agreed to purchase 
and Owners have agreed to sell certain real property, located in the City of West Jordan, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, generally composed of approximately 41 acres of land , located 
approximately 7800 S 5300 W. 
Buyer (Rochelle Properties LC) and Seller have agreed that, for the price and subject to 
the terms and conditions herein addressed, at Close of Escrow and concurrently with and 
immediately following Seller's acquisition of the Property from Owners, Buyer will 
purchase the Property from Seller and Seller will sell the Property to Buyer. 
APPROVAL COSTS 
Prior to the date of this Agreement Seller has commenced, and continuing until Close of 
Escrow Seller will continue, to apply for, process and seek to obtain various governmental 
approvals for the development of the Property for residential purposes. Such activities are 
anticipated to benefit and expedite Buyer's use and development of the Property following 
the Close of Escrow, as well as Seller's use and development of the Property if Close of 
Escrow does not occur. Accordingly, in addition to the Purchase Price, at Close of 
Escrow Buyer shall deliver to the Title Company and Title Company shall deliver to Seller 
the amount of the costs and expenses paid or incurred by Seller after September 1, 1999, 
with respect to any governmental approvals of the development of the Property for 
residential purposes, such as (without limitation) Civil Engineering, City Processing and 
Permit Fees and Blueprints (the "Approval Costs"). Costs are estimated not to exceed 
$15,000. 
SELLER INVESTIGATIONS 
Buyer acknowledges that, pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, Owner has made only 
limited information available to Seller, and since execution and delivery of the Purchase 
agreement Seller has conducted limited investigations with respect to the Property. 
REMAINING HOMES AND LOTS 
Buyer hereby acknowledges that Two (2) single family homes currently exist on the 
Property, these are currently assigned lot numbers 68 and 96. Said single family homes 
shall be retained by Seller. In addition, Seller shall retain ownership of One (1) additional 
single family lot (currently lot number 43). Seller shall be responsible for improvement 
costs of said lot. Cost not to exceed $14,000.00, or if Buyer prefers, sales price shall be 
reduced by $14,000 and Buyer shall be responsible for the improvement costs of said lot. 
ARMANDO ALVAREZ BROKER, DECLARATION 
Armando Alvarez, Vice President of American Housing Partners Inc. is a real Estate 
Broker licensed in the State of Utah and California. 
10. EXTENDED DATE OF ACCEPTANCE 
Extend acceptance of offer dated August 16, 1999 to 5:00 P.M. August 25, 1999 
Buyer shall have 5:00 P.M. Mountain Time August 30, 1999 to accept this Counter Offer. Unless 
so accepted, this Counter Offer shall lapse. 
Seller: 
AMERICAN HOUSING! PARTNERS INC. 
J 
By: Armando Alvarez V.P. 
Date: 8-25-1999 
Buyer: 
ROCHELLE PROPERTIES LC 
Date: V^O'97 
TabD 
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SINGLE PARTY 
LISTING AND SALE AGREEMENT 
IN CONSIDERATION OF the service agreed to be performed by FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. in 
endeavoring to effect a sale or exchange of the real estate described below in this agreement, I hereby grant 
unto FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. the right to sell or exchange said property for a period of 180 days 
from the date hereof and thereafter until withdrawn by written notice. 
IF, AT ANY TIME, WITHIN SAID PERIOD, FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. procures, or presents an offer 
to purchase said property from the registered party listed below, at the price and upon the terms and 
conditions set forth herein, or at any other price or upon any other terms or conditions acceptable to me, I 
agree to pay a commission equal to $1,500.00 per lot 
IF AT ANY TIME within the said period FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. procures or presents an offer 
from the registered party listed below, to enter into joint venture or partnership at a price or terms or 
conditions acceptable to me, I agree to pay a commission equal to $1,500.00 per lot 
ALL COMMISSIONS shall be due and payable at closing or at the time of consummation of the marriage of 
the joint venture. 
IF, within twelve (12) months after expiration of this agreement, the property is acquired by the registered 
party listed below l agree to pay as soon as sale or exchange of said property is consummated, a 
commission to FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. equal to $1500.00 per lot 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. will be representing both owner and the 
prospective buyer, and owner consents to that dual representation. 
IN CASE OF the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement, I agree to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collection. 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. shall have the right to enter said premises at 
any reasonable time of day, for the purpose of inspecting or showing the same to a prospective customer. 
THE PROPERTY covered by this agreement is situated in Salt Lake County, Utah, to wit: 
Approx 41 acres at 7800 South 5300 West West Jordan, approx 99 undeveloped lots 
THE SALE PRICE IS: $2,277,000.00 
THE TERMS ARE: Cash at Closing 
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. HEREBY REGESTERS Rochelle Properties, LC or any of their agents 
or associates as being exposed to the disposition of your property as described above. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned agree to the above terms and acknowledge receipt of a copy of 
this Agreement. 
ACCEPTED exclusively for 
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. 
James B. Fairbourn, Principal Broker 
August 13, 1999 
Owner 
(Name^ 
(Name) 
TabE 
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September 10, 1999 
To: American Housing Partners 
Over several years we have been making acquisition and development loans 
to Liberty Homes and the various Rochelle entities. Current commitments 
are in the mid-seven figures. 
I would not expect having difficulty making acquisition and development 
loans in the future, barring something unforeseen in the economy. 
An acquisition and development loan would be subject to committee 
approval, and final plat approval. 
The final plat approval assumes final bonding numbers, confirmed utility 
connections, and all signatures needed for recording of the plat. 
Sincerely, 
Cy Simoi: 
Construction Loan Officer 
TabF 
September 17, 1999 
To: American Housing Partners 
Over several years we have been making acquisition and development loans to Liberty 
Homes and the various Rochelle entities. Liberty has existing lines available of 
$5,000,000 for construction loans and improved lot acquisitions. These lines have 
current commitments of $2,199,900. 
In addition, there are other lot loans and A&D loans with total commitments of 
$2,531,500. 
These numbers and commitments should in no way be construed to imply any 
maximum or minimum lending capacity. Each A&D loan is considered on it's own 
merits, 
This type of lending is considered "asset based". Therefore the project itself is an 
important consideration; i.e. costs, configuration, pricing, timing, etc. 
In addition to current commitments, barring something unforeseen in the economy, this 
loan officer does not foresee a problem of First Security Bank lending approximately $4 
million to Liberty or Rochelle for a future project. This would be contingent upon the 
acquisition and development loan receiving committee approval and the project having 
final plat approval. 
The final plat approval assumes final bonding numbers, confirmed utility connections, 
and all signatures needed for recording of the plat. 
We look forward to continuing the excellent relationship we have enjoyed with Liberty 
Homes and the Rochelle entities. 
Sincerely, 
Cy Simon ^ 
Construction Loan Officer 
-™^ r^.iu onf* stypet Sandy, Utah 84070 
TabG 
WHEN DOES THE SELLER OWE THE 
BROKER A COMMISSION? 
A DISCUSSION OF THE LAW AND 
WHAT IT TEACHES ABOUT 
LISTING AGREEMENTS 
by Steven K. Mulliken* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
^ ( 
Attorneys often are troubled when real estate agents complete 
•sales agreements for both parties to a transaction. This offends at-
torneys because it appears to be a conflict of interest, it provides 
.the potential for overreaching and abuse, and it may constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law. Despite those concerns, the practice 
ts quite common. 
The seller's listing agreement with a real estate agent is another 
area wiih great potential for abuse. Though this situation does not 
iK«w? similar questions of the unauthorized practice of law (the real 
estate agent is a party to the agreement), it does present problems 
^overreaching and potential difficulties for the seller. A significant 
number
 0f cases have litigated listing contracts.1 The greatest number 
^ i e c a s e s *nv°ive litigation concerning whether the seller owes 
^ b r o k e r a commission.2 Unfortunately, the average home buyer 
hfe* 1VOt c o n s u * t an attorney before employing a broker to sell a 
^
:
*Use Rather, most consult attorneys after problems with real estate 
|ff*its a n ^ - Many of these problems could be minimized or avoided 
| g ^ g ^ ^ ^ drafting of the listing agreement. 
" t ! r l a f Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps (USAR). Currently assigned 
» * n iHdividua; mobilization augmentee to the Administrative and Civil Law Div 
^ i m i ^ ^ t ^ d v o c a t e General's School, U.S. Army Partner in the law firm of Sher-
^^ll-Law ry -.'• '0 r a (*° Springs, Colorado. Formerly Instructor, Administrative and 
Uw Office^T1 ° D ; T h e J l i d g e A d v o c a t e General's School, 1984-1987; Administrative 
••
i
^»I9S3'<? ! a l C o u n s e l > a n d C h i ef of Military Justice, Fort Carson, Colorado, 
^ l^ tMai ton^Pr A " S S i s t a n c e 0 f f i c e r> F o r t Carson. Colorado, 1980-1981; Commander, 
^ & i r v Acaden C e i n - ? P ^ n y ' M i i i t a r y D i s t r i c t of Washington, 1976. B.S., United States 
!
^ ^ n i v t ^ r v y ' ' r t ' " * • " " " 
a s
^ m e n u rev i i C a s e s m U n i t e d States courts that have litigated listing 
"Wmmi^r is n< ? a h °V t 2 0 0 c a s e s i n a ten-year period from 1974 to 1983. While 
S^fctf the issu ->l f,XC:essive i n ^seif, the litigated cases likely represent a small per-
S ^ £ Rohan fT}< f! a r o s e : a s m a n y more undoubtedly were settled before trial. 
Bobi«, Real Estate Brokerage Law & Practice § 4.01 » S | I h ^ " a Goklstein & C: 
^972; M.S.S.M. University of Southern California, 1976; J.D., St. 
-•980; LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law, 1986. 
CI rn 
-x 
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This article surveys the law concerning when a real estate broker 
:arns a commission and focuses on when a seller may be liable for 
, commission even though the property did not sell. It discusses the 
raditional rule that a broker earns a commission when he or she 
•rings to the seller a purchaser ready, willing, and able to meet the 
erms in the listing agreement.3 The article also examines the minori-
y rule that a commission is owed only if a sale occurs and title passes, 
mless the failure of the sale to go through is the fault of the seller.4 
decent cases examining the issue are analyzed to determine whether 
ny trends can be identified. Lastly, the article provides guidance 
or practitioners concerning drafting or reviewing listing agreements. 
I . WHEN DOES THE REAL ESTATE AGENT 
EARN A COMMISSION—THE 
TWO DOMINANT THEORIES 
A seller negotiating with a prospective real estate agent must deter-
mine when the real estate agent earns a commission. Will the com-
mission be due when a contract for sale is signed, or only after clos-
mg? What happens if the buyer defaults or cannot get financing? Pro-
ably few sellers consider these questions before signing a listing 
greement. Unfortunately, they frequently become critical concerns. 
A. THE MAJORITY RULE: FINDING A 
READY, WILLING, AND ABLE BUYER 
Most jurisdictions follow the rule that the broker earns a commis-
ion when he or she brings to the buyer a purchaser who is ready, 
rilling, and able to buy the property on the terms set out in the listing 
greement.5 While the parties clearly are free to modify that com-
mon law rule in their agreement,6 if they fail to do so, a commission 
may be earned even though a sale never takes place.7 Similarly, a 
Hd. § 4.02(1). 
*Id. § 4.03; see also Annotation, Modern View as to Right of Real Estate Broker to 
?cover Commission From Seller-Principal Wlicre Buyer Defaults Under Valid- Con-
act of Sale, 12 A.L.R. 4th 1083, 1094 (1983). 
5Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.02(1). The author lists 25 jurisdictions that have adopted 
te traditional rule concerning when the commission is earned. See also Annotation, 
ipra note 4, at 1090-93. 
6Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.02(2). Because the seller generally is not represented during 
igotiations with the real estate agent, and because agents use form listing agreements 
•epared by their counsel, it is unlikely that the common law will be altered in favor 
the seller. 
T h i s situation frequently occurs when the buyer defaults prior to closing. In that 
rent, many jurisdictions would hold that the broker earned his commission when 
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full commission generally will have been earned even if the purchaser 
defaults on payments shortly after closing.8 
Many of the cases that hold that a commission is earned merely 
by producing a ready, willing, and able buyer involve situations in 
which the seller has backed out of the deal. For example, in Holl-
inger v. McMichael,9 the seller signed a listing agreement with a 
broker that included a provision for a six-percent commission. The 
broker brought the seller a written offer, which was accepted and 
later modified to adjust the price to reflect the cost of points charged 
the seller because of FHA financing. When the broker called the seller 
to arrange closing, the seller indicated that the deal was off. The 
court found that the broker had earned his commission when he 
"procured a purchaser able, ready and willing to purchase the seller's 
property on the terms and conditions specified in the contract of 
employment."10 
The general rule appears logical in cases in which the seller is to 
blame for the deal's failure. That same rule, however, also can result 
in liability for a commission when the deal fails through no fault of 
the seller. For example if, after the sales contract is signed, the pur-
chaser is unable to get financing, the seller generally is still liable 
for a commission, even though no sale results.11 The theory is that 
the seller is capable of investigating the financial backing of the pro-
spective purchaser and accepts the purchaser by entering into a bin-
ding agreement12 The reality of most residential purchases, including 
the short time period most offers remain open, makes this theory 
more fiction than fact. Regardless, the seller frequently will be re-
sponsible for paying the commission in these circumstances although 
the deal never closes. 
Liability for a commission also may occur in other instances that 
are not necessarily the result of seller bad faith, such as when a joint 
owner of the property becomes unable or unwilling to complete the 
transaction,13 or when the seller has a defect in title.14 
*See, eg., Taylor v. Weingart, 693 R2d 1231 (Mont. 1984). 
9177 Mont. 144, 580 R2d 927 (1978). 
l0Id.y 580 R2d at 929. 
"Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.02(3). 
l3See Guillotte v. Pope Quint, Inc., 349 So. 2d 62 (La. Ct. App. 1977). In Guillotte 
a n usband entered into a listing agreement to sell the house. The wife did not sign 
the agreement because she was in the hospital at the time with mental problems. The 
broker was informed of her hospitalization, but may not have known that it was because 
°f mental problems. The wife later refused to sell the property and thus no sale oc-
curred. The court held that the broker had found a willing buyer and was entitled 
«.> his commission. Accord Joiner v. Lockart, 350 So. 2d 199 (La. Ct. App.), cert, denied. 
:d52_S0. 2d 240 (La. 1977). 
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MINORITY RULE: UPON TITLE CLOSING 
i 1967, in the case of Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson}70 the 
3reme Court of New- Jersey took the lead and reversed the tradi-
nal rule. Dobbs involved the failure of closing because of the finan-
1 inability of the buyer. A contract for sale was signed that called 
$2500 in payments prior to closing. Those payments were made, 
: the buyer was unable to arrange financing to complete the sale. 
:er tying up the property for a year, the seller released the buyer 
m the contract. The real estate agent sued the seller and the buyer 
his commission. The Supreme Court of New Jersey departed from 
; traditional rule and held as follows: 
When a broker is engaged by an owner of property to find a 
purchaser for it, the broker earns his commission when (a) he 
produces a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on the terms 
fixed by the owner, (b) the purchaser enters into a binding con-
tract with the owrner to do so, and (c) the purchaser completes 
the transaction by closing the title in accordance with the pro-
visions of the contract. If the contract is not consummated 
because of lack of financial ability of the buyer to perform or 
because of any other default of his,. . . there is no right to com-
mission against the seller.16 
Dther jurisdictions have found the New Jersey rule persuasive, with 
urts in a number of jurisdictions expressly adopting the Dobbs posi-
n.17 Additionally, at least one jurisdiction imposes the rule by 
ttute.18 
50 N..I. -528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967). 
Id., 236 A.2d at. 855 (emphasis added). 
Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.03(2); see also Annotation, supra note 4, at 1088. The 
•)\ving jurisdictions have either adopted or expressly approved the Dobbs holding: 
;tz v. Anderson, 274 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1978), Potter v."Ridge Realty Corp., 28 Conn, 
•p. 304, 259 A.2d 758 (1969); Rogers v. Hendrix, 92 Idaho 141, 438 P.2d 653 (1968); 
ilenger v. Clause, 1789 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1970); Winkelman v. Allen, 214 Haw. 22, 
P.2d 1377 (1974); Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 327 N.E.2d 727 
7b); Cornett v. Nathan, 196 Neb. 277, 242 N.W.2d 855 (1976); Sester v. Com-
nwealth, Inc., 256 Or. 11, 470 P.2d 142 (1970); Staab v. Messier, 128 Vt. 2380. 264 
d 790 (1970). For an in depth discussion of the Dobbs case, see Note, Ellsworth 
)bs, Inc. v. Johnson: A Reexamination of the Broker--Buyer-Seller Relationship in 
o Jersey, 23 Rutgers L. Rev. 83 (1968). 
While the New Jersey case was a trend setter in the judicial arena, at least one 
slature had foreseen the problem and legislatively eliminated it before Dobbs. Since 
3, Colorado statutes have provided the following concerning when the broker can 
m a commission: 
No real estate agent or broker is entitled to a commission for finding a pur-
chaser who is ready, willing, and able to complete the purchase by the owner 
until the same is consummated or is defeated by the refusal or neglect of the 
owner to consummate the same as agreed upon, 
o. Rev. Stat. •§ .12-61-201 (1973). 
8 
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The New Jersey rule clearly is the superior rule. It more accurate-
ly reflects the understanding of the parties, and works equity. While 
a number of jurisdictions have not adopted the New Jersey rule ex-
pressly, courts often attempt to reach the result of the rule through 
other doctrines. Although a seller can be found liable for a commis-
sion when title does not close, courts are hostile to this result and 
generally avoid imposing liability on a seller when the sale falls 
through, unless the failure of the sale was the seller's fault. Thus, 
most courts examine whether the seller was guilty of bad faith. 
C. LIABILITY FOR A COMMISSION IS 
GENERALLY LIMITED TO SITUATIONS 
IN WHICH THE DEAL CLOSES OR 
THE SELLER DEFAULTS 
If a real estate transaction fails to close because of the fault of the 
seller, courts often will find that a commission is owing. When the 
seller is not at fault, courts will avoid imposing liability on the seller 
for a commission by employing any number of doctrinal approaches. 
The primary doctrines are discussed below. 
1. Construction of the Listing Contract to Require a Sale 
Perhaps not surprisingly, one way courts frequently impose the 
New Jersey rule is by construing the listing agreement to require that 
a sale or exchange occur before liability for a commission arises. In 
some instances this is clearly legitimate, such as when the listing 
agreement uses language that clearly calls for a sale. Listing agree-
ments in New York, for example, frequently indicate that the com-
mission is due "as, if, and when title passes."19 That language makes 
the commission contingent upon title passing. 
.
 l
*See, e.g., Graff v. Billet, 64 N.Y.2d 899, 477 N.E.2d 212 (1984). The strict construc-
tion of this language may work an injustice on the realtor. In Graff the broker brought 
what was apparently an acceptable offer under the listing contract. The seller refused 
to accept the offer, let the listing period expire,, and then accepted^ higher offer. The 
court construed the listing agreement strictly against the broker. The listing agree-
ment included the following language: "The aforesaid commission is due and payable 
to the above named licensed broker as, if and when title passes (rider omitted), ex-
cept for willful default on the part of the seller, in which case the commission shall 
be payable upon demand." Id., 477 N.E.2d at 214. The court determined that a seller 
could be in willful default only after a contract had been entered into. The result 
0
 this decision, as aptly expressed by the dissent, is to permit sellers to avoid pay-
ment for the broker's efforts by refusing to sign an offer and waiting until the listing 
•Period expires. 
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Other jurisdictions stretch quite far to reach the desired result. For 
example, in Diehl and Associates, Inc. v. Houtchens20 the court ex-
plained that a difference exists between a listing agreement that "re-
quires a broker to merely find a purchaser and a brokerage contract 
which requires a broker to sell, make, or effect a sale."21 The listing 
agreement the court wras examining began by indicating that the real 
estate agent was employed to ' 'sell or exchange the property.'' The 
court focused on that language to determine that the listing agree-
ment required a sale before a commission was due. The court did 
not note the following language in the clause concerning the com-
mission: 
In the event thai you, or any other brokers cooperating with 
you, shall find a buyer ready and, willing to enter into a deal 
for said price and terms, or such other terms and price as I may 
accept, or that during your employment you place me in con-
tact with a buyer to or through whom at any time within 90 
days after the termination of said employment I may sell or con- _ 
vey said property, I hereby agree to pay you in cash for your 
services a commission equal in amount to % of the above 
stated selling price.22 
This language easily could be read to reflect the majority rule and 
require a commission if, during the listing period, the real estate 
agent finds a ready and willing buyer. The court, however, ignored 
the language and indicated that the plain and clear language of the 
agreement required a sale The court actually ignored the fair mean-
ing of the language, and imposed the New Jersey rule upon the par-
ties. The sale fell through because the contract for sale included some 
substantial conditions that were not met. This failure was not the 
seller's fault.23 Accordingly, the court legitimately could have treated 
the issue as a breach of contract for failure to produce a willing buyer, 
rather than stretch a fair reading of the language to find that the 
listing agreement required a sale. 
20173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977) 
21/d., 567 P. 2d at 935. 
22Id. (emphasis added) 
23The conditions involved the granting of an easement and the failure to settle a 
boundary dispute. Id. at 933 Inclusion of conditions in the sales contract can protect 
the seller from owing a commission if the seller later backs out of the sale For exam-
ple, m ERA Real Estate Home Ranch Properties v. Big Horn Game Ranch, Inc., 692 
P.2d 1218 (Mont. 1984), the corporate seller included a clause in the contract for sale 
Hull icqulieu Jit; sale uu ue appiovtru Iry dll of the shareholders. No approval was ob 
tained, and the court held that the real estate agent was not entitled to a commission 
because a sale had not occurred and no evidence of wrongful conduct existed on the 
part of the seller 
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In Property Brokers, Inc. v. Loynhtg2^ a similar listing agreement 
was construed with the same result. That agreement also included 
a prefatory statement indicating that the broker was employed to 
sell or exchange the property. That language was followed by a pro-
vision indicating that in the event the broker found "a buyer ready 
and willing to enter into a deal" the seller would pay a commission.25 
The broker found a prospective buyer within the period of the listing 
agreement. The contract for purchase that the parties signed con-
tained a provision making it contingent on sale of the purchaser's 
home. The buyer was unable to sell his home within the primary 
listing period (and the six-month extension period after its expira-
tion during which ihe seller would be liable for commission if tne 
sale was to a buyer placed in contact writh the seller by the broker). 
After expiration of these periods, however, the buyer sold his home 
and bought the seller's home. The court found that the listing agree-
ment required a sale, and that no sale occurred during the effective 
period under the listing agieement. This case is another example of 
a sale that failed because of no fault of the seller.26 
2. No Willing Buyer on Terms of the Listing Agreement 
a. In General—Offer Must Meet all Terms 
A second and more common way courts permit sellers to avoid 
liability for a commission under contracts that require payment of 
a commission when brokers find ready, willing, and able buyers is 
to determine that no buyer was willing to buy on the listing agree-
ment terms. In other words, the courts require that the broker find 
a buyer who is willing to meet all of the terms in the listing agree-
ment before a commission is owed. 
Rcnfro v. Mcacham27 is illustrative of how closely the terms of the 
offer must match the terms of the listing agreement before the seller 
may incur liability for a commission. In Renfro the listing agreement 
called for the sale of 550 acres of open land for $687,500 or equivalent 
price per acre, and sale of 1088 acres of woodland for $562,500 or 
equivalent price per acre, or a total sale price of $1,250,000 for the 
entire property. Terms of the sale identified in the listing agreement 
called for one-half of the purchase price at closing and the balance 
m six months if the entire property was sold. 
-
!201 Mont 309, 6R4 P2d 521 (1982) 
yi 
Afit-i beemg ine lengths courts will go to Imd Lhar a written agreement called 
for a sale before a commission is earned, it is not surprising that the court in Big Horn 
tound that an oral listing agreement required a sale before a c->r° mission wa<? eirned 
2750 N c A P P 4^1, 274 S E.2d 377 (1981) 
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The broker brought an offer for $1,250,000 for 1638 acres or 
quivalent price per acre based on a survey to be run at the buyer's 
spense. The terms of the offer were to be half of the purchase price 
t closing and half six months later. The seller rejected the offer and 
llegedly refused to negotiate the terms. The broker sued for the com-
tission, arguing that he had produced a ready, willing, and able 
uyer. 
The court found for the seller, finding that the offer was not made 
n the terms of the listing agreement. The court focused on the dif-
jrence caused by including the language ' 'or equivalent price per 
ere" for a purchase of the entire tract, while that language was in-
luded in the listing agreement only after the price statement for 
ach individual track.28 Accordingly, the sale of the entire tract could 
»sult in less than the full $125,000 under terms of the offer if a 
arvey discovered less than 1638 acres. This would not be possible 
nder terms of the listing contract. Though this is true, the buyer 
3uld have accomplished the same result, consistent with the terms 
f the listing agreement, by offering the full asking price for each 
•act separately, rather than offering the full asking price for the en-
re parcel. The court also noted a similarly inconsequential dif-
>rence in the financing terms that was caused by including the 
quivalent price per acre language after the full acreage, rather than 
fter the two tracts. This case would suggest that a seller can pro-
ide maximum flexibility by making the terms of the listing agree-
Lent as specific as possible. The chance of a broker finding a buyer 
rho will offer identical terms is remote. If the listing agreement is 
efficiently detailed, the seller may be at greater liberty later to 
hange his mind about the wisdom of a sale and reject the offer as 
>ng as the offer is not identical to the listing agreement on all 
ibstantial terms.29 
The courts can make the broker's job next to impossible. In Har-
ing v. Warren30 the listing agreement set out the purchase price 
nd specified the terms of payment. The listing agreement clearly 
squired a twenty-nine percent down payment and the balance amor-
2SId., 21A S.E.2d at 380. Interestingly, the offer contained additional terms that the 
ourt did not discuss. For example, the offer provided that each party would pay their 
>wn attorneys' fees, and that taxes would be prorated. 
29For other cases in which the seller has avoided owing a commission when rejec-
ing an offer that contained terms different than those in the listing agreement, see 
Wilson v. Upchurch, 425 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. App. 1981); William G. Vandever Co. v. Black, 
»45 R2d 637 (Utah 1982); and Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977) 
3030 Wash. App. 848, 639 R2d 750 (1982). 
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^zed over twenty years, with a balloon payment after ten years. No 
iterest rate was listed on the line containing the financing terms, 
elow this line was an indication of the current financing on the 
roperty that included, in two places, the term seven percent. 
The broker brought an offer for the full asking price, including a 
twenty-nine percent down payment and a seven-percent interest rate 
n the balance. The seller rejected the offer and the broker sued for 
is commission. The issue was whether the offer matched the listing 
greement. The court determined that the listing agreement was am-
iguous as to the financing term and accepted parol evidence as to 
le terms. The seller alleged that the interest rate was to be negoti-
ble, while the broker alleged that they had agreed on seven per-
snt. The court believed the seller. Because the interest rate was con-
dered negotiable, the broker was found not to have produced a 
?ady? willing, and able buyer on terms acceptable to the seller. Ad-
itionally, the court determined that the seller had no obligation to 
egotiate unless the seller had refused to do so in bad faith.31 
Harding indicates that the seller need only include one term that 
left negotiable, and then refuse to negotiate that term, to avoid 
ability. Some limitation on the seller exists in that his refusal to 
egotiate cannot be in bad faith. Proving bad faith, however, puts 
ie broker to a difficult test. 
If the listing agreement does not include a negotiable term, the 
same objective can be accomplished using the sales contract. In ERA 
Real Estate Home & Ranch Properties v. Big Horn Game Ranch, Inc. ,32 
for example, the parties had an oral listing agreement. When the 
broker brought the seller a contract for sale, the seller had inserted 
in the contract a provision requiring that the corporate shareholders 
informally approve any sale. Although the shareholders approved of 
the sale during a meeting, no formal ratification of the offer ever 
occurred. Because this condition was part of the sales contract and 
never was met the court determined that no commission was due. 
_ If the seller intends to rely on a negotiable term or condition in 
the listing agreement, that term or condition should be carried over 
nito any contract for sale. Failure to include the term in the contract 
~
 3lThe broker alleged that the seller refused to meet to discuss offers, never informed 
the broker of the objection to the seven percent interest rate, changed his mind about 
Ranting to sell that year's crop with the property, and had decided he wanted a tax-
tree exchange rather than a contract for sale. Id., 639 P.2d at 754 
32692P2d 1218 (Mont 1984) 
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may, under the merger theory, mean that it no longer applies. In 
Thy lor v. Gaudry33 the listing agreement included a provision that 
made any sale contingent upon the seller approving the buyer's 
business qualifications. The broker brought an offer, which, after a 
counter offer by the seller, resulted in a signed agreement. The sale 
never was completed, but the broker sued the seller for the com-
mission, arguing that he had produced a ready and able buyer. The 
seller apparently backed out of the deal believing the buyers did not 
have sufficient financial ability. The seller also defended by arguing 
that the broker had not produced a buyer agreeable to the seller 
because he had not approved the buyer's business qualifications. The 
court noted that this condition—approval of the business qualifica-
tions of a prospective buyer—had not been carried over from the 
listing agreement to the sales contract. Accordingly, because the sales 
contract constituted a new agreement and overcame theiisting agree-
ment, that condition was not relevant to the inquiry. According to 
the broker, the business qualifications of the buyer were discussed 
with the seller at the time of the initial offer, and the seller accepted 
the buyer's qualifications. Seemingly, then, brokers can benefit from 
their own inept (or perhaps skillful and cunning) drafting of the sales 
contract by failing to carry over a term from the listing agreement 
to the sales contract. 
While a seller generally can be protected from having to pay a com-
mission for a sale that does not occur by including sufficient provi-
sions or conditions in the listing agreement, bad faith always is a 
limitation. If the court believes that the seller refused to accept an 
offer in bad faith or took advantage of the broker's efforts without 
paying, the court in most instances will find that the broker earned 
a commission.34 Some cases, however, would indicate that the seller 
can go pretty far without reaching this point. One illustration is Col-
orado City Development Co. v. Jones-Healy Realty, Inc.35 
The broker for Jones-Healy was working under an oral, nonex-
clusive listing agreement to sell the property for a cash price of $220 
per acre. The broker brought an offer for the full asking price, but 
the offer included terms additional to those in the listing agreement 
(inclusion of equipment and livestock with the sale and conducting 
a survey). The seller's board initially approved the sale subject to 
approval of an ad-hoc committee made up of some of the directors. 
The committee failed to approve the sale, and the offer never was 
accepted. The evidence indicated that the committee's failure to ap-
™46 Or. App. 235, 611 R2d 336 (1980). 
:uRohan, supra note 2, § 4.04(1). 
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prove the offer was due to its belief that the property was worth 
more than the $220 per acre, the price reflected in the listing agree-
ment. 
Jones-Healy sued for its commission, alleging bad faith rejection 
by the seller. The trial court noted that the offer from the sellers con-
tained substantial differences from the listing agreement, which en-
titled the seller to reject the offer without indicating to the broker 
why the offer had been rejected.36 The trial court entered judgment 
for the seller and the broker appealed. 
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that the board of directors 
had decided to reject the offer not because of any of the substantial 
new terms, but because it felt the price was too low. The court refused 
to let the sellers rely on the additional terms when the reason for 
the rejection was their disagreement with the price reflected in the 
listing agreement and offered by the buyer. Finding that the sellers 
rejected the offer to hold out for more money, the court remanded 
the cage for a directed verdict for the broker.37 
The broker did not get the last laugh, however. The seller appealed 
to the Colorado Supreme Court.38 The court reversed, and indicated 
that when the terms are substantially different, the seller can re-
ject the offer for any reason, even if the seller merely had changed 
his mind about selling. Thus, at least in Colorado, if the offer con-
tains any substantial terms different from those in the listing agree-
ment, the seller can reject the offer, regardless of the real reason 
for the rejection. 
* Jones-Healy Realty, Inc. v. Colorado City Dev. Co., 568 R2d 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977), 
rev rf, 576 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1978). 
37
 The court of appeals stated: 
The owner may decline to convey or complete the sale. He may so decline for 
the reason that he may get more by holding and raising his price, or for any 
other reason; but this does not and should not relieve him from his liability 
to pay his broker for his services in procuring a person able, ready and willing 
to purchase at the terms given, the same as if he had completed the sale. 
Id. at 90 (citing Dickey v. Waggoner, 114 P.2d 1097 (Colo. 1941)). 
^Colorado City Dev. Co. v. Jones-Healy Realty, Inc., 576 P.2d 160 (1978). The Col-
,. prado Supreme Court made the following distinction concerning minor and substan-
tial variations: 
An offer to purchase real estate often differs from the terms of the listing 
agreement in some respect or adds terms regarding matters not addressed in 
the listing. Where the variations are minor, the seller is obligated to identify 
those on which it would rely if it chooses to reject the offer. Fairness requires 
that the broker be afforded the opportunity to correct minor variations so that 
the sale may be completed and a commission earned. However, wThen the varia-
tions are substantial, the seller is entitled to refuse the offer without specify-
ing the reason for its rejection. The broker is charged with knowledge that the 
substantial variation exists when he submits the offer. 
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b the extent the variations are not substantial, the seller may have 
uty to negotiate the terms but the seller still will gam flexibility 
having a detailed listing agreement If the sale will include seller 
ancmg, the acceptable financing terms should be specified, and 
» sale should be made contingent upon the seller personally ap 
>ving the creditworthiness of the buyer79 When negotiating with 
eal estate agent concerning who should bear the risk of default 
the buyer prior to closing, the seller should be aware that the 
>ker can, in the sales contract shift liability for a lost commission 
the buyer in case of default by the buyer 80 
^ related point is that the seller should be advised to make the 
ce reflected m the listing contract high and the payment terms 
imal As shown above, a seller may realize after signing the listing 
eement that the property is worth more than agreed to m the 
mg agreement Unfortunately, once the agreement is signed, if 
broker brings an offer for that price, the seller may have to pay 
commission even if the offer is rejected 
'he attorney also should advise the client that if an offer is 
pared by the broker, it should include all the conditions that ap 
ir in the listing agreement Conditions not transferred to the sales 
itract may be lost 
'inally, the attorney should consider expandmg the broker s duties 
ting agreements generally are vague or silent about the broker's 
cif IC responsibilities The seller would be wise to indicate expressly 
he agreement the level of sales and advertising efforts the broker 
equired to deliver If the seller subsequently becomes dissatisfied 
h the real estate agent and early termination of the agreement 
lecessary, the seller will have something concrete m the listing 
eement upon which to rely 
See Taylor v Weingart 693 P2d 1231 (Mont 1984) 
When negotiating with the broker concerning who should bear the loss if the buyer 
lults before closing there is authority in some jurisdictions that the buyer who 
s a contract for sale and later defaults can be held liable to the broker for the 
commission Clark v Wright 699 SW2d 174 (lenn Ct App 1985) A term im 
ng liability for the commission on the buyer in the case of a default by the buyer 
be placed m the contract for sale Salmon v Hodges 398 So 2d 548 (La Ct App 
3) The seller should request such a term and use the a\ailabihtv of shifting the 
to the buyer as a reason why the seller should not bear the risk 
3 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has discussed some of the law concerning when a 
broker can demand a commission from a seller of property The com 
mission obviously is earned when the broker finds a buyer within 
the period of the hstmg and the property is sold When the property 
is not sold or when the seller rejects an offer the question of whether 
the seller is liable to pay a commission is more difficult While some 
variance exists between jurisdictions the trend is that the commis 
sion is earned only when title passes unless failure of the transac 
tion was because of the fault or bad faith of the seller While many 
jurisdictions do not indicate that this is the rule frequently this is 
the result achieved through various doctrines used by the courts to 
avoid imposing liability on a seller for a real estate agent s commis 
sion when the failure of the transaction was not the seller s fault 
Though the law has treated sellers fairly, the numerous cases 
litigating brokers' commissions are evidence that the law is not clear, 
and that the agreements are not drafted adequately to avoid 
misunderstanding and clearly allocate the risks Attorneys schooled 
in this subject can benefit their clients by carefully reviewing and 
drafting listing agreements 
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tould be avoided. A lawsuit may cost the seller more than the com-
ission. For attorneys who are fortunate enough to have a client seek 
ieir advice prior to entering into a listing agreement, the following 
sues should be considered when reviewing or drafting a listing 
^reement. 
The obvious starting point is to make certain that the time when 
ie commission is earned is clearly set out. From the seller's perspee-
ve, the commission should be made contingent on title closing. This 
ill remove any doubt and will contractually guarantee treatment 
>nsistent with the modern trend established in New Jersey.75 
The parties should anticipate and provide for any contingencies 
lat might cause the deal to fall through and should allocate the risks 
lemselves. If, as suggested above, the commission is made con-
ngent on title passing, the risk is on the broker if the buyer is unable 
> obtain financing or breaches the agreement before closing. 
Another risk that should be anticipated is failure of title. If the 
ansaction cannot be completed because a title defect exists, who 
lould bear the loss? Thoughts may differ on this. Some may believe 
ie seller should bear the risk, because he or she may be able to take 
2tion to cure title or may be insured for loss from title defects, 
smetimes, however, curing title requires cooperation by the buyer, 
t; least in extending the time to close. At any rate, the parties should 
nticipate this problem and specify how it should be handled. Listing 
^ntracts often address this risk and, not surprisingly, they general-
r
 place the burden on the seller.76 
Two other situations that could occur and should be anticipated 
re foreclosure against the seller and subsequent default by the buyer 
fter closing. First, if the broker is unable to find a buyer and the 
roperty stays on the market for an extended period, the seller could 
ecome financially strapped, resulting in a foreclosure sale. If the 
roker has an exclusive right to sell, should a foreclosure sale be con-
.dered a sale or exchange under the listing agreement? That adds 
isult to injury and should be avoided. 
75See, e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967). 
76The following language is taken from a sample listing agreement produced by the 
utchinson Board of Realtors in Kansas: "MARKETABLE TITLE: The REALTOR has 
dunned SELLER of ihcii le^punbibiliij UJ piuvidc the BUYER? of the property vr{+h 
vidence of marketable title and also to provide access for inspections, if any, wher 
ailed for in a sales agreement and our obligation to disclose any known material 
efects." 
o * 
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A more likely problem may result if the buyer defaults. If the 
default occurs before closing, and the listing agreement calls for a 
commission only upon closing of title, then no commission will be 
owing. When, however, the seller is financing part of the purchase, 
the seller may want to make some part of the commission payable 
over time from receipts from the installment payments; in this way, 
the broker shares the risk of future performance.77 
The period of the listing should be identified clearly, preferably 
by indicating termination as of a specific day of the month rather 
than after a given period. If the agreement will include an exten-
sion clause by which the seller agrees to pay a commission to the 
broker during a period following expiration of the listing agreement 
should a sale occur to one identified by the broker, the agreement 
also should require that the broker, within a short period after ex-
piration of the listing agreement, deliver to the seller a listing of all 
parties to whom the property has been shown. The seller cannot 
know who has seen the property with the broker, because the seller 
may not even be present when the property is shown. Requiring the 
broker to provide a list to the seller can avoid confusion and permit 
ihe seller to exclude those parties from coverage under a listing agree-
ment with a subsequent broker. 
As a practical matter, if a client seeks assistance after terminating 
a listing agreement that included an extension clause, but that did 
not require the first broker to provide a list, the seller should be ad-
vised to request one from the first broker and to refuse to sign a con-
tiact for sale until confirming with the first broker that the prospec-
tive purchaser was not identified by the first broker. If the purchaser 
was identified by the first broker, the seller should refuse to accept 
the offer until the two brokers concerned agree how to split the com-
mission. Also, any extension clause should require payment of a com-
mission only upon an actual sale, not upon signing of a contract for 
sale. 
In most instances the attorney will be assisting the client by mak-
ing the terms of the listing agreement as specific and detailed as possi-
ble. The seller generally will not be bound to accept the offer unless 
the offer matches the terms of the listing agreement.78 
77Puttmg some of the risk of future default by the buyer on the broker makes good 
business sense. The broker, if not subjected to the risk, has no interest in the buyer's 
,U
*
U
*Z~ " ,, 'ifunu bc>und clusing If ~>cmc of the broker's commission is dependent 
"n the buyer's future payment performance, the-broker may be more motivated to 
^reen the buyer adequately based on financial ability. 
,sSee supra notes 28-50 and accompanying text. 
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In Jackson v. Free&1 the listing agreement granted the broker an 
exclusive right to sell for 365 days from the date of the agreement 
md thereafter until the broker received a fifteen-day written notice 
,erminating the agreement. Additionally, the agreement included an 
extension clause requiring a commission if, within one year from the 
:ermination of the agreement, the property was sold to any person 
Adth whom the broker had negotiations. The contract called for a 
;en-percent commission. The broker found a potential buyer and sub-
mitted an offer to purchase. The offer was countered, and the coun-
:eroffer never was accepted. The property later was sold to the first 
offeror under terms identical to the first offer. The sale, however, 
occurred a little over two years after the listing contract was signed. 
When the broker sued for a commission, the seller alleged that she 
iad sent a letter terminating the agreement, and produced a copy 
jf it. The broker denied ever receiving the letter. The court found 
^hat it had been sent and that the agreement and extension period 
had expired, resulting in a verdict for the seller. 
For the extension clause to be effective, the broker will have to 
>how that the eventual buyer was introduced to the seller during 
;he period of the listing contract.68 If the buyer is not identified un-
;il after the listing period has expired but during the extension period, 
;he broker, in many jurisdictions, will not be successful in using the 
:lause to recover a commission.69 
2. Procuring Cause Doctrine 
When two brokers claim entitlement to a commission from the pro-
ceeds of the same sale, the courts generally try to determine which 
Droker was the procuring cause of the sale.70 In some jurisdictions, 
nowever, this doctrine is used to permit a broker to recover a com-
67442 So. 2d 1346 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
68In Heckenlaible v. Fromherz, 577 R2d 523 (Or. 1978), the listing contract included 
;he following language: 
"In the event that you shall find a buyer ready and willing to enter into a deal 
for said price and terms, or at such other price and terms as I may accept, or 
that I am placed in contact with a buyer to or through whom at any time within 
90 days after the termination of said employment I may sell or convey said pro-
perty, I hereby agree to pay you in cash for your services a commission equal 
in amount to seven % of the above stated selling price." 
Id. at 523 (quoting Harkey v. Gahagan, 338 So. 2d 133 (La. Ct. App. 1976)). The broker, 
shortly after the listing agreement expired, brought a buyer to the seller and a sale 
resulted. The court denied the broker a commission, stating that "[presenting a seller 
with a buyer for the first time after the listing agreement has expired is no different 
than presenting a seller with a buyer when no agreement exists." Id. at 524. 
&Hd. 
70Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.07. 
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mission when the broker has placed the seller in contact with a buyer 
during the listing agreement, but the contract for sale and actual 
sale occur after the listing agreement has expired. 
The procuring cause doctrine can provide a basis for recovery when 
no extension clause is present in the listing agreement, or it may pro-
vide a basis for recovery independent of the extension clause.71 To 
obtain relief under the procuring cause theory, the broker must show 
that he did more than just aid the sale.72 "Procuring cause refers 
to the efforts of a broker in introducing, producing, finding, or in-
teresting a purchaser, and means that negotiations which eventual-
ly lead to a sale must be the result of some active effort of the 
broker."73 Thus, the mere absence of an extension clause will not 
necessarily prevent the broker from obtaining a commission. Of 
course, in many jurisdictions, oral listing agreements are permitted, 
and courts can find that the parties who previously had a written 
listing agreement either extended it or entered into a subsequent 
oral listing agreement.74 
III. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS 
While the law concerning when a commission is earned frequent-
ly is favorable to the seller, significant risks still exists that can and 
7lln Jackson v. Free, 442 So. 2d 1346 (La. Ct. App. 1983), the listing contract con-
tained an extension clause. The court found that the doctrine of procuring cause could 
entitle the broker to relief when the extension clause was not effective: 
1
 'The purpose of the extension clause in a real estate listing contract is to in-
sure the realtor's right to a fee when the property owner sells the property 
subject to the listing after expiration of the primary term to a purchaser who 
had been located or otherwise interested in the property by the realtor's ef-
fort. The realtor does not have to be the procuring cause in order to activate 
the extension clause. He need not have been involved in active negotiation with 
the purchaser at the time of the expiration of the primary term." 
Id at 1348 (quoting Harkey v. Gahagan, 338 So. 2d 133 (La. Ct. App. 1976)). The court 
continues by indicating that "a real estate broker is entitled to a commission if he 
is the 'procuring cause' of the sale, even though the term of his listing agreement may 
have expired." Id. 
72Id. at 1349. 
73/d. 
74For example, in Dickerson v. Hughes, 370 So. 2d 1301 (La. Ct. App. 1979), the seller 
initially had listed his property with the broker, but the property did not sell. At the 
expiration of the listing the seller validly terminated the agreement. A few months 
later, the seller stopped by the broker's office and told him that if he knew of someone 
interested m the house to bring them by. The broker brought an interested buyer to 
^ee the house, and the seller was present during that showing. The seller then pro-
ceeded to negotiate a sale directly with the buyer, and, actually sold the home to the 
buyer a month later. The broker sued for a commission and prevailed. The court found 
'hat the seller's few words when he stopped by the broker's office were sufficient 
> form an oral listing agreement. 
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E. LIABILITY FOR COMMISSION AFTER 
EXPIRATION OF THE LISTING CONTRACT 
Perhaps the most dangerous area for sellers is the possibility of ow-
g a commission to a broker based on a sale of the property after 
e listing contract has expired. This can come as somewhat of a sur-
ise and can work a tremendous hardship. An attorney advising a 
Her about selling real estate should caution sellers about this 
mger. The problem most often arises in one of two contexts. 
Extension Clauses 
Listing agreements often extend liability for a commission for a 
ated period of time beyond expiration of the listing period should 
e seller sell the property to a buyer identified by thei>roker.58 The 
ording of these provisions varies considerably. For example, some 
dicate that the sale must be due to the broker's efforts,59 while 
hers require that the buyer be 'one with whom the broker had 
igotiations,60 or one whose interest in the property was initiated 
7
 the broker or who was placed in contact with the seller by the 
oker.61 The length of time for which this period of liability may 
n varies, but generally is not less than three months, and may be 
) to one year. 
Some listing agreements include a stated initial period for the 
ting, but include a clause that keeps the agreement in force until 
e seller gives the broker written notice of termination of the agree-
ent.62 Witii this automatic lenewal provision, the seller often 
istakenly assumes that the agreement has expired. 
Extension clauses serve th^ legitimate purpose of preventing a 
Her from unfairly benefiting from the labors of the broker by 
HSee, e.g., The Nebraskans, Inc. v. Homan, 206 Neb. 749, 294 N W.2d 879 (1980), 
ckenlaible v. Fromherz, 28 Or. 199, 577 R2d 523 (1978). 
9See, e.g., The Nebraskans, Inc., 294 N.W.2d at 879. 
"The following language is used in a real estate listing contract from the Hutchin-
i Board of Realtors in Kansas: 
PROTECTION PERIOD: The SELLER agrees to pay the aforesaid brokerage fee 
should a sale be made directly by the SELLER within days after this 
exclusive right to sell terminates to parties with whom the REALTOR has 
negotiated with or whose interest in the property was initiated by REALTOR 
during the term hereof providing the REALTOR has notified the SELLER in 
writing of such negotiation during the term of the exclusive right to sell, unless 
the property is re-listed with another licensed person. 
'See, e.<?., Heckenlaible, 577 P.2d at 523, Ferrara, 533 P.2d at 1351. 
\Se<>, e.g., Jackson v. Free, 442 So. 2d 1346 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
K> 
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waiting a few days beyond the expiration of the listing agreement 
to close a deal. For example, in Collins v. Ogburn Realty Co.63 the 
seller gave an exclusive listing to the broker for 120 days. The con-
tract called for a six-percent commission if the home was sold dur-
ing the listing period, or if within ninety days following the expira-
tion of the listing agreement it was contracted for by one to whom 
the broker had shown the property during the listing agreement. The 
broker brought a buyer to the seller while the listing agreement was 
in force, and the seller and buyer entered into a contact for purchase. 
The sales contract was made contingent on the buyer selling his 
house, but gave the buyer immediate possession of the property pur-
suant to a lease provision. The buyer did not sell his house quickly, 
and, as a result, the sale of the seller's home did not occur during 
the listing period. The seller sent a letter to the broker instructing 
him to refund the buyer's deposit because no sale had occurred dur-
ing the listing period. The broker refused, arguing that he-had earned 
his commission because the contract for sale of the property was 
entered into within the 120-day period, even though the eventual 
sale did jiot get finalized until after the listing period. The court found 
that the broker was the procuring cause of the sale and, therefore, 
had earned the commission. 
While extension agreements can serve a legitimate purpose, they 
also can be abused, and frequently are met with hostility by courts. 
Courts generally will construe the agreement rigidly against the 
broker who drafts the agreement.64 For example, in McCartney v. 
Malm,65 the broker drafted a listing agreement that included an at-
tempt at an extension clause. The clause included the following lan-
guage- "or if the property is afterwards sold within six (6) months 
from the termination of this agency to a purchaser to whom it was 
submitted by listing REALTOR."66 That language, however, was not 
integrated accurately into the remainder of the commission clause. 
Within the six-month period following expiration of the listing agree-
ment the seller sold the property to a buyer identified by the broker 
during the period of the listing agreement. Despite its statement that 
such clauses were common practice in listing agreements, the court 
determined that the extension agreement was ambiguous and refused 
to enforce it. The court, however, found no bad faith on the part of 
the sellers and indicated that any ambiguity had to be resolved 
against the author of the instrument. 
6349 N.C. App. 316, 271 S.E.2d 512 (1980). 
.
 6 4
^ eg., McCartney v. Maim, 627 R2d 1014 (Wyo. 1981). "Finally, any ambiguity 
in tha ™^*™„t m u s t b e resolved against appellants (realtors) as authors of the instru-
n
^m." id. at 1020. 
6Vd. 
a
'Id. at 1018. 
9ft1 
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tive purchasers to ensure they are financially capable of buying the 
property. The broker wastes the seller's time by showing the property 
to those unable to purchase it. Further, today's lending practices are 
more complex than before, with many different types of financing 
being offered by a greater variety of institutions. Actually, because 
of this complexity, some mortgage brokers specialize in finding loans 
for buyers.50 
D. IDENTIFYING AND AVOIDING THE RISKS 
Though the majority rule may seem inequitable, the practitioner 
should be aware of the risks it poses to clients. The following cases 
illustrate those risks and suggest how they can be avoided. 
In Taylor v. Gaudry51 the seller of a business noted in the listing 
contract that any sale was conditioned upon approval of the business 
qualifications of the buyer. When an offer was received, the resulting 
sales contract did not include the condition. The court determined 
that the seller could not rely on the failure of that condition in 
defense to owing a commission to the real estate agent because the 
listing contract was overcome by the contract for sale. Thus, any con-
dition that the seller wants to rely upon must be found in the listing 
agreement and the sales contract. 
A similar problem is demonstrated by Fleming Bealty and In-
surance v. Evans.52 The seller entered into a listing agreement with 
the broker. The listing agreement specified a price of $155,840, in-
cluding $34,000 down, and $12,184 per year for ten years. Although 
it indicated that the seller would carry the financing (less down pay-
ment), the listing ?»g*^ement did not provide that the sale was con-
tingent on the seller approving Hie financial capability of the pro-
spective buyer. The broker found a buyer who was willing to buy 
the property on the terms of the listing contract. The seller refused 
the offer, alleging that the buyer was not financially able to purchase. 
When the matter was submitted to the jury, the jury examined the 
financial assets of the prospective buyer, found him able, and award-
ed a commission to the broker. The court held that a ''prospective 
purchaser is financially able if he has capability to make the down 
payment and all deferred payments required under the proposed con-
tract of sale."53 The lesson is that whenever a seller intends to pro-
b0See, e.g., William G. Vandever Co. v. Black, 645 P.2d 637 (Utah 1982) 
5146 Or. App. 235, 611 R2d 336 (1980). 
52199 Neb. 440, 259 N.W.2d 604 (1977) 
M/d., 259 N.W.2d at 606. 
278 
1991] REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS 
vide financing as part of a sale, the seller would be wise to include 
in the listing agreement a provision making any sale contingent on 
the seller's personal satisfaction with the buyer's financial status. 
While such a provision probably would not protect the seller if the 
rejection is in bad faith, it would give the seller more freedom to 
reject a buyer based on the seller's personal evaluation of the buyer's 
creditworthiness. As mentioned above, if the seller signs a contract 
for sale, this provision should be carried over to the sales contract. 
A related problem that should be anticipated and avoided concerns 
the possibility of default by the purchaser after closing. In Taylor 
u Weingart54 Weingart entered into a sales contract with a purchaser 
brought to him by Taylor, the broker. The sales contract called for 
a commission of five percent upon a sale. The financing terms pro-
vided for a down payment of $50,000, a $160,000 payment at clos-
ing, $210,000 by May 12, 1982, and the balance of the $1,750,000 
purchase price to be paid in installments over a twenty-five-year 
period. Closing took place, but the buyer was unable to make the 
$2ip?000 payment by May 12. At the time of the default, the broker 
had not been paid his full commission, and he sued for the balance 
due. The seller tried to defend on a number of theories, none of which 
was successful, and the court entered judgment for the broker. 
This case illustrates that once closing has occurred, all risks of 
future compliance are on the seller unless the contract provides 
otherwise. Under the law of most jurisdictions most courts will hold 
that the seller has accepted the buyer when the sales contract is 
signed.55 The stated rationale for this rule is that the broker does 
not ensure performance under the contract.56 Whether or not this 
seems equitable, the seller can alter this result either by placing con-
ditions in the listing agreement or by altering the clause for payment 
of commission to the broker.57 For instance, if the sales contract will 
include seller financing, the seller may want to consider paying a 
portion of the real estate agent's commission over time out of the 
anticipated receipts under the contract and conditioning those future 
commission payments on receipt of amounts due under the sales con-
tract. This would provide some protection to the seller and would 
shift some of the risk of future performance to the broker. 
r,4693 R2d 1231 (Mont. 1984) 
"Rohan, supra note 2, § 5.02(1). 
^Id (citing Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 R2d 746, 751 (Utah 1983)) 
^Eg.. Ferrara v. Firschmg, 533 R2d 1351 (Nev. 1975) 
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Financially Able Buyer. 
\ n issue that arises with some frequency is whether the seller owes 
e broker a commission when the transaction fails to close because 
e prospective buyer is financially unable to complete the purchase, 
those states that have adopted the New Jersey position, of course, 
ere would be no liability for a commission because title never 
ssed.39 In other jurisdictions, the question is whether the broker 
s performed under the listing agreement. The analysis in situa-
>ns in which the seller rejected an offer from a purchaser whom 
e broker alleges was a ready and able buyer is different than the 
alysis in situations in which the seller accepted the offer and 
tered into a purchase contract with the buyer and then discovered 
e buyer's financial inability.40 
1) Rejecting the Offer. When the seller refuses to accept an offer 
d the broker brings suit to recover a commission, courts generally 
11 require the broker, as part of his case, to prove that the purchaser 
,d financial ability.41 This makes sense because the listing agree-
*nt generally indicates that the broker earns the commission upon 
esenting a ready, willing, and able buyer. A buyer who is not finan-
illy capable of buying the property should not be construed to be 
> able purchaser.42 
While courts will use this to protect a purchaser who properly re-
:ts an offer from an unqualified buyer,43 the protection is far from 
solute. For example, in Fleming Realty & Insurance, Inc. v. Evans44 
e seller rejected an offer brought by the broker, claiming that the 
tyer was not financially able to purchase the property. The issue 
is sent to the jury, and the broker produced sufficient evidence 
convince the jury that the buyer had the necessary means to fund 
e deal. 
McGill Corp. v. Werner45 is an example of a seller who unsuccessful-
attempted to defend her rejection of an offer for full price based 
L the buyer's financial inability. In McGill Corp. when the seller 
jected the offer, she made a counter offer at the same price, but 
™E.g., Cornett v. Nathan, 196 Neb. 277, 242 N.W.2d 855 (1976). 
10Rohan, su,pra note 2, § 5.02. 
"Id. § 5.02(3). 
t2E.g., Goetz v. Anderson, 274 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1978). 
™bee, e.g.} Kusciano Kealty bervs., Ltd. v. (inffler, 6^ N/Lzd 696, 465 N.E.2d 33 
6 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1947). 
"199 Neb. 440, 259 N.W.2d 604 (1977). 
l5631 P.2d 1178 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). 
r6 
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included additional terms. She asked to be permitted to store her 
personal property on the land, asked for more earnest money, and 
specified a real estate agent's commission of seven percent rather 
than the ten percent indicated in the listing agreement and first of-
fer. Her counter offer was not accepted, and the buyers bought 
another home from the same real estate agent. The agent sued suc-
cessfully for his ten-percent commission. The court rejected the 
seller's defense that the purchasers were not financially able. The 
buyers had received a tentative loan commitment at the time of the 
rejection, and the court indicated that this was evidence that the 
buyers "had the financial ability to complete the purchase within 
the time permitted by the offer."46 
(2) Default by Buyer After Contract Signed. When the buyer 
defaults after signing a contract for sale, most jurisdictions will hold 
that the broker need not prove that the purchaser was financially 
able because the seller has accepted the purchaser by entering into 
a contract.47 The broker, therefore, earns the commission even though 
the purchaser later defaults. Because of the harshness of this rule, 
a growing number of jurisdictions hold that the broker represents 
that the purchaser is financially able and that the seller can rely on 
the broker's expertise.48 This position is a necessary result of the 
jurisdictions following the New Jersey rule formulated in Dobbs.49 
The minority position arguably makes more sense in today's 
market. The seller employs a real estate agent to do more that just 
show the property. The seller expects the agent to screen prospec-
M
'Id at 1180. Some jurisdictions treat the seller who rejects a buyer on the basis 
of financial ability much more favorably. For example, in Goetz the court explained 
the broker's obligation as follows: 
In summary, the proem mg of a prospective purchaser under an exclusive listing 
agreement implies the production of a ready, willing, and financially able pur-
chaser. The financially able condition refers to the requirement at the time of 
closing the transaction of either having the funds to make the payment or be 
in a position to arrange for the necessary financing to pay for the property to 
be purchased, but does not refer to subsequent developments. It therefore 
follows that for a real estate broker to be entitled to a commission pursuant 
to an exclusive listing agreement he must produce a prospective ready, willing 
and financially able purchaser of the property. It also follows that if the seller 
rejects the purchaser, evidence must be introduced to establish that the seller's 
refusal to consummate the sale was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or 
wrongful and was not for good cause. 
Goetz, 274 N.W.2d at 182-83. As can be imagined, it would be difficult for a broker 
to prove that the seller wrongfully rejected the buyer under the standards in North 
Dakota. Again, what the court examines is whether the seller acted in bad faith. 
-ui, oapta ituLc 2, £ "> 02(1; 
'Vd. § 5.02(2). 
4<
*See text accompanying notes 15-16. 
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INTRODUCTIOXN 
The past decade has witnessed a real estate boom throughout 
Massachusetts.1 With the boom, real estate brokerage firms have become more 
* I would like to thank my fellow members of the Boston University Law Review for their 
work on this Note, especially Shireen Arani for her editing, Kevin Sullivan for his valuable 
discussions and insightful comments, and Howard Lipton for his patience. I would also like 
to thank my fiancee Lindsay for her continued love and support, not only during the course 
of my work on this Note, but also throughout my law school career. 
1
 Thomas Grillo, Housing Prices Soared in Most of the Bay State, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 
22, 2001, at HI ("The longest-running real estate boom in Massachusetts has pushed the 
median price for single-family homes up by 36.7 percent from 1990 to 2000."); see also 
Lynnley Browning, Firms Bearing Larger Share of Tax Burden, Report Says; Industry 
Study Blames Property Rating System, BOSTON GLOBE , Nov. 19, 1998, at C3; Kimberly 
Blanton, Market Economy Benefits of Bull Market Had Seeped Deep Into Economic Fabric 
of State. A Retreat Could Cut Just as Deep, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1998, at Gl (noting 
that home prices in Boston and nearby suburbs have "skyrocketed"). 
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prevalent and more profitable than ever before.2 As a result of the increase in 
the number of real estate transactions and the coinciding increase in the 
number of brokers, it follows that real estate brokerage contracts have become 
more widespread as well. 
Due to the uncertain nature of the rea] estate market, disputes arising out of 
real estate brokerage contracts have always been very common. As Corbin 
notes, during the past century real estate brokerage contracts have given rise to 
seemingly abundant litigation.3 One of the most frequently litigated issues 
involves a broker's right to a commission when the broker presents a buyer to 
the seller, 4 the two parties enter into a purchase and sale agreement, but the 
buyer backs out before closing and the deal falls through.5 The ensuing 
dispute frequently centers on ambiguous contractual language concerning 
whether the broker is legally entitled to a commission. In particular, 
contractual clauses dealing with a broker's entitlement to a commission are 
often susceptible to interpretation as either a condition precedent to payment or 
as a schedule setting the time when payment of the commission is due.6 In 
2
 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEFT, OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 430 tbl.684. 507 tbi.787, 507 tbl.788 (120th ed. 2000) (illustrating the 
increase of establishments, employees, revenues, and earnings in the real estate brokerage 
industry during the 1990s); see also BUSINESS STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 260 tbl.20-
1 (Linz Audain & Cornelia J. Strawser eds., 6th ed. 2000) (illustrating the real estate 
industry's increased payroll during the 1990s). 
3
 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 50, at 78-81 (1952); see also-Henderson 
& Beal, Inc. v. Glen, J10 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Mass. 1953) ("The obligation of an owner, or 
one who engages a real estate broker, to pay a commission to the broker has been the subject 
of frequent litigation in our courts."); Gaynor v. Laverdure, 291 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Mass. 
1973) (quoting Henderson & Beal for the same proposition). Corbin attributes the 
"immense amount of litigation" both to the character of the real estate business itself, with 
buyers and sellers frequently feeling that the broker's commission is disproportionate to the 
service that the broker provides, and to the use of vague terms in the agreement between the 
principal and the broker, with "no clear provision as to matters that become the subject of 
dispute." CORBIN, supra, at 78. 
4
 This Note uses the terms "property owner" and "seller" interchangeably to refer to a 
property owner who engages a broker to sell his property. 
5
 This Note focuses on cases involving buyer default. While there is a rich body of law 
dealing with entitlement to a brokerage commission in the case of seller default, compare 
Bennett v. McCabe, 808 F.2d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that "Massachusetts law 
does not restrict a broker's entitlement to receive a commission on a failed transaction only 
to those cases where a seller's default involves affirmative conduct rising to the level of a 
wrongful act or interference") with Hillis v. Lake, 658 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Mass. 1995) ("The 
Bennett decision does not state Massachusetts law correctly. . . . In circumstances like those 
present in this case and in the Bennett case, the broker is not entitled to a commission unless 
it appears that the closing is prevented by wrongful conduct on the seller's part."), that issue 
is beyond the scope of this Note. 
0
 Common contractual language to this effect calls for payment of the commission "on 
said sale." See e.g.. Tristam's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Mass. 1975). 
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spite of the profusion of litigation, courts have not yet settled on a uniform 
interpretation of these clauses.7 
Uncertainty in the interpretation of ambiguous contractual language as a 
condition precedent or as a schedule of payments is by no means isolated to 
real estate brokerage contracts. To the contrary, the issue arises throughout 
contract law.8 In interpreting these ambiguous clauses, courts generally apply 
familiar methods of contractual interpretation,9 with two provisos: (1) courts 
The question that arises is whether a completed sale, with the passing of title, is required 
before the broker becomes entitled to a commission, or whether the parties used the 
language to set a convenient time when the commission should be paid. If a court adopts 
the former interpretation, then a failed sale will prevent the owner from owing the broker a 
commission, as a condition precedent to the commission (the closing of the sale) will have 
failed. If, on the other hand, the court adopts the latter interpretation, the owner will owe 
the broker a commission despite the failed sale, as the failure of the parties' schedule of 
payments will have no effect on the broker's legal entitlement to a commission. 
7
 Compare Alvord v. Cook, 54 N.E. 499, 500 (Mass. 1899) (construing contractual 
language providing for payment of a brokerage fee when "the agreement between [the 
seller] and [the buyer] is carried into effect" to set a convenient time when payment of the 
commission should be made) and Kuga v. Chang, 399 S.E.2d 816, 817 (Va. 1991) 
(construing an agreement providing for the payment of a brokerage fee "if anyone produces 
a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy the property" not to make settlement of the sale a 
condition precedent to payment of the brokerage commission) with Tristam's Landing, Inc. 
v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d at 730 (construing contractual language providing for the payment of a 
brokerage commission "on said sale" to make consummation of the sale a condition 
precedent for the broker to earn his commission) and Currier v. Kosinski, 506 N.E.2d 895 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (construing contractual language providing for the payment of a 
brokerage fee "if the broker produced a buyer ready, willing and able to buy [the property]" 
as insufficient to require payment of a brokerage fee absent a completed sale (internal 
quotation -marks omitted)). 
3
 Most arrangements giving rise to this controversy involve claims for payment for 
services rendered. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTHON CONTRACTS § 8.4. at 535 (3d 
ed. 1999). One of the most common situations involves "pay when paid" clauses in 
agreements between general contractors and subcontractors. See A.J. Wolfe Co. v. 
Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 244 N.E,2d 717 (Mass 1969); Jeremiah Sullivan & Sons, Inc. v. 
Kay-Locke, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); Bayer & Mingolla Indus., Inc. v. 
A.J. Orlando Contracting Co., 370 N.E.2d 1391 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). In the typical case, 
the contract provides that the general contractor will pay the subcontractor within a certain 
amount of-time after the property owner pays the general contractor. See e.g., A.J. Wolfe. 
244.N.E.2d at 720 (interpreting contract calling for payment "within 10 days after" the 
general contractor received payment from the owner). When the owner fails or is unable to 
pay the general contractor, the general contractor often refuses to pay the subcontractor, and 
the subcontractor brings suit to recover money owed. See id. at 719-20. In the subsequent 
litigation, the general contractor argues thai the "pay when paid" clause establishes a 
condition precedent to payment, while the subcontractor argues that the clause merely sets a 
time for payment. See id. at 720. Massachusetts courts generally interpret these clauses to 
set a time for payment. See id.: Sullivan. 459 N.E.2d at 838; Bayer. 370 N.E.2d at 1382. 
q
 Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Town of Dan vers, 577 N.E.2d 283. 288 (Mass. 
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prefer an interpretation that imposes a duty on one of the parties to ensure that 
an event occurs, rather than an interpretation that makes the other party's duty 
conditional on the happening of an event;10 and (2) courts prefer an 
interpretation that will lessen the obligee's risk of forfeiture if the event does 
not occur.11 Nonetheless, in real estate brokerage contracts, ambiguous 
language generally renders familiar methods of interpretation ineffective, and 
courts' provisos do not provide a ready answer.12 As a result, without the aid 
of these tools, policy considerations often become determinative. 
Courts have looked to several opposing policies when interpreting 
ambiguous contractual language regarding a broker's right to a commission. 
On the broker's side of the balance, the primary argument builds from the 
premise that the broker's duty is to bring the buyer and seller together in a 
legally enforceable agreement, and, at that point, the broker's work is at an 
end.13 Under this view, once the parties have entered into a purchase and sale 
1991) ("When construing a contract, a court looks to the parties" intent to determine whether 
they have created a condition precedent. To ascertain intent, a court considers the words 
used by the parties, the agreement taken as a whole, and surrounding facts and 
circumstances." (internal citations omitted)); FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 530. 
10
 FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 532. Professor Farnsworth provides the example of a 
contract for the sale of goods that calls for "[sjelection by the buyer to be made before 
September 1,"' but in which the buyer does not select the goods until September 10. Id. The 
question arises whether the seller's duty to perform is discharged because the buyer failed to 
make selection in accordance with the contract. Id. Rather than interpreting the clause as a 
condition, which results in a discharge of the seller's duty to perform if the buyer does not 
make proper selection, most courts interpret the clause as imposing a duty on the buyer to 
make a proper selection, leaving the buyer liable for damages if he fails to do so, but not 
allowing the seller to escape his duty to perform under the contract. Id. 
11
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227(1) (1981). 
In resolving doubts as to whether an event is made a condition of an obligor's duty, and 
as to the nature of such an event, an interpretation is preferred that will reduce the 
obligee's risk of forfeiture, unless the event is within the obligee's control or the 
circumstances indicate that he has assumed the risk. 
Id. 
12
 Because of the nature of real estate brokerage contracts, courts' provisos generally 
lend no aid. First, because real estate brokerage contracts involve a third party—the buyer, 
who is most often at the root of the default—in a dispute between the owner and the broker, 
it is not a sufficient answer simply to say that the court can construe the contract in a way 
that closing of the sale rests in the control of one of the parties to the contract. Second, the 
only risk of forfeiture in the contract between the owner and the broker consists of a waste 
of the broker's expended efforts in arranging a sale. Nevertheless, a large portion of a 
broker's business involves expending energies in projects where the outcome is doubtful. 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 537. Therefore, a construction to avoid forfeiture provides 
no aid. as the broker assumes the risk of this forfeiture in the course of his business. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 illus. 4 (1981) (explaining that a broker's 
efforts should not be viewed as forfeiture because the broker assumes the risk that the sale 
will fall through). 
13
 One of the earliest expressions of this rationale appears in Fitzpatrick v Gilson. 57 
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agreement, the broker has no further control of the matter.14 Thus, ii would not 
be reasonable to interpret ambiguous language to condition the broker's right 
to a commission on the activities of people over whom the broker has no 
control.15 Some courts have therefore concluded that a broker becomes legally 
entitled to a commission at the time the buyer and seller enter into an 
enforceable agreement.16 
The arguments on the seller's side of the balance are founded on some 
courts' view of the relative skill and understanding of the broker and the 
property owner in the typical real estate transaction.17 The imbalance between 
the sophisticated broker and the naive property owner has prompted some 
courts to conclude that the default rule should favor the property owner and the 
broker should bear the burden of expressly contracting around that default rule 
if he so desires.18 Moreover, given the nature of a broker's business, the 
broker is better suited to shoulder the risk that the prospective buyer will fail to 
complete the transaction.19 Also, rather than viewing the broker's duty as 
producing a purchaser who will enter into an agreement, these courts have 
taken the different perspective that the broker's duty is to produce a purchaser 
N.E. 1000 (Mass. 1900). The court in Fitzpatrick reasoned as follows: 
When a broker has found a customer for that which his principal has employed him to 
find a customer, the broker has performed his duty, and has earned his commission; or. 
as the proposition is usually stated, if the person produced by the broker is able, ready, 
and willing to buy, sell, or lend, as the case may be, the broker's commission is earned. 
When the broker has produced a customer, his duty is at an end. So far as his rights or 
his duty are concerned, it is immaterial whether a contract is or is not made, or, if 
made, whether it is or is not performed. The broker's right to a commission is no more 
dependent upon or affected by the fact that a contract is or is not drawn up and 
executed than it is by the fact that the contract, if drawn up. is or is not carried into 
effect. Making or not making a contract with the customer produced, enforcing or not 
enforcing a contract, if made, arc matters for the broker's principal to do or not to do. 
as his ability and inclination determine. They are matters with which the broker is not 
concerned, and on which his right to a commission is not dependent. 
Id. at 1000-01 (citations omitted). 
14
 D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS § 3.5, at 3:69-3:70 (2d ed. 
1992 &Supp. 2001). 
15
 Id. at 3:70 ("There is no reason to make the broker's entitlement to a commission 
dependent upon the activities or persons—abstractors of title, attorneys, and, title insurers— 
over whom the broker has no control."). 
16
 See e.g., Canton v. Thomas, 162 N.E. 769 (Mass. 1928); Sayegusa v. Rogers. 846 P.2d 
1005 (Mont. 1993); Coughlin v. Neefos. 549 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Div. 1990). 
17
 See e.g., Tristam's Landing, Inc. v. Wrait. 327 N.E.2d 727. 731 (Mass. 1975) ("[M]any 
sellers, unlike brokers, are involved in real estate transactions infrequently, perhaps only 
once in a lifetime, and are thus unfamiliar with their legal rights.''). 
18
 Id. at 731-32. 
19
 See e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson. 236 A.2d 843. 855 (N.J. 1967) (arguing 
that the risk of the buyer's inability to go through with the transaction at closing "must be 
treated as a normal incident of the brokerage business"); Tristam's Landing. 327 N.E.2d at 
730-31. 
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who is financially capable of completing the transaction. As a result, the 
broker should bear the duty of investigating the prospective purchaser's 
finances to confirm that the purchaser is in fact capable of completing the 
deal.20 Finally, these courts have looked to the expectations of a property 
owner in a real estate transaction. The customary expectation of the owner is 
to pay the broker out of the proceeds of the sale,21 and it would be inconsistent 
with this expectation to hold an owner liable for a commission when the sale 
falls through and there are no proceeds to draw from.22 
Massachusetts courts have faced extensive litigation in this area and have 
taken a changing approach to ambiguous language in real estate brokerage 
contracts. Over the last century, Massachusetts courts have gone from 
interpreting ambiguous language in favor of real estate brokers to interpreting 
it in favor of property owners.23 At the same time, the courts in a majority of 
states continue to interpret ambiguous language in favor of real estate 
brokers.24 
20
 Ellsworth Dohbs, 236 A.2d at 853. The court noted: 
Since the broker's duty to the owner is to produce a prospective purchaser who is 
financially able to pay the purchase price and take title, a right in the owner to assume 
such capacity when the broker presents his purchase ought to be recognized. It follows 
that the obligation to inquire into the prospect's financial status and to establish his 
adequacy to fulfill the monetary conditions of the purchase must be regarded logically 
and sensibly as resting with the broker. 
Id. The placement of the burden of investigation is a function of a court's interpretation of 
ambiguous language. If a court interprets ambiguous language regarding the broker's 
entitlement to a commission as a condition precedent, then the burden of investigation will 
rest with the broker, as a buyer's inability to close the transaction will result in the loss of 
the broker's commission. If, on the other hand, the ambiguous language is treated as a 
schedule for payments, then the duty of investigation will fall on the property owner, as 
once the owner has accepted the buyer by entering into a purchase and sale agreement, the 
owner will be liable for a commission, even if the buyer is subsequently financially unable 
to go through with the transaction. In the latter scenario, the owner must therefore satisfy 
himself as to the financial capability of the buyer before entering into the purchase and sale 
agreement. 
21
 Id. at 854 ("The common understanding of men is, however, that the agent's 
commission is payable out of the purchase price." (quoting Dennis Reed, Ld. v. Goody, 
1950 K.B. 277, 284-85 (Eng. C.A.))). 
22
 Id. 854-55. hi addition, interpreting a brokerage contract to provide for a commission 
on a failed sale can lead to the odd result of a property owner paying multiple commissions 
on the sale of a single property. 
23
 See Gaynor v. Laverdure. 291 N.E.2d 617, 620-23 (Mass. 1973; (surveying 
Massachusetts courts' treatment of the issue): Trhtcun's Landing, 327 N.E.2d at 731 
(adopting a rule more favorable to property owners). 
24
 See BURKE, supra note 14. §§ 3, 4 (discussing the majority and minority rules on real 
estate brokerage commissions). Professor Burke notes that, at present, six states have 
adopted the minority rule, while eight others have cited it approvingly but not yet relied on 
it as the basis for a decision. Id. § 3. 
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This Note explores the law of real estate brokerage commissions through the 
disparate positions that courts have developed to deal with ambiguous 
language in real estate brokerage contracts.25 With a focus on Massachusetts 
case law,26 the Note sets forth the majority and minority rules27 and ultimately 
argues in favor of the minority rule. The Note begins in Part I by analyzing the 
decisions of Massachusetts courts over the past century, culminating with the 
decision in Trutam's Landing, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court (**SJC") formally adopted the minority rule. From this analysis. Part I 
identifies and examines the factors that motivated the Massachusetts courts* 
initial interpretation in favor of brokers, as well as the factors that were 
instrumental in the SJC's adoption of the minority rule. Part II takes a closer 
look at the justifications that courts have given for the majority rule in the 
years since Massachusetts courts abandoned it. After Parts I and II have 
examined the majority and minority positions and their underlying 
justifications, Part III argues that the minority rule is superior: first, by drawing 
on the reasons set forth by courts in their decisions, and second, by raising 
efficiency considerations that, to this point, courts have not explicitly taken 
into account in their opinions. 
I. MASSACHUSETTS CASES 
For the first seventy-five years of the twentieth century, when Massachusetts 
courts faced ambiguous language in real estate brokerage contracts regarding a 
broker's entitlement to a commission, they interpreted the language in favor of 
brokers.28 This approach was developed in a series of cases beginning in 1899. 
25
 The Note focuses on the specific ambiguity that arises when a clause is susceptible to 
interpretation as either a condition precedent to payment or a schedule for payments. While 
this scenario is probably the most common, the default rules applied by courts in resolving 
these disputes have application beyond this situation. Indeed, as many of the discussed 
cases reveal, courts will apply the default rules in any dispute involving ambiguity 
surrounding a broker's right to a commission. Consequently, the reasoning employed in this 
Note has application beyond the condition precedent/schedule for payments dichotomy. 
Furthermore, this Note deals primarily with transactions involving a broker and an 
inexperienced residential property owner rather than a commercial entity. While it is 
beyond the scope of this Note, it is worth noting that courts have applied the rules developed 
in the residential context to transactions involving a broker and a sophisticated commercial 
entity. See infra note 105. 
26
 Massachusetts case law provides an excellent vehicle tor exploring this area of the 
law. Not only have Massachusetts courts have faced exteusi\e litigation in this area, but the 
decisions have run the gamut both in terms of their outcomes and the considerations that 
have driven courts1 decisions. 
27
 The majority rule, also called the "ready, willing and able*1 rule, interprets ambiguous 
language in favor of real estate brokers, while the minority rule, also called the Ellsworth 
rule, interprets ambiguous language in ta\or of property owners. 
2K
 See e.g., Alvord v. Cook. 54 N.E. 499 (Mass. 1899) (interpreting the language "when 
the con t rac t . . . is carried into effect" as a schedule for payment of Hie brokerage fee;; 
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A. The Early Cases 
1. Alvord v. Cook 
In Alvord v. Cook, 29 the property owners, the Cooks, entered into an 
agreement with two real estate brokers regarding the sale of real estate. Under 
the agreement, the brokers were to obtain a sale or exchange of the Cook's 
property. Some time after the agreement was entered into, the brokers 
succeeded in procuring an individual named Jewell to exchange his property 
for the property of the Cooks. In return, the Cooks agreed to pay the brokers a 
commission consisting of the transfer of a portion of the land to be conveyed 
by Jewell plus $200. The contract between Jewell and the Cooks contained 
language providing for the payment of the commission to the brokers when the 
' contract with Jewell "is carried into effect."30 The exchange with Jewell 
ultimately fell through, and the brokers brought an action to recover their 
commission.3 ] 
The SJC acknowledged that the clause was open to two potential 
interpretations, 
A [fjirst, as being a clause for the protection of the defendants, and 
| I providing that they should pay nothing unless Jewell carried out his 
/ I contract or the defendants saw fit to make him do so; and, second, as 
JI being a clause for the protection of the plaintiffs, and limiting the time 
( beyond which they would not have to wait for their commission.32 
The court opted for the latter interpretation, concluding that the clause set a 
time for payment, thus entitling the brokers to a commission despite the failed 
Rosenthal v. Schwartz, 101 N.E. 1070 (Mass. 1913) (finding that contractual language that 
called for the payment of the brokerage fee "when title passed" did not make the brokerage 
fee conditional upon the transfer of the title, but merely set a dead-line for payment); Canton 
v. Thomas, 162 N.E. 769 (Mass. 1928) (interpreting language that called for the brokerage 
fee to be paid "when papers are passed" to set a time for payment of the fee, noting that the 
payment was not conditioned on the papers actually being passed); Maher v. Haycock, 18 
N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1938) (stating that language making the brokerage fee payable when the 
property was "sold" required only that the broker produce "a purchaser ready, willing, and 
able to buy" and that the language should not "be so strictly construed as to require that title 
should actually pass before the plaintiff should be entitled to a commission"); Henderson & 
Beal. Inc. v. Glen. 110 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1953) ("a broker in the absence of special 
circumstances is entitled to a commission if he produces a customer ready, willing, and able 
to buy upon the terms and for the price given the broker by the owner"); Gaxnor, 291 
N.E.2d 617 (holding that once a broker produces an acceptable customer, "making or not 
making a contract aie matters with which the broker is not concerned, and on which 
commission is not dependent'') 
29
 54 N.E. 499 (Mass. 1899). 
30
 Id. at 500 
31
 Id. at 499 
32
 Id 
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deal.33 In reaching this outcome, the court fust defined the duty of Alvord 
under the contract as "obtaining a satisfactory contract for a purchase or 
exchange," rather than as obtaining a completed sale of the property.34 From 
the assumption that the broker's duty was merely to find a buyer who would 
enter into a contract, the remainder of the court* s analysis flowed easily: 
The plaintiffs had done all they were employed to do. They had obtained 
for the defendants a contract with Jewell which the defendants could 
compel him to carry out. and all parties expected that it would be carried 
out. The plaintiffs had no further power in the matter; the rest was to be 
done by the defendants. But they had the right to assume that the 
defendants would use all reasonable efforts to do the rest, and to avail 
themselves of the agreement with Jewell.35 
In keeping with the SJC's interpretation, the risk that the purchaser would 
default between the time of the agreement to buy and the time of closing fell 
squarely on the property owner. It was not long before the SJC began to 
express misgivings about this result. 
2. Canton v. Thomas 
In Canton v. Thomas,36 the broker. Canton, entered into a written agreement 
33
 Id 
'
4
 Id The court's opinion does not lend any insight into why it started from the baseline 
assumption that the broker's duty was merely to bring the two parties together; it does not 
indicate whether this assumption came from the court's reading of the language in the 
contract, whether it was the common understanding of the time, or whether it originated 
from some other source. 
:5
 Id. One factor in the case that appeais to ha\e been of critical importance to the court 
was the Cooks' failure to enforce their contract with Jewell. Fiom the facts that the couit 
piovides, it appears that after entering into the contract. Jewell continually postponed 
closing. Id. After several failed attempts to encourage Jewell to close, the Cooks eventually 
ceased their efforts to enforce the contract against Jewell and declined to hold themselves 
bound. The court viewed the Cooks' efforts as insufficient, and its opinion is littered with 
references to the Cooks" failure to enforce their contract against Jewell. A few of the many 
examples of the court's displeasure with the Cooks include: the court's reference to its 
disinclination to leave Alvord's payment to the "whim or caprice of either of the principals": 
the court's note that the Cooks have "by their own voluntary conduct" become unable to 
carry out their contract with the brokers; the court's reference to the contract between the 
Cooks and Jewell as "canceled by mutual agreement"; and the court's finding that the Cooks 
had "neglected to use reasonable means" to hold Jewell to the contract. Id. While the facts 
are insufficient to determine whether and at what cost the Cooks would have been able to 
force Jewell to go through with the deal, the court was extremely harsh on the Cooks lor not 
doing moie to enforce the deal against Tevvell Id While this factoi may go a long way in 
explaining the outcome in the case, the opinion established a rule that would ha\e bioad 
application in subsequent years See e ? , Canton v Thomas. 162 N E 769. 769 (Mass 
1928) (finding that the facts be lore the court were "governed by Alvord v Cook") 
* 162 NE 769 (Mass 1928) 
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with the property owner, Thomas, later on the same day that Thomas entered 
into an agreement with a buyer. The agreement between Canton and Thomas 
provided that "in j^^^\dn^U^ft-^--4Cm).ton]vwcurm^ a purchaser for the 
property . . . [Thomas] agree[s] to pay [Cantorjthe surrTof $1,632 when papers 
are passed."37 When the prospective buyer breached, Thomas refused to pay 
the brokerage commission, and Canton brought an action for recovery.38 
In its analysis, the SJC turned immediately to Alvord and found its rule 
controlling39 and dispositive of the case.40 Nevertheless, the court appeared to 
be growing uncomfortable with the Alvord rule. The SJC noted that the 
slightly different language "if and when papers are passed" would have been 
sufficient to create a condition precedent.41 Moreover, the court identified 
several other cases where "ameliorating circumstances" had required a 
different result.42 Finally, the SJC noted that its interpretation of the contract 
37
 Id. at 769. Though the court did not overtly consider it m its opinion, there is an 
argument that the contractual language ''in consideration of. . . procuring a purchaser" 
established the broker's duty as providing a purchaser, independent of whether the 
purchaser ever carried out the transaction. See Coughlin v. Neefus, 549 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. 
Div. 1990) (holding that contractual language providing for the payment of a commission 
when "a transfer, sale or exchange of said property is made or effected or agreed upon with 
anyone" unambiguously entitled the broker to her commission for producing a prospective 
purchaser, despite the failed sale (emphasis added)). While this may have played a role m 
the decision, the court overtly rested its decision on other grounds. 
38
 Canton, 162 N.E. at 769. While it is not clear from the court's opinion, the most likely 
reason that the parties signed an agreement after Thomas had already entered into an 
agreement with a prospective purchase is that Canton and Thomas had previously entered 
into an oral agreement that they were memorializing in a writing. Nonetheless, due to the 
operation of the Parol Evidence Rule, the court's interpretation may create problems of past 
consideration. See infra note 46. 
39
 Id. (noting that there is no workable difference between a contract to pay a broker 
when an agreement "is carried into effect" and "when papers are passed") 
40
 Id. ("[W]here cases arise not fairly distinguishable in their facts from Alvord v. 
Cook . . . the rule there established must be followed."). 
41
 Id. (emphasis added) ("A condition of the payment of the commission would be 
expressed if the words 'if and when papers are passed' had been used in the contract here in 
issue in place of the words 'when papers are passed.'"). 
42
 Id. Among the cases that the court cites for this proposition are Pagum v. White, 156 
N.E. 711 (Mass. 1927) (interpreting an agreement, that provided the broker with a 
commission consisting of the amount that the broker obtained on the sale of the property in 
excess of $10,500, to foreclose a commission when the property sold for exactly $10,500); 
Brown v. Jacobs. 150 N.E. 206 (Mass. 1926) (upholding lower court's finding that the 
parties had orally agreed that the broker would receive no commission if the deal did not go 
through); Carpenter v. Blake, 146 N.E. 224 (Mass. 1925) (upholding lower court's finding 
that the contract only entitled the broker to a commission if he received more than $5000 for 
the property): Clark v. Hovey, 105 N.E. 222 (Mass. 1914) (finding that, because the contract 
provided for payment of the commission from the proceeds of the sale that came after the 
first $5000 had been paid, payment of $5000 was a condition precedent to the broker 
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"may be not that which an inexperienced owner might think the contract to 
mean."43 
The S J C s misgivings in Canton mark the beginning of its recognition of a 
policy supporting a contrary interpretation. In particular, the court's statement 
regarding the meaning that an inexperience property owner would give to the 
contract reflects a recognition of the unfairness in holding an inexperienced 
property owner liable for a brokerage commission when the sale of the 
property never transpires. There are two bases for questioning a rule that 
effectuates such a result. The first builds on the parties' intent in entering the 
contract. Absent clear and unambiguous language to the contrary, in the 
ordinary case a property owner will not anticipate being liable for a brokerage 
commission on a failed sale.44 As a result, it is unreasonable for a court to hold 
that through ambiguous langr^w* the, parties' intent at the, time, of contracting 
was to achieve exactly that result. 
The second basis is grounded in public policy. The broker is a repeat player 
in real estate transactions and thus presumably is more conscious of the 
interpretation that courts will give to ambiguous language in real estate 
brokerage contracts. As a result, it is more equitable for a court to interpret 
ambiguous language in favor of property owners—or, in the alternative, to 
create a default rule that favors property owners and to put the burden on 
brokers to contract around the rule through clear and unambiguous language. 
An interpretation of ambiguous language in favor of property owners would 
force brokers to include clear and unambiguous language providing for 
entitlement to a commission in the absence of a completed sale, if that were the 
parties' desired result. This would ensure that both the broker and the property 
owner are conscious of the agreement that they are entering. 
On the other hand, an interpretation of ambiguous language in favor of 
brokers may create a trap for the unwary property owner. Such an 
interpretation would allow brokers to mislead property owners into a contract 
where the property owners will unexpectedly be liable for a brokerage 
commission in the absence of a completed sale. The broker, knowing that 
courts will interpret the ambiguity in his favor and desiring to maximize his 
profits in the transaction, may actually preter tne use ot ambiguous larrguage.45 
earning a commission); Munroe v. Taylor, 78 N.E. 106 (Mass. 1906) (holding that an 
agreement fixing the amount of the broker's commission to the amount of the sale price 
made completion of the sale a condition precedent to a brokerage commission) 
43
 Canton, 162 N.E. at 769. 
44
 See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 855 (N.J. 1967). 
45
 The risk of buyer default is a risk that the agreement between the property owner and 
the seller will take into account. Theoretically, if the owner is bearing that risk, than the 
broker will be paid less, and, conversely, if the broker is bearing that risk, the broker will be 
paid more. The use of ambiguous language allows the broker to have the best of both 
worlds, for if the courts will construe ambiguous language in favor of brokers—an 
interpretation that property owners do not anticipate but brokers do—then the broker can 
contract for a rate that reflects the broker bearing the risk, while, in reality, the owner will 
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As the court started to appreciate this reality, it began to question the Alvord 
rule. Though the SJC acknowledged the problem, at this point, it did not view 
the problem as sufficiently serious to overcome precedent and thus construed 
the contract at issue in favor of the broker.46 
3. Maker v. Haycock 
In Maker v. Haycock, 47 the broker went to the property owner's home, 
identified himself as a real estate broker, and told the property owner that he 
had a customer who was willing to buy the home. The two parties then entered 
into an oral contract calling for the property owner to pay the plaintiff broker a 
commission "if the house were sold."48 The broker produced a purchaser, who 
entered into an agreement to purchase the property and completed the 
transaction. Nevertheless, the property owner subsequently tried to invalidate 
his contract with the broker because the sale of the property took place on a 
Sunday.49 The broker then brought suit to recover his commission.50 
The court held that the contract did not require a completed sale for the 
broker to earn his commission.51 It reasoned that "[t]he word 'sold' in this 
connection should not, in the absence of anything to indicate the contrary, be 
so strictly construed as to require that titleshould actually pass before the 
bear it. 
46
 There are additional grounds to challenge the court's outcome m this case. The 
contract between the seller and buyer was entered into before the agreement between the 
seller and the broker. Thus, under the court's interpretation, the broker had already 
provided the consideration at the time that the seller and broker entered into their contract. 
Consequently, Thomas' promise to pay cannot have been made in exchange for Canton 
procuring a purchaser who would enter into an agreement to buy, and the doctrine of past 
consideration would render the agreement unenforceable. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, 
at 54-55. On the other hand, if the court had interpreted the contract to require a purchaser 
who completed the transaction, Canton's performance would still be forthcoming, and 
problems of past consideration would be avoided. 
47
 18 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1938). 
48
 Id. 
49
 The property owner based his argument on chapter 136, section 5 of Massachusetts 
General Laws, which prohibits "any manner of labor, business or work, except works of 
necessity and charity" on Sunday. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 136, § 5 (2001). The property 
owner argued that because the transaction closed on a Sunday and his agreement with the 
broker required payment of a brokerage commission when the deal closed (under his 
reading), the agreement with the broker was invalid because it transpired on a Sunday. 
Nevertheless, under the court's interpretation, because the broker earned his commission 
upon procuring a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy, rather than at the time of 
closing, the broker had become entitled to his commission earlier in the week, and thus 
chapter 136, section 5 was of no consequence. Maker, 18 N.E.2d at 349. 
50
 Maker, 18 N.E.2d at 348. 
51
 Id. at 349. 
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plaintiff should become entitled to a commission. , ,52 Instead, it was enough if 
the broker produced a purchaser "ready wjlljfia nnH nh1r»" tn buy on the 
seller's terms.53 
The^court's articulation of the ready, willing, and able rule became the 
baseline rule for entitlement to a brokerage commission in Massachusetts.54 
Henceforth, absent special circumstances or an agreement otherwise, a broker 
would be entitled to a commission when he produced a purchaser who was 
ready, willing, and able to buy on the seller's terms.55 This rule has several 
consequences adverse to property owners. First, the ready, willing, and able 
rule puts the risk of buyer default on the property owner during the executory 
period, the time between the initial agreement between the buyer and seller and 
closing of the deal.56 This seems counterintuitive, as the nature of the broker 's 
business involves expending energies in projects where the outcome is 
52
 Id. 
5
" Id. 
54
 A number of cases subscribes to this rule. In Talanian v. Phippen. 256 N.E.2d 445, 
446 (Mass. 1970), the court held that the evidence supported a finding that the broker 
produced a customer ready, able and willing to purchase the property on the 
defendant's terms, at which time the [broker's] obligation as a broker ceased and he 
was entitled to his commission regardless of whether the contract between the 
defendant and the purchaser was thereafter made, or, if made, whether it was carried 
into effect. 
Id. In Spence v. Lawrence, 149 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Mass. 1958), the SJC found that 
[w]here the broker's right to a commission is not by the terms of his undertaking made 
dependent upon the completion of a sale, the fact tha t . . . the sale is not completed is 
immaterial and it is sufficient if the broker has procured a customer ready, able, and 
willing to purchase the premises at the price and on the terms stipulated by the seller. 
Id. Additional cases include MacDonald v. Mihalopoulas. 149 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Mass. 
1958) ("If the customer procured by the broker is ready, able, and willing to purchase the 
property on the terms fixed by the seller, the broker's duty is at an end and he has earned his 
commission."); McKallagat v. La Cognata, 140 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Mass. 1957) ("When the 
[broker] has [produced a customer ready, able, and willing to buy on the seller's terms] he is 
not required to show that a sale resulted or even that a written agreement of sale was ever 
entered into by the parties."); Drake v. Sweet, 92 N.E.2d 346, 347-48 (Mass. 1950) ("It is 
familiar law that to recover a commission a broker ordinarily is required to prove only that 
he produced a customer who was ready, able, and willing to purchase on the seller's 
terms."); Chapin v. Ruby, 74 N.E.2d 12, 13 (Mass.1947) ("If the finding of the judge that 
the customers produced were ready, able and willing to accept the defendant's 
proposition . . . the [broker] should prevail."). 
55
 For a description of the substance that courts have given to the terms "ready." 
"willing," and "able" in years following the Maker decision, see infra note 64. 
36
 Under the ready, willing, and able regime, once the broker has produced a prospective 
buyer on the seller's terms, the broker has earned a commission. As a result, during the 
period between agreement and closing, the so-called executory period, if the buyer breaches, 
the broker is still entitled to a commission, but the seller will not yet have sold the property. 
See e.g., Gaynor v. Laverdure. 291 N.E.2d 617, 621 (Mass. 1973). The effect of this system 
is to place the risk of buyer breach on the seller during the executory period. 
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uncertain.57 As a result, brokers are familiar with handling this sort of risk, and 
if courts put the additional risk of buyer default on brokers, then brokers can 
account for the increase by raising their compensation on completed sales. On 
the other hand, property owners are largely incapable of dealing with this risk. 
Property owners may not even be aware that the risk exists, and if they are 
aware of it, they would only have two ways to try to account for it, both 
ineffective. They could increase the asking price for their property, which 
would pass the cost on to buyers and artificially inflate real estate prices, which 
in turn would distort the market's pricing of property. In the alternative, 
property owners could demand lower brokerage commissions. In addition to 
the collective action problem that a diverse group of property owners would 
face in effectuating this second option, even if successful, this set-up would 
lead property owners and brokers to alter their agreements to provide that the 
broker would bear the risk of buyer default during the executory period in 
exchange for an increased commission. This leads to exactly the situation that 
an initial interpretation in favor of owners brings about, except that such an 
interpretation in favor of owners in the first instance avoids the transaction 
costs that this alternate scenario incurs. 
Second, the ready, willing, and able rule puts the duty of investigating the 
financial capability of the buyer on the seller rather than on the broker.58 This 
is objectionable as well. Certainly, of the two parties, the broker is in a better 
position to investigate the resources of the buyer. In almost every case, the 
typical seller will not have sufficient access to financial information about the 
buyer to conduct an adequate investigation.59 On the other hand, the broker 
makes his living in the real estate business and as a result is likely to have 
superior access to financial information.60 If the duty of investigation was put 
57
 FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 537. 
58
 See supra note 20 (explaining that the burden of investigation is a function of the way 
in which a court interprets ambiguous language regarding entitlement to a brokerage 
commission). 
59
 ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW § 153, at 218 (1987 & Supp. 
2001) ("[I]t is unrealistic to believe that most sellers, no matter how vigilant and 
resourceful, would be able to protect themselves by investigating the buyer's financial 
ability."). 
60
 Id. (noting that the broker "can make a spot qualification of the prospective buyer with 
possible lenders")- In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court of Iowa expressed its 
view on the duty of investigation: 
[The brokers] found a buyer unknown to the [seller], and the latter was necessarily 
interested in the financial responsibility of the purchaser with whom he was about to 
deal through an agent. Under such conditions the principal is not bound to investigate 
the truth of the facts stated as an inducement for his signature to a contract, nor does it 
lie in the mouth of the agent to say that his statements should not have been believed 
by his principal. 
Thompson v. Finch, 195 N.W. 744, 744-45 (Iowa 1923) (deciding a case where the property 
owner defended against the broker's suit to recover commission by claiming fraudulent 
misrepresentation on the part of the broker). 
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upon brokers in the ordinary course, brokers would develop an expertise and 
efficiency in conducting these investigations that property owners would likely 
never be capable of developing. 
Finally, the ready, willing, and able rule leaves open the possibility of fraud 
or a conspiracy between the broker and a prospective purchaser. It is not hard 
to imagine a situation where the broker knowingly produces a purchaser who 
has no intention of going through with the deal, but, by presenting the 
purchaser as a ready, willing, and able, the broker becomes entitled to a 
commission despite the ultimate failure of the sale through buyer default.61 
Courts have used several doctrines to deal with this problem, including breach 
of fiduciary duty62 and the general tort of misrepresentation.63 Additionally, 
courts have attempted to guard against misrepresentation and conspiracy 
through the substance that they have given to the terms "ready," "willing," and 
"able."64 Consequently, while the ready, willing, and able rule does account 
61
 See e.g., White \. Boucher. 322 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1982) (finding that broker's 
failure to disclose pertinent adverse information regarding prospective buyer" s inability to 
go through with transaction constituted breach of broker's fiduciary duty to seller). 
62
 Id. 
63
 BURKE, supra note 14, at 8:9-8:16. Professor Burke sets forth the nine element of the 
tort of misrepresentation: 
(1) a representation 
(2) which is false and 
(3) material to the plaintiffs transaction, and 
(4) which the broker knows to be false or does not know to be true, but which the 
broker makes 
(5) with the intent that the plaintiff act on it 
(6) while ignorant of its falsity and 
(7) relying on its truth; 
(8) the plaintiff must have been entitled to his or her reliance (it must have been 
reasonable), and 
(9) his or her reliance caused him injury. 
Id. at 8:9. 
54
 The terms "ready" and "willing" have been interpreted together to require that the 
buyer be ready and willing to purchase on terms agreeable to the owner, including not only 
the purchase price, but also the amount of the down payment, E.A. Strout Western Realty 
Agency, Inc. v. Peterson, 585 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978), the possession date, Weittmg v. 
McFeeters, 304 N.W.2d 525 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), and items to be included in the sale, 
Colorado City Dev. Co. v. Jones-Healy Realty, Inc., 576 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1978). See 
GAUDIO, supra note 59, at 196. "Able" has been interpreted to require that the buyer have 
the legal capacity and the financial ability to complete the transaction. Goetz v. Anderson, 
274 N.W.2d 175, 179 (N.D. 1978). Traditionally, the operative time for satisfying these 
terms has been the time at which the buyer and seller reach an initial agreement. See e.g., 
Storm Associates, Inc. v. Baumgold, 440 A.2d 306, 308 (Conn. 1982). Thus, the critical 
time is the time at which the seller "accepts" the buyer and the two parties reach an 
agreement for sale. Generally, a seller "accepts" a buyer when the two enter into an 
agreement, either oral or written, regarding sale of the property. See William Pitt, Inc. v. 
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for this sort of deceit, it does so only by incurring litigation and other 
enforcement costs that a rule that dealt with misrepresentation and conspiracy 
in the first instance would avoid. 
B. The Late Twentieth Century 
In keeping with the decisions of the SJC, nearly every jurisdiction that 
considered the issue during the early part of the twentieth century accepted and 
applied the ready, willing, and able rule.65 In the 1960s, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court was the first to abandon the rule. This prompted the SJC to 
reconsider its position on real estate brokerage contracts—a reconsideration 
that ultimately led to the adoption of a new rule in Massachusetts. 
1. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson 
The New Jersey Supreme Court was the first to break from the ready, 
willing, and able rule. In Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson,66 the New Jersey 
court added two prongs to the ready, willing, and able rule, holding that a 
broker was not entitled to a commission until "( a) he produces a purchaser 
ready, willing and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner, (b) the 
purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner to do so, and (c) the 
Taylor, 438 A.2d 1206 (Conn. 1982) (oral agreement sufficient); Walsh v. Turlick, 316 
A.2d 759 (Conn. 1972). Consequently, in a majority of jurisdictions adhering to the ready, 
willing, and able rule, the prospective purchaser must be willing to purchase on the seller's 
terms and must be legally and financially able to do so at the time the prospective purchaser 
and seller enter into an initial agreement. See GAUDIO, supra note 59, at 208. If, however, 
the prospective purchaser subsequently becomes either unwilling or unable to purchase on 
the seller terms, the purchaser will still be deemed ready, willing, and able. 
65
 In its consideration of the issue, the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides as 
follows: 
If the broker produces a customer who, without misrepresentation as to his assets or his 
intent to purchase, makes a binding contract with the principal, the broker's right to his 
commission is not defeated by a subsequent default on the customer's part, unless the 
principal's promise to the broker is expressed to be conditional upon actual 
performance by the customer, or unless the broker has failed to reveal to the principal 
facts known to him which would indicate the likelihood of such default, or unless he is 
guilty of some similar breach of duty to the principal. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 445 cmt. d (1957). The states expressing support for 
the minority rule from an early date include Maryland, see Riggs v. Turnbull, 66 A. 13 (Md. 
1907) (finding that the legal import of a contract to produce a purchaser binds the broker to 
present a buyer who ultimately buys the property, mere execution of a contract to purchase 
was insufficient), and Rhode Island, see Butler v. Baker, 23 A. 1019 (R.I. 1892) (rejecting 
broker's position that he became entitled to a commission when the buyer and seller entered 
into a contract for sale of the property). 
66
 236 A.2d 848 (NJ. 1967). The Ellsworth Dobbs decision has been extremely 
influential in other jurisdictions, especially Massachusetts. See e.g., Tristam's Landing, Inc. 
v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727, 730-31 (Mass. 1975) (relying heavily on Ellsworth Dobbs in 
reaching its decision). 
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purchaser completes the transaction by closing the title in accordance with the 
provisions of the contract."67 The Ellsworth rule drastically alters the way that 
courts approach real estate brokerage contracts. Under the rule, the purchaser 
must close the transaction before a broker becomes entitled to a commission. 
This ameliorates many of the aspects of the ready, willing, and able rule that 
were so troubling.68 First, the broker bears the risk of buyer default during the 
executory period.69 In addition, the duty of investigation into the buyer 's 
finances falls upon the broker.70 Finally, the Ellsworth rule eliminates the risk 
67
 Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 855. The Ellsworth Dobbs court's view of the facts in 
the case before it provides an interesting contrast to the Alvord court's view of the facts in 
that case. See supra note 35 (discussing the Alvord court's view that the property owners in 
that case had taken insufficient measures to enforce their contract against the defaulting 
purchaser). In Ellsworth Dobbs, the owners entered into a purchase and sale agreement with 
a prospective buyer. Subsequently, the buyer continually failed to generate financing for his 
development plans for the property and thus continually postponed the closing. The buyer 
made two small payments, but after several extensions from the seller, and a suit by the 
buyer against the seller for specific performance, the sellers ultimately released the buyer 
from the contract. Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 847-49. Unlike the SJC in Alvord, in 
Ellsworth Dobbs, the New Jersey Supreme Court believed that the sellers had made a 
reasonable attempt to enforce their agreement against the buyer, despite the ultimate release. 
Id. at 847-48. The court explained its view of the seller's position as follows: 
The property which they were anxious to sell had been tied up for more than a year by 
the [] contract [with the prospective purchaser]. They had been subjected to litigation 
and other expenses. They were advised by their attorneys that further litigation with 
[the prospective purchaser] might well tie up their land for an indefinite period of time. 
So they concluded they had no choice but to "rescind the contract," since they were 
interested in selling the land. 
Id. at 849. 
68
 See supra text accompanying notes 43-46, 55-64 (discussing several of the 
objectionable aspects of the ready, willing, and able rule). 
69
 The New Jersey Supreme Court stated: 
In reason and in justice it must be said that the duty to produce a purchaser able in the 
financial sense to complete the purchase at the time fixed is an incident of the broker's 
business. . . . The risk of [financial] inability at [the time of closing] must be treated as 
a normal incident of the brokerage business. 
Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 853, 855. 
The Ellsworth rule achieves this result by depriving the broker of a commission unless the 
buyer completes the transaction. This puts the risk that the buyer will default at any time 
prior to closing on the broker. Cf. supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (explaining 
that the ready, willing, and able rule puts the risk of buyer default on the seller). 
70
 Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 853 ("[T]he obligation to inquire into the prospect's 
financial status and to establish his adequacy to fulfill the monetary conditions of the 
purchase must be regarded logically and sensibly as resting with the broker."). Under the 
Ellsworth rule, the buyer must close the deal for the broker to earn a commission. This puts 
the duty of investigation on the broker, as under the rule it is crucial for the broker to 
produce a buyer who is capable of completing the transaction. Cf. supra notes 58-60 and 
accompanying text (explaining that the ready, willing, and able rule puts duty of 
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of broker misrepresentation or conspiracy between the broker and the 
prospective purchaser in the first instance.71 The New Jersey Supreme Court 
I demonstrated the strength of its conviction in adopting this rule by making any 
attempt to contract around it void per se as inconsistent with public policy in 
I any case where the parties stood on unequal footing.72 
In Ellsworth Dobbs, the New Jersey Supreme Court was prompted by the 
need to take "[a] new and more realistic approach" to real estate brokerage 
contracts.73 This need was compelled both by the court's view of the 
expectations of the parties in entering into a brokerage contract and by public 
policy considerations. Under its view of the expectation of the parties, the 
court noted that a property owner normally hires a broker with the expectation 
that he will not be liable for a commission unless there is a completed sale of 
the property.74 Indeed, the property owner expects to pay the commission 
from the proceeds of the sale.75 Thus, it would not be consistent with these 
expectations for the court to interpret a brokerage contract to provide for a 
commission in the absence of a completed sale. Additionally, the owner is 
entitled to the reasonable expectation that when the broker produces a 
purchaser who executes a contract on mutually agreeable terms, the buyer will 
investigation on the seller). 
71
 Cf. supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
72
 Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 857-58. The court explained: 
[I]n our judgment public policy requires the courts to read into every brokerage 
agreement or contract of sale a requirement that barring default by the seller, 
commissions shall not be deemed earned against him unless the contract of sale is 
performed. By the same token, whenever the substantial inequality of bargaining 
power, position or advantage to which we have adverted appears, a provision to the 
contrary in the agreement prepared or presented or negotiated or procured by the 
broker shall be deemed inconsistent with public policy and unenforceable. 
Id. The SJC, in its adoption of the Ellsworth rule, took a slightly different approach to the 
enforceability of a broker's attempt to contract around the default rule. See infra note 104 
(explaining that the SJC announced its intention to scrutinize attempts to contract around the 
Ellsworth rule closely, but that such attempts would not be vo ider se). 
73
 Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 852. 
74
 Id. at 853, 855 ("'What must be regarded as the fundamental intendment of the parties, 
owner and broker, i.e., that the owner will sell and the buyer will pay, and the broker will 
thus earn a commission out of the proceeds, cannot be ignored in this connection.")-
75
 Id. at 852. The court quoted at length from Lord Denning: 
When a house owner puts his house into the hands of an estate agent, the ordinary 
understanding is that the agent is only to receive a commission if he succeeds in 
effecting a sale; but if not, he is entitled to nothing. That has been well understood for 
the last 100 years or more. . . . The agent in practice takes what is a business risk: he 
takes on himself the expense of preparing particulars and advertising the property in 
return for the substantial remuneration . . . which he will receive if he succeeds in 
finding a purchaser. . . . The house-owner wants to find a man who will actually buy 
his house and pay for it. He does not want a man who will only make an offer or sign a 
contract. 
Id. at 853-54 (quoting Dennis Reed, Ld. v. Goody, 1950 K.B. 277, 284-85 (Eng. C.A.)). 
2002] ARGUING FOR THE MINORITY RULE 213 
perform.76 Providing the broker with a commission in a case of buyer default 
is inconsistent with this expectation as well. 
Building on these realities of the owner-broker relationship, the court turned 
to public policy. The court expressed its misgivings about several aspects of 
the ready, willing, and able rule.77 In particular, the court noted that the ready, 
willing, and able rule forced the owner to bear the risk of buyer default and to 
investigate the prospective purchaser's resources, preventing the owner from 
relying at all on the broker's good faith production of the purchaser.78 This 
arrangement "puts the burden on the wrong shoulders." Instead, in a more 
equitable arrangement, the broker should bear both the duty of reasonable 
investigation and the risk of buyer default.79 
In the years following the decision, the Ellsworth Dobbs opinion would 
have wide-reaching effects.80 
2. Gaynor v. Laverdure 
It was not long after the Ellsworth Dobbs decision that the issue again 
confronted Massachusetts courts. In Gaynor v. Laverdure}1 the property 
owner and the broker entered into an oral agreement providing for the payment 
of a 10% brokerage commission "on whatever price [the broker] could get a 
ready, willing and able buyer to agree to pay for [the seller's land]."82 The 
broker produced a prospective purchaser who entered into an agreement to buy 
but subsequently defaulted.83 
The court acknowledged that the law concerning real estate brokerage 
commissions as it stood in Massachusetts appeared "unduly favorable to 
-brokers, particularly by permitting brokers to recover commissions for 
procuring customers . . . who at the time fixed for sale may not be ready, 
willing or able to complete the purchase."84 In addition, the court recognized 
76
 Id. at 852-53. 
77
 Id. at 853 (noting that the ready, willing, and able rule was "deficient as an instrument 
of justice"). 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. 
80
 A few of the decisions expressing support for the Ellsworth rule in the years following 
the decision include Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 1377, 1389-90 (Kan. 1974) ("We are 
persuaded by the cogent reasoning in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson . . . and adopt the 
rules stated [therein]/'); Brown v. Grimm, 481 P.2d 63, 65-66 (Or. 197D: Setser v. 
Commonwealth, Inc., 470 P.2d 142, 145-47 (Or. 1970); Staab v. Messier, 264 A.2d 790, 
792 (Vt. 1970) (quoting "with approval" from the Ellsworth decision); and Rogers v. 
HendrixT^P.2d 653, 656 (Idaho 1968). 
81
 291 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. \9iy). ' 
82
 Id. at 619. 
83
 Id. The court specifically noted that the record did not reflect an attempt by the 
property owner to obtain specific performance against the prospective purchaser. Id. 
84
 Id. at 622. 
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the trend, led by Ellsworth Dobbs, towards a rule more favorable to property 
owners 85 Nonetheless, the SJC refused to relinquish its existing rule The 
court justified continued adherence to the ready, willing, and able rule based in 
part on its perception of mitigating factors softening the harshness of the rule 
and in part on the facts in the case before it While the ready, willing, and able 
rule could leave the owner liable for a brokerage commission without proceeds 
to draw from, the court reasoned that this was mitigated by the owner's ability 
to pursue an action for breach of contract or a suit m equity for specific 
performance against the defaulting purchaser86 Moreover, the owner was free 
to contract around this result by including clear and unambiguous language in 
the brokerage contract to the effect that the broker would not be entitled to a 
commission absent a completed sale 87 
In addition to these mitigating factors, the court was persuaded by the facts 
m the case before it The court pointed to Ellsworth's reliance on the 
"substantial inequality of bargaining power, position, or advantage" between 
the broker and the property owner m that case 88 Nevertheless, m Gaynor, 
both the broker and the property owner were licensed real estate brokers, and 
the property owner was actually more expenenced in real estate transactions 89 
Moreover, the property owner had signed the purchase and sale agreement 
only after consulting with his attorney 90 Thus, even if the Ellswoi th rule was 
the superior rule, the facts before the SJC did not provide the appropriate 
vehicle for adopting i t 9 1 
While the court may or may not have made too much of the importance of 
an inequality of bargaining power, position, or advantage to the decision m 
85
 The SJC stated 
We are aware of the fact that in several States in which the general rule of the liability 
of an owner of real estate to a broker procuring a purchaser ready able and willing to 
purchase the real estate was substantially the same as that of Massachusetts, the law 
has been changed bv recent decisions 
Id at 623 
86
 Id at 622 
87
 Id The court made clear that the burden on the owner to contract around the ready, 
willing, and able rule would be an onerous one In its articulation of the burden, the court 
noted that conditioning payment of the commission on payment of the purchase price was 
"legally possible," but "clear and unambiguous language to that effect is necessary to 
accomplish that result ' Id 
88
 Id at 624 (quoting Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc v Johnson, 236 A 2d 843 857 (N J 1967)) 
89
 Id (noting that the facts before court did not present a "case involving a broker and a 
person selling his residence once in his lifetime" and thus it did not in\olve a "substantial 
inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage between the broker and the other 
party involved' (internal quotation marks & citation omitted)) 
90
 Id 
91
 But see mpia note 105 (discussing Massachusetts courts' eventual abandonment of a 
finding of inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage between the propetty 
owner and the seller as a prerequisite to application of the Ellsworth rule) 
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Ellsworth Dobbs,92 the SJC's belief that two mitigating factors—the property 
owner's ability to bring suit against the defaulting buver for indemnification 
and to contract around the default rule—-justified continued adherence to the 
ready, willing, and able rule seems misguided First, a property owner's action 
against a defaulting buyer will produce results m only the rarest of cases The 
typical reason for buyer breach is insufficient funding to complete the 
transaction, and therefore a suit against a defaulting buyer is likely to yield 
only a very small award or no award at all9^ Second, it seems nonsensical to 
put the burden of contracting around the default rule on the party who is less 
experienced m transactions of the sort at issue 94 Rather, a more equitable rule 
would draw the default rule m favor of property owners and put the burden on 
brokers to contract around it 
A few years after Gaynoi, the SJC was faced with a moie appropriate 
vehicle for reconsideration of the ready, willing, and able rule 
3 Ti istam 's Landing Inc v Wait 
Tnstam s Landing, Inc v Wait9* involved a property owner who was 
inexperienced m real estate transactions The owner agieed to allow a bioker 
to show her property to prospective buyers Accordingly, the broker produced 
90
 See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc v Johnson 236 A 2d 843, 857 (N J 1967) The New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the Ellswoi th would be applicable m every case it was m cases 
where there was a 'substantial inequality of bargaining power position or advantage" 
between the property owner and the broker that the court would strike down attempts to 
contract around the rule Id Nonetheless, this portion of the court s holding does nothing 
to disrupt application of the rule in cases not involving this inequality 
93
 GAUDIO, mpia note 59, at 217-18 ("Even though the damages ma> be less than trie 
funds necessary to complete the purchase, there is no reason to believe that the purchaser 
will be any more able to obtain the funds necessary to pay the judgment than to complete 
the purchase ') Professor Gaudio points to two additional reasons why recovery against the 
defaulting purchaser is likely to be ' more theory than reality Id at 217 First the owner 
will have to bear the transaction costs of any suit against a defaulting purchase, and, absent a 
special agreement, these costs cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract Id 
(noting that the relevant transaction costs include attorneys fees courts costs, and loss of 
interest on the recovery in the time between payment to the bioker and reco\ery from the 
buyer) In addition m many situations forcing the seller to pay a broker fee in the absence 
of sale proceeds to draw from will "necessitate the depletion of life savings or the sale of 
other assets to raise, if at all possible, the funds necessary to pay the broker " Id 
94
 See sup? a notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing why it is more equitable for 
courts to establish the default rule in favor of property owners and to put the burden of 
contracting around that rule on brokers) see also GAUDIO, sup? a note 59, at 218 (noting 
that, because "many sellers are involved m real estate transactions infrequently perhaps 
only one m a lifetime, and are thus unfamiliar with their legal rights' it may be more 
appropriate for courts to equalize the position of the parties by drawing the default rule m 
favor of the seller and making the broker contract around it (quoting Tnstam's Landing, Inc 
\ Wait, 327 N E 2d 727 731 (Mass 1975))) 
95
 327 N E 2d 727 (Mass 1975) 
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a buyer who signed a purchase and sale agreement. The purchase and sale 
agreement contained a provision that provided: "It is understood that a broker's 
commission of five (5) percent on the said sale is to be paid to . . . [the broker] 
by the said seller. , ,% After the seller granted the buyer a fifteen-day extension, 
the buyer failed to show at closing and subsequently refused to go through with 
the deal.97 The broker then brought suit to recover the commission.98 
The SJC based its decision in the case before it on the ready, willing, and 
able rule. The court construed the language "on said sale" to make the 
completion of the sale a condition precedent to the broker's right to a 
commission.99 The court did not stop there, however. Instead it went on to 
"join the growing minority of States who have adopted the rule of Ellsworth 
Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson."100 The court quoted at length from the Ellsworth 
Dobbs opinion and expressly adopted Ellsworth's three implied conditions 
precedent to a broker's entitlement to a commission.101 The court reasoned 
that the Ellsworth rule provided the necessary protection for sellers and "places 
the burden with the broker, where it belongs."102 In Massachusetts, brokers 
remained free to alter these implied conditions through clear and unambiguous 
language in their agreements.103 Nonetheless, the court made clear that, in the 
future, it would closely scrutinize attempts to contract around these conditions 
precedent to ensure that they were not void as unconscionable.104 
96
 Id. at 729. 
97
 Id. at 728. The court noted that the seller had not taken formal action against the 
prospective purchaser to recover damages, but that the seller had retained the down 
payment. Id. 
98
 Id. 
99
 Id. at 730 C'[W]e construe the language 'on said sale' as providing for a special 
agreement or as creating special circumstances wherein consummation of the sale became a 
condition precedent for the broker to earn his commission." (internal quotation marks & 
citations omitted)). 
100
 Id. 
101
 Id. at 731. The court adopted the three implied conditions precedent of Ellsworth 
Dobbs in the following passage: 
Thus we adopt the following rules: "When a broker is engaged by an owner of property 
to find a purchaser for it, the broker earns his commission when (a) he produces a 
purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner, (b) the 
purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner to do so, and (c) the purchaser 
completes the transaction by closing the title in accordance with the provisions of the 
contract. If the contract is not consummated because of the lack of financial ability of 
the buyer to perform or because of any other default of his. . . there is no right to 
commission against the seller." 
Id. (quoting Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 855 (NJ. 1967)). 
102
 Id. 
103
 Id. at 731 ("We recognize that this rule could be easily circumvented by language to 
the contrary in the purchase and sale agreements or in agreements between sellers and 
brokers."). 
104
 Id. at 731. In this respect, the SJC broke from the New Jersey Supreme Court's 
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With the Tristam's Landing decision, Massachusetts joined the minority of 
states that interpreted real estate brokerage contracts in favor of property 
owners. In the years following the case, the Massachusetts courts 
demonstrated how far they were willing to stretch the Ellsworth rule.105 
Nevertheless, a majority of states continue to adhere to the ready, willing, and 
able rule.106 
IT. M O D E R N JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE MAJORITY RULE 
Though in recent years many states have subscribed to the reasoning of 
Ellsworth Dobbs and adopted its rule, a majority of states still follow the ready, 
willing, able rule. While the old Massachusetts cases provide some of the 
justifications for the majority rule, courts and commentators have put forth 
several other arguments in favor of the rule in the years since Tristam's 
Landing. This section takes a comprehensive look at the arguments in favor of 
the ready, willing, and able rule. 
The primary justification for the ready, willing, and able rule is that once the 
buyer and the seller have entered into a purchase and sale agreement, the 
position in Ellsworth Dobbs. In Ellsworth Dobbs, the court held that the three conditions 
for entitlement to a real estate brokerage commission were mandatory in cases involving 
inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage between the parties. Ellsworth 
Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 857 (N.J. 1967). That is, any attempt to contract 
around them was per se void as inconsistent with public policy. See supra note 72. On the 
contrary, in Massachusetts, these agreements were not per se unlawful; rather, the SJC 
expressed its intention to scrutinize them closely. Tristam's Landing, 327 N.E.2d at 731-32. 
105
 In particular, Massachusetts courts have made it extremely difficult for brokers to 
contract around the Ellsworth rule. In Currier v. Kosinski, 506 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1987), the contract between the seller and the broker provided that the broker would earn a 
commission if he produced a buyer "ready, willing and able to buy said property in 
accordance with the price, terms and conditions of the Agreement or such other price, terms, 
and conditions as shall be acceptable to the Seller." The Massachusetts Appeals Court held 
that this language was not sufficient to override the implied conditions of Tristam's 
Landing. While the language reflected the first condition of Tristam's Landing, it did not 
explicitly negate the other two conditions. Id. at 896-97. Thus, it did not put the seller "on 
notice that he may incur liability for a broker's commission even though he does not enter 
into a purchase and sale agreement or, if he does, even though the buyer defaults." Id. at 
897. Further, "a provision in a brokerage agreement varying the rule should be made to 
appear with enough specificity to alert the seller to the situations in which he can be liable 
for a brokerage commission even if a sale is not consummated." Id. at 896. The SJC has 
also applied the rule to transactions involving two parties well versed in real estate 
transactions. In Capezzuto v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 476 N.E.2d 188 
(Mass. 1985), the court applied the rule of Tristam's Landing to a transaction where the 
property owner was a large commercial entity, experienced in real estate transactions. 
While the court in Gaynor found a transaction involving two commercial parties an 
inappropriate context for application of the same rule, by the time of Capezzuto, it did not 
give the court a moment's pause. 
106
 BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:3-3:17. 
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broker's duty under the agreement is complete. One of the most detailed 
discussions of this rationale appeared in Gay nor, where the court noted: 
When the broker has produced a customer, his duty is at an end; so far as 
his rights or his duty are concerned, it is immaterial whether a contract is, 
or is not, made, or, if made, whether it is or is not performed. The 
broker's right to a commission is no more dependent upon, or affected by, 
the fact that a contract is, or is not, drawn up and executed, than it is by 
the fact that the contract, if drawn up, is or is not, carried into effect. 
Making or not making a contract with the customer produced, enforcing 
or not enforcing a contract, if made, are matters for the broker's principle 
to do or not to do, as his ability and inclination determine; they are 
matters with which the broker is not concerned, and on which his right to 
a commission is not dependent.107 
Accordingly, some have argued that there is no justification for making a 
broker's entitlement to a commission depend upon the activities of others— 
including abstractors of title, attorneys, and title insurers—over whom the 
broker has no control.108 
Some have taken issue with the Ellsworth rule's placement of the burden of 
buyer default on the broker, arguing instead that the seller is in a better position 
to know the state of the title and therefore better situated to bear the risk that 
the title will prove unmarketable.109 There are two grounds to question this 
reasoning. First, if there is a defect in the title that prevents the seller from 
conveying the property to the buyer, then that would constitute a case for seller 
breach rather than one for buyer breach. In such a case, the Ellsworth rule and 
the arguments in support of it would not apply.110 Nevertheless, the reasoning 
behind holding the seller liable for a commission in a case of seller breach does 
not provide any support, and indeed has no application, in a case for buyer 
breach. Second, it is common for the buyer to arrange financing during the 
107
 Gaynor v. La verdure, 291 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Mass. 1973) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. 
Gilson, 57 N.E.1000, 1000-01 (Mass. 1900) (quotation errors in original)). 
108
 BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:70. 
109
 Id. There are several cases that adhere to this reasoning, each of which involves a 
broker's successful claim for a commission where the broker produced a purchaser who was 
ready, willing, and able to buy, but the property owner was ultimately unable to convey the 
property because a family member refused to convey his or her joint interest in the property. 
See Woodworth v. Vranizan, 539 P.2d 1005 (Or. 1975); Perkins v. Willacy, 431 P.2d 141, 
144 (Alaska 1967); Roy v. Huard, 174 A.2d 41 (Me. 1961); Portis v. Thrash, 229 S.W,2d 
127 (Ark. 1950); Reynolds v. Ashabranner, 207 S.W.2d 304 (Ark. 1948); Chastain v. 
Carrol, 307 So. 2d 491 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); McAlinden v. Nelson, 262 P.2d 627, 627-
29 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953). 
110
 See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 855 (N.J. 1967) ("On the other 
hand, if the failure of completion of the contract results from the wrongful act or 
interference of the seller, the broker's claim is valid and must be paid."); Tristam's Landing, 
Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727, 731 (Mass. 1975) (same); see also supra note 5 (explaining 
that the topic of seller default is outside the scope of this Note). 
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executory period.111 A failure of financing during this time is one of the most 
common causes of buyer default. In such a situation, the broker is at least as 
well suited as the seller to be aware of the possibility that the deal will fail, and 
therefore at least as well suited to bear the risk of default.112 
The proponents of the ready, willing, and able rule also argue that in the 
event of buyer default, the seller can bring a legal claim against the breaching 
buyer for damages, while the broker, not being a party to the contract, 
cannot.113 As a result of this cause of action, they argue that the broker is in a 
better position to absorb the buyer's breach.114 Moreover, they argue, if the 
seller decides not to sue, he can recover the commission by increasing the 
asking price when re-listing the property.115 This argument fails as the seller's 
right against the breaching buyer is likely an empty one.116 In reality, a seller's 
claim is likely to entail high transaction costs and is unlikely to yield a 
worthwhile recovery.117 Further, the argument that a seller who is liable for a 
brokerage commission on a failed sale can simply re-list the property to take 
111
 BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:70. 
112
 See also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (explaining why the broker is 
better situated to investigate the prospective purchaser's finances). 
113
 BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:70-3:71. But see Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A. 2d at 859-61 
(allowing the broker to proceed with a claim against the breaching buyer). In Ellsworth 
Dobbs, the court held that the buyer's liability to the broker was a jury question that 
depended on the nature of the relationship between the broker and buyer. Id. at 861. More 
specifically, it hinged on whether the buyer made an implied promise to the broker at the 
time of signing the contract. The New Jersey Supreme Court later explained the theory: 
[W]hen a buyer solicits a broker's services in finding a suitable property, the buyer 
impliedly contracts with the broker that, if the latter produces a property which the 
buyer agrees to purchase, he will complete the transaction through the broker so that 
the latter will receive his commission from the seller, and that, if the buyer does not do 
so, he will be liable for the commission. 
McCann v. Biss, 322 A.2d 161, 167 (N.J. 1967). Subsequent commentary has been 
skeptical of this theory. BURKE, supra note 14, at 4:48. 
114
 BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:71. 
115
 Id. 
116
 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the problems, in practice, with a 
seller's claim against a buyer); GAUDIO, supra note 59, at 217-18 (detailing the difficulties 
that a seller will likely experience in an action against a breaching buyer). 
117
 GAUDIO, supra note 59, at 217-18. There is a counter argument to this point that the 
seller often is in possession of the buyer's down payment and thus can draw from those 
funds in paying the broker. While a down payment will likely be insufficient to cover the 
broker's fee, certainly in most cases the down payment will not cover the seller's expended 
costs in attempting to go through with the transaction to the point of buyer breach in 
addition to the brokerage fee. Courts have not overtly considered down payments, and it 
does not appear to have played a role in their decisions. See e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs. 236 
A.2d at 850 (noting that the Johnsons had received small payments under the contract); 
Tristam's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727, 728 (Mass. 1975) (noting that the sellers 
had retained the breaching buyer's down payment). 
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account of the paid commission is overstated It is hard to imagine that a 
rational, profit-maximizing seller and broker would not list the property for the 
highest possible price m the first instance This would eliminate the realistic 
prospect of sale if the seller attempted to raise the pi ice furthei In addition, 
adding lost brokerage commissions to the sale price of property would add an 
artificial increase to the price of property, thereby interfering with the market's 
ability to price accurately 
There is also the argument that under the majority rule, though legally 
entitled to a commission at the time of the purchase and sale, the broker retains 
an incentive to remain involved m the transaction m In particular, the broker 
has an incentive to remam involved m arranging financing or attending to the 
details of closing 1I9 Under this argument, the incentive of the broker will \ary 
among jurisdictions, depending on which version of the ready, willing, and 
able rule that the jurisdiction has adopted 120 Contrary to this argument, it is 
the Ellsworth rule that provides an incentive for brokers to remain involved in 
the transaction, while the ready, willing, and able rule creates an incentive for 
the broker to move on to the next deal as soon as the buyer accepts the seller 
121
 As a result, any argument based on broker incentives can only be an 
argument in favor of the Ellsworth rule 
A final argument for the ready, willing, and able rule is that the seller is 
better able to absorb the loss incurred when a buyer breaches 122 As a factual 
matter, this proposition is questionable 123 Moreover, even if true, a broker, by 
the nature of his business, assumes exactly this sort of risk 124 Thus, this risk 
should be treated as an incident of the brokerage business, and a property 
owner's ability to absorb the loss is therefore of no consequence 125 
118
 BURKE, supra note 14, at 3 69 
119
 Id Potential reasons for a broker to remain involved m the transaction beyond the 
signing of the purchase and sale agreement include the prevention of potential litigation 
costs, see supia text accompanying notes 132 33, and the attempt to gam an ad\antage over 
competitors by prouding superior services 
120
 See supra note 64 (discussing the meaning gi\en to "ready willing, and able' 
formulation) 
121
 See infia Part IH (discussing the incentives created by the Ellswoith rule and the 
ready, willing, and able rule) 
122
 BURKE, supra note 14, at 3 71 ("The vendor's income and livelihood are not at 
stake—the broker s are ) 
123
 See GAUDIO, supia note 59, at 211 ("For many sellers [payment of the brokerage 
commission without the proceeds from a completed sale] will necessitate the depletion of 
life savings or the sale of other assets to raise if at all possible, the funds necessary to pay 
the broker *) 
124
 See FARMSWORTH supra note 8, at 582, Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc v Johnson, 236 A 2d 
843, 855 (NJ 1967) 
125
 As discussed supra text accompanying notes 57-58 the broker can account for this 
risk by increasing the price of commission on a completed sale, while property owners are 
largely incapable of dealing with it 
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in ARGUING FOR THE MINORITY RULE 
Courts should apply the Ellsworth mle when interpreting leal estate 
brokerage contracts As the preceding discussion indicates, the reasomng 
employed by the courts that have adopted the Ellswoith rule illustrates its 
supenonty to the ready, willing, and able rule The Ellswoith rule takes better 
account of the bargaining power, skill, and understanding of the bioker and the 
property owner m a typical real estate transaction As a repeat player, in the 
ordinary case, the broker is better situated to bear the risk of buyer default,126 
to shoulder the duty of investigation into the prospective buyer's finances,127 
and to contract around an adverse default position through clear and 
unambiguous language 128 Moreover, interpreting ambiguous language in 
favor of property owners produces a result that is more consistent with the 
realities of a real estate transaction and the expectations of property owners m 
those transactions 129 Furthermore, this interpretation better effectuates the 
intent of the parties 13° Finally, the reasons provided m support of the ready, 
willing, and able rule fail to justify its application 131 
In addition to the reasons that courts have expressed m then opinions there 
are thiee efficiency considerations that courts have not explicitly relied on that 
also argue in favor of interpreting ambiguous language m favor of property 
owners These three efficiency considerations derive from three underlying — 
factors the incentives that brokers have to remain involved m real estate 
transactions during the executory period, the accuracy of the relationship 
between the services that brokers supply and the fees that they receive, and the 
degree of broker accountability for the prospective purchaser Each of these 
factors in some way affects the efficiency of real estate transactions, and each 
resulting efficiency consideration supports courts' employment of the 
Ellswoi th rule 
When dealing with ambiguous language in real estate brokerage contracts, 
courts should consider the incentives that different interpretations will give to 
brokers The Ellsworth rule and the ready, willing, and able rule create 
opposite incentives for brokers The Ellswoith lule creates an incentive for 
brokers to remam involved m transactions through the time of closing The 
ready, willing, and able rule, on the other hand, creates an incentrve for brokers 
to move on to the next transaction immediately after the buyer and seller reach 
an agreement 
The disparate incentives that these rules produce stem from the nature of the 
biokerage business Under the commission pay structure which is widely used 
in the brokerage industry, a broker maximizes his profits by completing as 
See supi a notes 56-57 and accompanying text 
See supia notes 58-60 and accompanying text 
See supi a text accompanying notes 44-45 
See supia notes 74-76 and accompanying text 
See supia note 44 and accompanying texi 
See supia Part II 
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many deals as possible A broker has limited resources and thus has a stiong 
incentive to put those resources to the most profitable use Undei the ready, 
willing, and able rule, these considerations prompt a profit-maximizing broker 
to move to the next deal immediately after earning a commission on the first 
Stated from the bioker's standpoint, it would be a waste of valuable lesources 
to spend any tune at all on a deal where he has already earned everything that 
he can To the contrary, under the Ellswoith rule, a broker has an incentive to 
remain involved m the transaction through closing, and if the buyei breaches at 
any point prior to that, the broker will not receive a commission 
The counterargument is that a broker does retain an incentive to remain 
involved m a deal through closing under the ready, willing, and able rule 
Otherwise the broker may incur litigation costs if forced to sue to collect a 
commission after buyer default during the executory period, while the broker 
does not incur these costs if the deal goes smoothly.132 Under this argument, 
the broker retains an incentive to remain involved because these potential 
litigation costs will prevent his gam expected from moving on to the next 
transaction from outstripping his expected loss from doing so Nevertheless, it 
is unlikely that property owners, faced with adverse court opimons, would 
refuse to pay m a sufficient number of cases to make the broker's decision to 
move on to the next deal an irrational one 133 Thus, this argument likely fails 
While brokers have different incentives under these different schemes of 
interpretation, there remains the question of which incentive is more optimal 
from a societal standpoint That is, is it better for society if the role of a broker 
is confined solely to acting as a reputational intermediary, merely providing a 
means for a buyer and seller to meet and subsequently attempt to work out a 
deal on their own7134 Or instead, should the broker stay active m the deal, 
132
 This aigument is bolstered by the fact that, in litigation under the ready, willing, and 
able rule, the broker bears the burden of proving that the purchaser was ready, willing, and 
able to buy on the owner's terms at the time the agreement was entered into Gaynor v 
Laverdure, 291 N E 2d 617, 621 (Mass 1973) 
133
 The broker's determination in this situation would involve a weighing of the expected 
costs of litigation m a certain percentage of cases against the expected benefit of getting a 
jump on the next deal As the textual discussion indicates, the rational choice for the broker 
is likely to be moving on to the next deal Under the case law m jurisdictions subscribing to 
the ready, willing, and able rule, a property owner is unlikely to litigate a case where the law 
is directly against him If the property owner decides to get involved in legal action, he has 
a much stronger case, and thus is much more likely to proceed against, the defaulting buyer 
than he is to defend against the suing broker In addition, even if the broker is forced to 
recover the commission m court, the possibility of summary judgment lowers the expected 
litigation costs of the broker, thereby reducing the calculated loss under this course of 
action At the same time, the broker's expected benefit from getting a jump on the next deal 
is hkel> to be significant 
134
 See 15 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 84C 01, at 84C-4 to 84C-7 (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed , 2001) The Powell treatise defines a broker as "an agent who, for a commission or fee 
is employed by a principal to negotiate the sale, purchase, lease, or exchange of real 
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assisting the parties m their negotiations and helping to ensure that the deal 
goes through9 
From a societal peispective, the more desirable incentive stiucture is the one 
that encourages biokers to lemam involved in deals The socially optimal 
function for brokers goes beyond merely mtroducmg the two parties, instead 
brokers should actively participate m the deal itself, and, m so doing help the 
deal to close A structure where brokers fill this role benefits society by 
preventing waste of the resources that have already been expended m bringing 
the deal to the point of potential failure Brokers are uniquely situated to 
effectuate this result Not only do brokers have funds invested m the deal that 
they can use to help in the negotiations, but, because they are routinely 
involved in real estate transactions, they have an accumulated knowledge that 
they can employ to help parties work through common sticking points 
A simple example illustiates this point Suppose a property owner hires a 
broker to assist m the sale of his house m exchange for a commission of 5% of 
the sale price The broker subsequently introduces the seller and a prospective 
purchaser The two parties agree on a price of $100,000 and enter into a 
purchase and sale agreement During the executory period (peihaps following 
a home inspection), the prospective buyer decides that he has agreed to pay too 
much for the house and is willing to walk away from the deal if forced to pay 
anything more than $90,000 This represents a significant peicentage of the 
purchase price, and is a potential deal breaker While there is a possibility that 
the buyer and seller can work something out without outside assistance 
(perhaps through the buyer agreeing to lower the sale price or through some 
other compromise), a more likely scenario for the deal staying mtact exists if 
the broker remains involved First, the broker has undoubtedly faced this 
scenario in the past and thus can piovide a mechamsm to help the parties leach 
agieement Moreover, the bioker can offer part of his commission to increase 
the range of possible agreement points between the parties Faced with the 
potential alternative of losing his commission entirely, the bioker may suggest 
that the owner take $5000 off the asking price, while the broker will take 
$2500 off his commission, possibly salvaging the deal While in tins scenano 
the broker lelmquishes half of his commission, tins may provide an attractive 
alternative to taking a chance on a full commission from a new buyer Starting 
over with a new buyer entails the accrual of additional costs to re-list the 
property to a third party " Id at 84C-4 (emphasis added) On the contiary, if the broker is 
specifically employed merely as a "finder," the broker's duty is merely to "find a 
prospective purchaser, introduce the parties, and then leave the negotiations to the buyer and 
seller" Id at 84C-7 The determination of whether a broker was hired as a "broker' or as a 
"finder" is a question of fact that depends on the agreement between the parties Id 
Logically, a bioker employed as a "broker' in this sense would command a higher 
commission than a broker employed as a "finder " This Note uses the term "broker ' to refer 
to one "employed by a principal to negotiate the sale purchase, lease, or exchange of real 
pioperty to a third party," rather than to refer to a brokei uho is employed to act as a 
"findei 
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property and the possible loss of the commission entirely if the property proves 
difficult to resell or if the listing agreement is non-exclusive.135 
Active involve from the broker during the executory period creates a much 
higher likelihood that the deal will close than if the buyer and the seller are the 
only parties working to complete the deal. As noted above, this helps to 
prevent a waste of the resources that have already been expended on the deal 
and additionally ensures that the property is sold for a value unencumbered by 
tangential considerations.136 Consequently, because the Ellsworth rule creates 
an incentive for broker to engage in this level of involvement, it leads to the 
more efficient result, and, in this respect, it is the more desirable rule from a 
societal standpoint. 
Next, as the preceding discussion indicates, under the ready, willing and 
able rule, brokers have an incentive not to remain involved in real estate 
transactions after the point at which the buyer and seller reach an initial 
agreement. If brokers do not remain involved after this point, the only thing 
that brokers provide is a reputational intermediary through which buyers and 
sellers may meet, leaving the parties on their own to work out the deal after the 
initial agreement. Given this situation, in ready, willing, and able jurisdictions 
the commissions that brokers charge are clearly excessive in relation to the 
services that they provide and the risk that they bear. This, of course, is an 
inefficient allocation of resources. Nevertheless, the situation is a difficult one 
to resolve. Property owners will be largely incapable of correcting the 
overpayment because they suffer from a collective action problem. But, on the 
other hand, courts have a ready mechanism to alleviate this problem. If courts 
apply the Ellsworth rule, it will force brokers either to provide services that are 
more commensurate with their fees by remaining involved in transactions 
through the time of closing and bearing the risk of buyer breach, or, in the 
alternative, to contract around the Ellsworth rule, and in so doing to set out 
exactly when they will become entitled to a commission and exactly what risk 
the property owner will bear. The latter scenario will provide property owners 
with a clearer understanding of their agreement with brokers and will help 
them to recognize exactly what services the broker will and will not provide 
and in what circumstances the broker will be entitled to a commission. This 
recognition will prompt individual owners to adjust the commission rate when 
brokers alter the default rule.137 This will benefit society by helping to correct 
235
 Under a non-exclusive listing agreement, more than one broker lists the property, and 
only the successful broker earns a commission on the sale. BURKE, supra note 14, at 2:13-
2:14 (describing the "open listing," under which the first broker to produce an acceptable 
purchaser earns the commission). 
136
 If the property owner is forced to re-list the property after buyer breach, he may be 
forced to factor other considerations into the re-list price, including the lost brokerage fee, 
the lost time spent on the failed transaction, and other costs associated with the failed sale. 
This may result in an asking price that does not accurately reflect the value of the property, 
which in turn may hurt the accuracy of pricing in the overall market. 
137
 The collective action problem mentioned above will not be present in this situation, 
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the existing inefficient allocation of resources in ready, willing, and able 
jurisdictions. 
Finally, while generally the broker acts as the agent of the seller, society 
benefits from the broker being accountable, to some extent, for the provided 
purchaser. If the broker produces a quality purchaser—one who completes the 
transaction rather than merely signing a purchase and sale agreement—society 
receives the benefits that flow from real estate deals closing more efficiently. 
These benefits include a reduction in transaction costs incurred in closing and a 
decrease in the amount of time that it takes for a deal to close. As a result, a 
rule that makes a broker more accountable for the provided purchaser is more 
desirable from a societal standpoint. Clearly, the Ellsworth rule makes a 
broker more accountable for the prospective purchaser than the ready, willing, 
and able rule. Though under any rule a broker faces potential reputational 
harm by producing a buyer who does not complete the transaction, the 
Ellsworth rule creates an additional incentive for the broker to produce a 
capable buyer. Under the Ellsworth rule the broker's commission is 
completely dependent on the closing of the deal, and therefore brokers will 
endeavor in the first instance to find a purchaser who will not breach. 
Moreover, once the buyer and seller enter into a purchase and sale, the broker's 
incentive is to close the deal as quickly and as quietly as possible. As a result, 
the broker will do everything in his power to ensure that the deal goes 
smoothly. These contributions from the broker will streamline the executory 
period, as sellers will be provided with superior purchasers, and brokers will 
lend their expertise to help move the transaction along. This will reduce the 
transaction costs incurred in closing and diminish the time that it takes to close 
deals, which will increase the efficiency of real estate deals and in turn benefit 
society. 
CONCLUSION 
As the preceding discussion has indicated, the Ellsworth rule is the correct 
one for courts to apply when dealing with real estate brokerage contracts. As 
the reasons given by courts in their opinions illustrate, the Ellsworth rule helps 
to balance the scales between property owners and brokers in real estate 
transactions. Moreover, as this Note explains, the rule also benefits society by 
preventing waste of the resources that have been expended on deals to the 
point of potential failure, helping to establish compensation levels for brokers 
that are more commensurate with the services that brokers provide and 
because the broker will be the party attempting to alter the status quo. The Ellsworth rule 
establishes the baseline set of services that a broker will have to provide m order to earn a 
given commission. If the broker attempts to contract around this default position in clear 
and unambiguous language, the services that the broker will provide and the risk that the 
property owner will bear will be laid bare for the property owner. As a result, it is unlikely 
that the property owner will agree to a modification to the default position unless the broker 
lowers his commission. 
226 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:195 
reducing the transaction costs of deals themselves. Each of these effects 
enhances the overall efficiency of real estate transaction which benefits 
society. Moreover, as a result of these considerations, the Ellsworth rule may 
actually benefit brokers in the long run, as it will reduce the tangential costs 
that property owners incur in real estate transactions. This will result in an 
increase in the value to property owners of the services that brokers provide, 
which in turn will be reflected in the commissions that brokers command. 
